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PALESTINE

3 JAN 1947

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ALC/17

HC ARAB LEGION,
AMMAN,
TRANSJORDAN.

14th December, 1946.

3 JAN

Dear Beeley

This is primarily to introduce Colonel Lash of the Arab Legion, who is in England to do a course. He knows most of what is going on in these parts.

I have also ventured to send by him a copy of my latest screed to give to you. I sent two copies to Furlonge a little time ago, but they crossed a letter from him to me to the effect that he was leaving the Foreign Office. All the same, I expect he will have sent them to you, but in case he did not, Lash has a spare copy. If you do not want it, he can keep it.

I feel very hesitating about constantly writing long memoranda and apparently offering advice to my seniors and betters. I hope they are not annoyed! If so, can you assure them of my due humility?

Of course we have no indication as to what the Palestine Solution is to be, but we are chiefly concerned if by any chance partition be adopted, with the incorporation of Arab Palestine with Trans-Jordan. In this connection, we are locally increasingly impressed with the importance of speed of implementation, once a decision is made public. The situation has become potentially more difficult lately, owing to the return of the Mufti and all the Arab extremists. The Arabs have not done anything yet, but that is only because they do not think the time has come. But inside Palestine, the Mufti's party has won all the prestige.

I am afraid that if partition were decided upon, implementation might be delayed for months and months, while U.N.O. argue and wrangle, while Russia constituted herself chanpion of the Arab cause. This might give us a very bad time. I am sure that His Majesty's Government will realize the immense importance of speedy implementation from the point of view of local public security. Ninety per cent of the Palestine Arabs are bewildered and hesitating, and will follow any firm lead and bow before any determined action. But if long periods of uncertainty are involved, the extremists will undoubtedly swing them.

The second point which I have ventured to submit is the idea of postponing the fixation of the frontier. I think both sides might accept (or at least not very violently resist) the principle of partition, but that the battle would then be transferred to the question of fixing the frontier.

be, one side or other may resist forcibly, although they would not have resisted the principle of partition if the frontier had been more favourable. The worst that could happen would be that His Majesty's Government announce that Jaffa will be in the Arab State, and then that implementation be delayed for several months. This would provide the ideal slogan for an Arab rising "Save Jaffa".

I submit that if partition were to be decided on, the first announcement would lay down three zones—the Jewish area, the Arab area and the Frontier belt. The frontier belt would cover the most favourable reasonable solution from the Arab point of view and from the Jewish point of view. This would keep both sides guessing as to where the actual frontier was going to be, until all the U.N.O. talking was over. Then partition could be implemented by giving the obviously Jewish area to the Jewish state and the obviously Arab area to the Arabs and still keeping the frontier belt under British control, and both sides guessing.

Once the Jewish State had been set up and the Arab areas taken over by Trans-Jordan, partition would be a fait accompli. It could never be undone, and also the whole problem would cease to be front page news all over the world. Then we could start fixing the actual frontier mile by mile.

This and similar arguments could be used before U.N.O. to justify postponement of frontier fixation until after the principle of partition had been accepted. These arguments are moreover perfectly true, not merely sophistry.

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Reference: FO 371 61858

I note with some alarm that the press is beginning to refer to partition as the Jewish plan. There is a great danger that the Arabs, (if we do have partition) will not believe we have adopted it on its merits. We shall be charged with rejection of the Arab plan and acceptance of the Jewish plan. It is really of great importance to ensure that the Jews reject any scheme we choose! If they are likely to accept it, it should be made more unfavourable so as to ensure that they reject it. The ideal would be for both sides to reject, but neither side to be so displeased as to resist with arms (excepting of course for a minority of extremists).

I am sorry to write at such length.

Harold Beeley, Esq., Foreign Office, Whitehall,

/THMB

London.


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Last Paper.

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This opinion which is summarised in para. 7) will be submitted to the Lord thanks for an Monday.

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
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(Draft Cabinet paper)

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Palestine: Reference to United Nations.

The Legal Advisers of the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office have prepared the annexed paper on the legal position of His Majesty's Government, in relation to the United Nations, in the event of their deciding either to partition Palestine or to introduce a system of provisional autonomy in that country. The Lord Chancellor and the Attorney General are in agreement with this paper and with the following conclusions, to the third of which they attach particular importance.

- 1. We should be legally obliged to obtain the approval of the United Nations before putting partition into effect.
- 2. From a strictly legal point of view, it would not be necessary to obtain the previous assent of the United Nations for the introduction of provisional autonomy.

J. It would be most unwise politically to attempt to give effect to either solution without first bringing the matter before the United Nations. In the case of provisional autonomy, the political arguments outweigh the any legal arguments.

If a proposal for provisional autonomy were brought before the United Nations, it would probably be presented in the form of a draft trusteeship agreement. It is, to say the least of it, questionable whether we could secure approval for a trusteeship agreement on these lines, in view of the requirements under Article 79 of the Charter/that the terms of trusteeship "shall be agreed upon by the p.

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states directly concerned", because the Arab states would certainly have a claim to be states directly concerned, and they would not assent. On the other hand, our political position would be strengthened if we could show that we had attempted to obtain the trusteeship agreement in accordance with the Charter. We might in fact, secure a majority vote in favour of the policy we wished to follow, and should thus have some degree of international backing although we should have been able formedly to comply with all the requirements of the Charter.

7th January, 1947.

Reference: **FO** 371 61858

Pager to

Draft Cabinet paper.

Palestine: Reference to United Nations.

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Legal Advisers of the Foreign
Office and the Colonial Office have prepared
the annexed paper on the legal position of
His Majesty's Government, in relation to the
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in that country. The Lord Chancellor and the
Attorney-General are in agreement with this
paper and with the following conclusions, to
the third of which they attach particular
importance.

- l. We should be legally obliged to obtain the approval of the United Nations before putting partition into effect.
- 2. From a strictly legal point of view, it would not be necessary to obtain the previous assent of the United Nations for the introduction of provincial autonomy.
- 3. It would be most unwise politically to attempt to introduce either provincial autonomy or partition without first bringing the matter before the United Nations. In the

6185

the case of provincial autonomy, the political arguments for so doing outweigh any legal arguments.

If a proposal for provincial autonomy were brought before the United Nations, it must presumably be presented in the form of a draft trusteeship agreement. In principle, there would be considerable support in the United Nations for the idea that Palestine ought to be put under trusteeship. But it is, to say the least of it, questionable whether we could secure approval for a trusteeship agreement on these lines, in view of the requirement under Article 79 of the Charter that the terms of trusteeship "shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned, because the Arab states would certainly have a claim to be state directly concerned, and they would not assent. the other hand, our political position would be strengthened if we could show that we had brought We might our proposals before the United Nations. in fact, secure a majority vote in favour of the policy we wished to follow, and should thus have some degree of international backing for our policy even if we could not obtain a formal trusteeship agreement.

8th January, 1947.

Minutes. Private Secretary Eastern Department United Nations Department

OF THE PUBLIC

RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Mr. Roberts-Wray and I have just seen the Lord Chancellor and the Attorney-General about Palestine. Both the L.C. and the A.G. state that they agree entirely with the note which To summarize their attitude we gave to them. very shortly, it is as follows:-

- 1. We should be legally obliged to obtain the approval of the United Nations for partition.
- 2. Strictly legally, we need not obtain the assent of the United Nations for provincial autonomy.
- 3. Most important, they both consider that we should be politically most unwise to attempt either provincial autonomy or partition without first bringing the matter before U.N.O. They both stress that the political arguments outweigh the legal arguments in this matter.

They are both aware that, if we do bring before U.N.O. a proposal for provincial autonomy, and that we think means for trusteeship containing these two elements, it is to say the least of it questionable whether a trusteeship agreement will go through under Article 79 because the Arab states will certainly have a claim to the states directly concerned, and they will not assent. On the other hand, our political position would be much better if we can show that we have done everything we can and brought our proposal before U.N.O. where, even if we cannot get a trusteeship agreement passed on this basis we may get a majority view for the policy which we wish to follow, or at any rate a majority view in favour of some policy.

1. ABrenett 6th January, 1947.

to be Written in this Margin.

PALESTINE Fuluro of Polistino, Reference & UNO. Hales that there is no Regal ally along and "I fater Hales that there any new policy for Palestine before u. n. o. for approval thought to My is he have the procedure would be the the thing the procedure would be the Arapt terms of trusteesting as was in Dec 1946 done for the approan mandalis. Received in Registry 13 FOUN. 1947 (Minutes.) € 140/115/31 un 4322/wn3156 United Nations Department agree that this References. paper should be entered E. E. 9509/4/31 It is to be noted that Foreign Office opinion on the question raised by Sir George Gater has been modified since Mr. Beckett wrote the memorandum referred to in paragraph 2 of the enclosed letter. Our revised view is stated in a minute to New York at E 10911. (Print.) The proposal which the Colonial Office are now putting before us is that, if we do not decide to place Palestine under trusteeship, but adopt a policy which would result in its early independence (How disposed of.) either as a unitary State or under a scheme of partition, we should inform the United Nations of our intention, without, however, formally seeking their The reasons advanced for this course are summarised in paragraph 7 of Sir George Gater's letter:-(1) that there is nothing in the Charter to provide for the specific approval of the United Nations on this hypothesis; (2) that we should avoid the disadvantage imposed on States making proposals in the General Assembly by the rule of procedure which requires them to obtain a two-thirds majority. If we were merely informing the Assembly, it would be for any delegation opposing our intentions to rally two-thirds

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but it does not appear to take sufficient account of the terms of the resolution carried at the final session of the League of Nations Assembly (paragraph 3 (a) of Sir George Gater's letter). This resolution speaks of agreement between the United Nations and the mandatory Power, and it seems doubtful whether the procedure now suggested by the Colonial Office would result in anything which could properly be called an

The first reason is of course technically sound

of the votes, and we sould avoid condemnation by

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securing one-third only.

agreement/

agreement. On the second or procedural argument, I should have thought it would not be difficult for a hostile delegation to manoeuvre us into a position in which we were compelled after all to propose a resolution ourselves. If I am right in this, it would probably be more advantageous to take the initiative from the outset.

Sir George Gater suggests (Paragraph 10) an interdepartmental discussion on the points raised in his letter. I have spoken to Mr. Heathcote-Smith and we think, subject to the views of the Legal Adviser, that we can be ready to meet the Colonial Office by Wednesday or Thursday of next Week.

? Inform Colonial Office accordingly.

Legal Adviser.

United Nations Dept.

4. Being

7th December, 1946.

It seems to me that, notwithstanding the lines of the Revolution adopted at the final taxes session of the League, we soight get away with simple notification of samething on the lines of the arab plan; but that we certainly should not get away with comple wiffication of partition.

A meeting to discuss the position serbainly seems desirable.

1 / g/ v " 10/2 12

I think it would be best to have a meeting and to thrash the matter out in this way. If time is not very important, it would be a great advantage if the meeting were postponed until the Delegation are back from the U.N.O. Assembly. There are many points in this letter where, for instance, Mr. Poynton would be very helpful. Lastly, if there is a meeting and I am to be present at it, I should like to have in my hands at the meeting (1) a copy of my opinion in E 9509, (2) a copy of the little note to Mr. Dixon in E 10911, and (3) a copy of Sir G. Gater's letter.

10th December, 1946.

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I am in general agreement with the views expressed in Mr. Beeley's minute which I have discussed with him. The experience of the South African Delegation over the case of South-West Africa in the Assembly does not augur well for any simple notification of our intentions. I think, moreover, that any attempt to adopt a solution for Palestine and then inform the United Nations of our intention of applying it would run counter to the Secretary of State's statement to the House of Commons of November 13th, 1945, on the subject of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry for Palestine. At that time Mr. Bevin said that H.M.G. would, after consulting the Arabs, and other parties concerned, prepare a permanent solution for submission to the United Nations and, if possible, an agreed one. I think submitting a solution, and merely notifying the United Nations of a solution are very different things.

2. I agree with Mr. Beckett that it would be best to postpone the proposed meeting until the Delegation are back from New York.

CBHHEatherle Smit

(C.B.B. Heathcote-Smith)

11th December, 1946.

The present sersion of the Assembly has so much for disposal in so few remaining days that there is practically no likelihood of Falishne coming up. I would only add that in the case of South West africa the opposition to South africa had very little difficulty in arganisms itself- and I think that the precedent would be a formidable, one when Falishne came to be considered

Thasa. 12.

I spoke to Mr. Martin on the lines suggested & Mr. Berkett. He tells me that the C.D. would be relectant to delay the meeting much longer. We think however that Mr. Poynton will probably return to Gendon early not week, and I therefore Jagreed

The Legal Advisor and ... Upo concur, in this agreement.

HBeeley

Qy. Arrange a meeting at time?

time. Unless Sin O. Inequate withes

to atome, it thould presumably be in

Sin G. Gater's room.

WM 12/12

Sir Orme Sargent

This paper sets out very clearly the issues which the Palestine question raises as far as concerns the United Nations Organisation aspect. It seems to me pretty clear that whatever solution H.M.G. propose will involve a reference to U.N.O. and that it will also be necessary to get U.N.O.'s approval.

Will you call a meeting?

14th December, 1946.

2. Stowe

Let me have the letter back to read before to meeting NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Reference: FO 371 61858

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Immediate

COLONIAL OFFICE

Downing Street, S.W.1

4th December, 1946.

hydean fargent,

Reference of the Palestine Question to the United Nations

We have been considering the manner in which the palestine question might come up in the United Nations on the initiative either of H.M.G. or of some other party. We felt that some attempt to foresee the broad lines of probable international procedure would assist us in framing policy before the Palestine Conference re-assembles.

The first point to establish seems to us to be that there is no legal obligation on H.M.G. to bring any new policy for Palestine before the United Nations for approval. The United Nations have no automatic jurisdiction over the future of palestine merely by virtue of its being a mandated territory; this is clearly borne out by the use of the words "The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories . as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements" in Article 77 of the Charter, and also by Article 80, paragraph 1, of the Charter. The line at present being taken by the Government of the Union of South Africa about South West Africa is a practical example. I have seen a copy of a minute by the Foreign E. 9509/4/31. Office Legal Adviser which I think confirms this general statement of our legal obligations under the United Nations Charter. The latest instructions to our Delegation at the present General Assembly (Foreign Office telegram No. 1796 of 2nd November to New York) are that any statement on the subject of Palestine should not commit us to seeking the approval of the United Nations for our policy in advance of its application, still less to placing Palestine under

trusteeship

Sir Orme Sargent, KCMG., CB.

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trusteeship.

3. On the other hand, it is I think inconceivable as a matter of practical policy that H.M.G. should embark on some entirely new line in Palestine without bringing the matter before the United Nations at some stage, or should even continue indefinitely with the present regime (if that were possible on other grounds). The following reasons seem to make some reference to the United Nations inevitable:-

(a) At the final session of the League of Nations Assembly on the 18th April, 1946, the U.K. Delegation voted for the following Resolution which was adopted without dissentient vote:-

"The Assembly.

Takes note of the expressed intentions of the Members of the League now administering territories under mandate to continue to administer them for the well-being and development of the peoples concerned in accordance with the obligations contained in the respective Mandates, until other arrangements have been agreed between the United Nations and the respective mandatory Powers."

(b) If the policy eventually adopted by H.M.G. necessitates and involves the continuance of British administration in Palestine, the correct way of regularising the position would be to seek to place Palestine under trusteeship with the U.K. as administering authority. This would mean obtaining the approval of terms of trusteeship by the General Assembly under Article 85 of the Charter, or by the Security Council under Article 83 if it were decided to declare Palestine a strategic area. The

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experience which the South African Government are now going through seems to demonstrate conclusively that it would be politically most unwise for H.M.G. to seek to continue British administration on any other terms than trusteeship. The Soviet Resolution calling on the South African Government to place South West Africa under trusteeship has obviously attracted a good deal of support in the Assembly, though as I write it appears that a less hostile resolution is likely to go through. A resolution on the lines of the Soviet one would admittedly not be binding on the South African Government, nor would it be binding on the U.K. Government as regards Palestine; but in view of the world interest in Palestine and of its strategic importance we should, I imagine, have the very greatest difficulty in getting away with anything else.

(c) Any alternative policy to the continuance of British administration would, in practice, involve the independence of the people of Palestine, either as a unitary State (the Arab proposal) or two States under partition (the Jewish proposal). It is significant that the Soviet Delegate, in the course of the current debate on South West Africa, has put forward the view that trusteeship or independence are the only two courses envisaged by the Charter for mandated territories. The Arab Delegations have expressed similar views in the past. If there were one generally agreed form in which independence could be achieved, as there was in the case of Trans-Jordan, it might be possible to avoid reference to the United Nations by presenting what was obviously a locally acceptable fait accompli. Circumstances being what they are in Palestine, however, it seems inevitable that the opponents of partition or of unitary

independence

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independence as the case may be would challenge our right as Mandatory Power to take such a decision unilaterally, and would use the United Nations as a forum for making their challenge. Further, as discussed at greater length in paragraph 9 below, under any form of partition on the lines hitherto envisaged we might have to obtain United Nations approval for administration of the "Jerusalem enclave" under trusteeship terms. We should therefore have to be ready in practice to meet criticism in the United Nations, even though our policy did not formally require United Nations approval.

(d) Finally, there is always the risk that we might be taken to the Security Council by some member of the United Nations on the grounds that our policy in Palestine was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security (Article 33) or was a "dispute" or "situation" within the meaning of Article 34. It seems unwise to count on this sanction not being used by any aggrieved party if we attempted to put through an unpopular policy unilaterally. We should presumably wish to avoid at all cost being haled before the Security Council, and the best way of doing so would seem to be to take the initiative ourselves in putting the matter of Palestine before the United Nations in some other form.

4. Accepting the necessity of some reference to the United Nations, the next question is that of the time and form of such reference. As regards timing, we would presumably wish to avoid having to make any statement of general policy at the current Assembly, on the grounds that our preliminary consultations are not yet complete (i.e. the Palestine Conference is to resume in December). If so, there will be no

occasion

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occasion for the matter to be raised again until the next General Assembly in September 1947, apart from the risk of our being haled before the Security Council which could of course take place at any time.

The form of reference to the United Nations depends, as we see it, on whether or not we go for trusteeship. If we do, the procedure is quite simple; we should have to table draft terms of trusteeship, as we have done for our African mandates, and the only question for decision would be whether to propose an ordinary or a strategic trusteeship agreement, i.e. whether to go to the Assembly or the Security Council. What is more difficult is to see any likelihood of our getting terms of trusteeship approved by the necessary two-thirds majority. With 54 United Nations, 19 hostile votes would block us. The Soviet Group would probably oppose us in any event; they already command 6 votes, and may have more next year if treaties with the satellites are through by then. It would probably be unwise to count on India, China and other Asiatic States not joining the opposition. The 5 Arab votes would certainly be cast against us unless the terms of trusteeship were framed in such a way as to meet substantially the Arab point of view about the future of Palestine. Consequently, any draft terms of trusteeship we may propose seem almost certain of rejection in the Assembly unless we can swing the Arabs to our side. This is, of course, not by any means an argument for abandoning the whole idea of submitting draft terms of trusteeship, since at first sight it would put us in a stronger position to have done so and have had them rejected rather than never to have submitted a draft at all.

6. There is, of course, the preliminary trusteeship hurdle of getting agreement to the terms by the "states directly concerned" under Article 79, but it is not possible to speculate how this would work out until we know what agreed procedure on the point, if any, will emerge from the present Assembly.

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- 7. On the assumption that we do not go for trusteeship, the right course would seem to be to inform the United Nations of our intentions, as the South African Government have done, but not formally to seek approval. There seem to be two procedural reasons in favour of this course. First, there is nothing in the Charter to provide for the specific approval of the United Nations to be sought except for actual terms of trusteeship. Secondly, it would place the onus on our critics to get a two-thirds majority condemning the policy we had announced.
- As stated above, the only practical alternative to trusteeship seems to be independence in one form or another. It would therefore be an essential part of our procedure under this heading to try to convince the United Nations General Assembly, in informing them of our policy, that the independence which it would give to the people of Palestine was genuine, and in accordance with the general purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. Thus, if we were creating Palestine a unitary independent State, we should have to satisfy opinion in some quarters of the United Nations about the position of the Jewish minority. Similarly, if we were to announce partition, we should have to satisfy opinion in other quarters of the United Nations about the position of the Arab minority in the Jewish State. In the case of partition we should, I think, also have to be ready to meet a further criticism to the effect that the creation of the Jewish State was a threat to the peace and security of the Middle East, on the ground that, for political and economic reasons, its policy would inevitably be expansionist.
- 9. There is a further complication, which I have already mentioned, over announcing to the United Nations a policy of partition. Every partition scheme so far considered has provided for retaining

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some area (varying in size according to the scheme) under permanent British administration. Partition is a division of the country into three parts and not into two. The reasons for this are of course (a) there are certain areas such as Jerusalem which it would be hard to allocate to either a Jewish or an Arab State, (b) it is argued that the Holy Places should be reserved, (c) the desire to retain strategic bases. The net result is that, under partition, we should not be giving independence to the whole country but should be permanently annexing part of it for ourselves, with very mixed motives. It seems most unlikely that this action would not be challenged, and we should no doubt be told that we could only retain portions of Palestine for ourselves by seeking a trusteeship agreement for those areas. If the reserved area were mainly Jerusalem and the Holy Places, certain States might also argue that the correct regime for this reserved area would be an international one. This, as you will recall, was the regime originally proposed in the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 for the whole of Palestine, and I understand that the French only withdrew their claim that it should be an international zone when the implications of the Zionist policy there were appreciated. There would be no such Zionist implications in the Jerusalem enclave, and there might be a renewed demand that the Holy Places should be placed under an international regime. The U.K. claim to be sole guardian might well be challenged by both the Roman Catholic World (led by France) and the Orthodox World (led by the Soviet Union). On the other hand, insofar as the object of the Jerusalem enclave is strategic, there would no doubt be opposition from our military authorities to the setting up of any international regime. This question is, we feel, one of the international implications of partition which requires thought.

10. I should be grateful to have your views on the points covered in this letter. It would, I think, be very convenient if we could draw up a note on the subject

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subject agreed between our two Departments for the guidance of Ministers. I think you will agree that it would be desirable to treat this as a matter of some urgency, particularly since we cannot be sure that the question of Palestine may not be raised at New York before the close of the current United Nations Assembly. Perhaps the best way would be to arrange an inter-departmental discussion as soon as you have had time to study this letter.

11. I am sending a copy of this letter to Ismay.

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C.P. (47) 28

13th January, 1947.

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PALESTINE: REFERENCE TO UNITED NATIONS

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

The Legal Advisers of the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office have prepared the annexed paper on the legal position of His Majesty's Government, in relation to the United Nations, in the event of their deciding either to partition Palestine or to introduce a system of provincial autonomy in that country. The Lord Chancellor and the Attorney-General are in agreement with this paper and with the following conclusions, to the third of which they attach particular importance.

- We should be legally obliged to obtain the approval (1)of the United Nations before putting partition into effect.
- From a strictly legal point of view, it would not be necessary to obtain the previous assent of the United Nations for the introduction of provincial autonomy.
- It would be most unwise politically to attempt to introduce either provincial autonomy or partition without first bringing the matter before the United Nations. In the case of provincial autonomy, the political arguments for so doing outweigh any legal arguments.

If a proposal for provincial autonomy were brought before the United Nations, it must presumably be presented in the form of a draft trusteeship agreement. In principle, there would be considerable support in the United Nations for the idea that Palestine ought to be put under trusteeship. to say the least of it, questionable whether we could secure approval for a trusteeship agreement on provincial autonomy lines, in view of the requirement under Article 79 of the Charter that the terms of trusteeship "shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned", because the Arab States would certainly have a claim to be states directly concerned, and they would not assent. On the other hand, our political position would be strengthened if we could show that we had brought our proposals before the United Nations. We might, in fact, secure a majority vote in favour of the policy we wished to follow, and should thus have some degree of international backing for our policy even if we could not obtain a formal trusteeship agreement.

E.B.

ANNEX

- (1) It seems desirable to begin by giving a rough definition of two terms which it is necessary to employ in the questions which have to be considered. These terms are:-
 - (i) Partition
 - (ii) Provincial Autonomy.
- (i) Partition means the creation of two independent states in Palestine, one Jewish and one Arab and also, a Jerusalem enclave which will not be independent but would be retained under outside administration. The outside administration might be administered by the United Kingdom, or a trusteeship administered by the United Nations as a collectivity or conceivably some other form of shared international administration (compare for instance Trieste).
- (ii) Provincial autonomy means the administrative division of Palestine into two provinces, one Jewish and one Arab and a Jerusalem enclave. Each of the two provinces would have wide powers of self government but the Central Palestine administration would retain:
 - (a) Overriding powers to ensure the fulfilment of the provisions of the Mandate (for instance Article 18 with regard to non-discrimination and Article 21 with regard to antiquities).
 - (b) The preservation of law and order including the police and the Courts and administration of justice (at any rate wholly to begin with, though there would be some possibility of it being transferred in whole or in part as things developed).
 - (c) (Perhaps) certain powers to ensure an equitable distribution of the revenues of the country.
 - (d) Defence
 - (e) Foreign relations.

The Jerusalem enclave would be administered directly by the Central Government. The Central Government of Palestine would remain as at present under the control of the Government of the United Kingdom with a High Commissioner at its head.

- (2) The questions are:-
- (i) Could His Majesty's Government carry out Partition without obtaining the agreement of the United Mations or of any other body or state?
- (ii) Could His Majesty's Government put into force provincial autonomy without obtaining the agreement of the United Nations or any other body or state?

- (iii) If the answer to (ii) is in the affirmative, could His Majesty's Government in putting into effect provincial autonomy couple (without obtaining the agreement of the United Nations or of any other body or state) it with an undertaking that at the end of a transitional period (of, say, five years) either of the provinces could become an independent state if that was clearly the desire of the population of the province in question.
- (3) There are certain basic legal considerations which apply to all three of the above questions. First, there is no legal obligation to place any particular territory, mandated or other, under the United Nations Trusteeship System and the United Nations has no automatic jurisdiction over the future of Palestine merely by virtue of its being a mandated territory. This is clear from Article 77 of the Charter. Paragraph 1 of that Article provides that the Trusteeship System shall apply to such territories in certain categories (one of which is "territories now under mandate") as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements. Paragraph 2 of the same Article re-enforces this by saying:-

"It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms".

Secondly, Article 80, paragraph 1, of the Charter (q.v.) provides in effect that, except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, nothing in the Charter alters any existing international instruments. Clearly the Palestine mandate is one of the existing international instruments.

Some United Mations Members (notably U.S.S.R.) have argued that, (notwithstanding Article 77), paragraph 2 of Article 80 imposes an obligation on Mandatory Powers to place mandated territories under trusteeship. (This provision states that paragraph 1 of Article 80 (mentioned above) shall not be interpreted as giving grounds for delay or postponement. of the negotiation and conclusion of agreements for placing mandated and other territories under trusteeship). an argument however is self-destructive. One of the categories of "other territories" to which the Trusteeship System may be applied (see Article 77) is "territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration". Clearly paragraph 2 of Article 80 cannot impose an obligation to place territories in that category under trusteeship; and since paragraph 2 of Article 80 makes no distinction between mandated and other territories, it cannot impose such an obligation in respect of mandated territories. Paragraph 2 of Article 80 must be read subject to Article 77 and must mean that, once a decision has been taken to place any particular territory under Trusteeship, the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 80 afford no excuse for delay in completing the necessary negotiations in respect of that territory.

Further, at the League of Nations Assembly in April, 1946, Lord Cecil on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom made a declaration in the following

"The future of Palestine cannot be decided until the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry have rendered their report but until the three African territories have actually been placed under trusteeship, and until fresh arrangements have been reached in regard to Palestine - whatever those arrangements may be - it is the intention of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to continue to administer these territories in accordance with the general principles of the existing mandates."

The League Assembly itself passed, without dissentient vote, and with the supporting votes of all the Mandatory Powers, a Resolution which contained the following passage:-

"The Assembly,

Takes note of the expressed intentions of the Members of the League now administering territories under mandate to continue to administer them for the well-being and development of the peoples concerned in accordance with the obligations contained in the respective Mandates, until other arrangements have been agreed between the United Nations and the respective Mandatory Powers."

(4) Question 1. In as much as Partition involves the creation of two independent States, i.e. the cessation of administration by the Mandatory Power in the areas made independent, Partition could not be said to be a continuance of administration in accordance with the obligations contained in the Mandate. Partition would therefore conflict with the undertaking given at the League of Nations Assembly and with the League Resolution quoted above, under which we are already committed to obtaining the agreement of the United Nations for any policy which involves a departure from the provisions of the Mandate.

Moreover, apart altogether from the undertaking to the League of Nations, it must be remembered that His Majesty's Government acquired the Mandate for Palestine under conditions which clearly made it necessary to obtain the assent of the Council of the League of Nations for any change such as Partition (see on this point Article 27 of the Mandate) and in fact when Partition was recommended by the Peel Commission in 1937, His Majesty's Government went to the Council of the League for its approval. The Council of the League has This disappearance, however, does not disappeared. necessarily imply legally that His Majesty's Government are thus free to do what they wish with regard to Palestine without the assent of anybody else. Politically at any rate, there is much to be said for the view that, with the disappearance of the League of Nations, the assent of U.N.O. should be sought and support for such a view is found in the fact that the Union of South Africa brought the question of the future of South West Africa before the United Nations.

Further in the case of Transjordan, which was part of the area covered by the Palestine Mandate, His Majesty's Government did announce to the United Nations their intention to recognize Transjordan's independence, and obtained a unanimous favourable resolution from the General Assembly before negotiating the Treaty of Alliance. Moreover, after

the Treaty had been signed and published, but before it was 3 ratified and came into force, they obtained a similar favourable resolution from the League of Nations Assembly. The Transjordan case therefore is no precedent for unilateral action in respect of any part of Palestine proper.

Finally, the position of the Jerusalem enclave must be considered and as stated in paragraph 1 above this enclave might under Partition be administered in three different ways of which one is some form of trusteeship: if any form of trusteeship were contemplated for the residual portion of Palestine - i.e. the "Jerusalem enclave" - it would be essential to submit a trusteeship agreement to the United In that case, it would be impossible to avoid discussion of the policy as a whole by the United Nations since the United Nations could not consider the merits of the limited trusteeship proposal except in relation to the wider If the Jerusalem enclave were not to be placed under Trusteeship this point would not arise on strictly legal grounds; but for political reasons (set out in paragraph 5 below), there would be the severest criticism in the United Nations Organisation if His Majesty's Government continued to administer this enclave otherwise than under trusteeship and it would be impossible to prevent the matter being raised.

- (5) Question 2. The escential difference between "provincial autonomy" and "Partition" is that provincial autonomy does not involve the cessation of administration of any part of Palestine (excluding Transjordan) by the existing Mandatory Power. It does not therefore give rise to the same difficulties of conflict with Article 80 of the Charter The United Kingdom or the League of Nations Resolution. could continue to implement the obligations of the Mandate under the "Provincial autonomy" scheme because it will retain sufficient legal powers to do so. Further Article 2 of the Mandate provides that the Mandatory is to place the country under such political etc. conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home and the development of self-governing institutions and Article 3 goes on to say that the Mandatory shall encourage local autonomy so far as circumstances permit. Clearly provincial autonomy is directly in accordance with Article 3 and with the development of selfgoverning institutions referred to in Article 2. are any objections the principal ones would be:-
 - (a) that insufficient provision has been made for the Jewish National Home; or
 - (b) that so much has been given to the Jewish National Home that insufficient is left to fulfil the obligation of safeguarding the civil and religious rights of the non-Jewish communities in Palestine. Although the area available for the Jewish National Home would henceforth be limited to the Jewish Province, the Mandate does not in fact provide that the whole of Palestine is to be given up to the Jewish National Home, although the Jews have argued to the contrary. Paragraph 2 of the Preamble refers to a Jewish National Home in Palestine.

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The answer to the Arab argument would be that their civil and religious rights as inhabitants of Palestine would be safeguarded by the fact that one province of Palestine is an Arab province and in the Jewish province His Majesty's Government retain over-riding powers to ensure that there is no discrimination on grounds of race, religion or language there (see Article 15) and that their civil and religious rights are preserved (second paragraph of the Preamble and Article 2). Article 6 refers in addition to the rights and position of other sections of the population and it was on the word "position" that His Majesty's Government based their contention that it was necessary to control Jewish immigration. If Jewish immigration into the Jewish province (which will contain a large Arab minority) is not to be controlled, His Majesty's Government would have to contend that the position (which includes the political position) of the Arabs is secured by the existence of an Arab province. appear, therefore, to be probably no legal necessity to consult the United Nations before putting into effect the scheme of "provincial autonomy" - unless it were proposed to place all or any part of Palestine under Trusteeship.

Nevertheless there are strong political reasons why it would be extremely difficult to defend the continuance of British administration in Palestine except under trusteeship. At the recently concluded Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York the U.S.S.R. and some of their group commented adversely upon the fact that no trusteeship agreements had yet been submitted in respect of South West Africa, Nauru and Palestine. The Chinese Delegation tabled a draft Resolution reminding the Mandatory Powers of the United Nations Resolution of February 1946 (which invited them to submit trusteeship agreements for their Mandated territories preferably not later than the second Part of the First Session) and urging them again to submit agreements in respect of these three outstanding territories. however, was not discussed and died a natural death. Africa's proposal to terminate the mandatory regime in South West Africa by incorporation of the territory into the Union was very bitterly attacked and found only one supporter the United Kingdom. In the end a Resolution was passed inviting the Union Government to submit a trusteeship agreement in respect of South West Africa. In regard to Nauru the Australian Government repeated an earlier promise to submit a trusteeship agreement as soon as possible. United Kingdom will be in a most unenviable position if the future of Palestine, the most important internationally of all the mandated territories, alone among them is not brought before the United Nations at all. Our reputation in trusteeship matters was, frankly, not improved by our support of South Africa as a result of which we are almost universally suspected of annexationist tendencies. will tell against us if we do not produce a trusteeship agreement for Palestine or a proposal for independence. could not avoid the Palestine question being raised by others either in the General Assembly or (what might be even more embarrassing) in the Security Council even if we did not bring the matter forward ourselves, and it is at least worth considering whether we might not make our position easier by taking the initiative ourselves. admittedly many and great practical difficulties about the submission of a trusteeship agreement for all or any part of Indeed, it seems most unlikely that we could obtain agreement of the "States directly concerned" on any



terms of trusteeship or perhaps even reach agreement on the identity of the "States directly concerned". But these difficulties are matters for separate consideration and are not immediately relevant to the question at present under examination. To sum up, there would seem to be no legal necessity for consulting the United Nations in regard to provincial autonomy unless trusteeship is proposed: but on political grounds it would be extrenely difficult to avoid reference to the United Nations either on our own initiative or on that of hostile critics.

This question is of practical (6) Question 3. significance only if the answer to question l is in the negative as well as the answer to question 2 being in the affirmative. Clearly, if Partition, involving the grant of independence to certain areas were legally possible now, without the agreement of the United Nations, a promise of such partition at a later date would equally be legally possible. Assuming, however, that the answer to question 1 is in the negative it would seem to follow (for the same reasons as lead to that negative answer) that an undertaking to grant independence at a later date could not be given without the agreement of the United Mations. On the other hand, an undertaking to make a recommendation to the United Nations in the sense proposed at the appropriate time would not seem to raise any legal difficulties.

SUMMARY

(7) To sum up, it is considered that, for the reasons stated, His Majesty's Government cannot partition Palestine without the consent, previously obtained, of the United Nations. Nor can they, without such consent, give any unconditional promise in connection with any other policy that partition will be effected at some future date if one or other of the communities in Palestine desire it.

His Majesty's Government can probably as a matter of strict law introduce provincial autonomy without the prior consent of the United Nations, though this view would not be uncontested. But in that event they would immediately come under strong pressure from the United Nations to bring Palestine under the Trusteeship System and to submit a Trusteeship Agreement for approval. This pressure would be very difficult to resist. Discussion of a Trusteeship Agreement would, of course, raise the whole question of Palestine policy.

Moreover, it is probable that, immediately on the announcement of His Majesty's Government's intention to give effect to the provincial autonomy plan, an appeal would be preferred by the Arab States either to the General Assembly, or to the Security Council on the ground that a situation had arisen which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute. Such an appeal could hardly be disposed of without a full discussion of Palestine policy.

It thus appears that, whatever course His Majesty's Government adopt, it is impossible to avoid a discussion of Palestine policy by the United Nations in the near future.

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INWARD TELEGRAM

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FROM PALESTINE (O.A.G.)

TO S. OF S. COLONIES.

D. 10th January, 1947. R. 10th

15,00 hrs.

No. 63 Secret.

Addressed to S. of S. Repeated to Jedda No. 4 and to Anman No. 22 by savingram.

The Emir Feisal, Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, when in transit through Palestine to Trans-Jordan on 30th December, 1946, made a statement at Lydda airport (apparently in reply to a journalist's enquiry) condemning a partitionist solution of the Palestine problem and indicating that such a solution would be opposed by the Arab States. Actual words used are not on record. One newspaper version reads "This holy soil is a trust in the hands of the Arabs and we, the Arabs, will oppose any attempt at partition". Another states that, in answering enquiry about the position which would arise if the British Government intended to impose partition, His Highness replied that "It is impossible for the Arab States to accept any solution imposed on Palestine against the Wishes of its masters the Arabs".

Such utterances on the part of a Foreign Minister enjoying travel facilities through another country would scarcely appear to accord with diplomatic proprieties. I may add that Emir Feisal had just been formally received by a representative of the High Commissioner and it was apparently only by chance that these remarks were not made in his presence. I do not, however, suggest any action.





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PALESTINE

Registry Number	16647/115/31
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Secretary of State

INDEXED

The attached paper was prepared at an interdepartmental meeting last night. The conclusions to be drawn from it seem to be the following:-

- (1) It is exceedingly difficult to make any forecast of this kind in advance, and the figures must be treated with reserve.
- (2) The chances of carrying either partition or provincial autonomy through the United Nations do not seem to be very good.
- (3) As regards the plan for a unitary independent State, you will notice that most of the votes which it is estimated would be cast against this plan are the votes of Latin American States, who would oppose it because the United States did so. We should therefore stand a good chance of obtaining the necessary majority for this proposal if we could induce the United States not to vote against it.

R. VA one

16th January, 1947.

61858

PALESTINE

An attempt to forecast the possible result of reference to the United Nations.

- 1. This paper has been prepared in consultation with the Colonial Office. The estimates of voting which it contains are highly speculative. In reality a vote on the issue of Palestine would depend to some extent on the atmosphere created in the General Assembly by discussion of other issues, which cannot be foreseen. Apart altogether from this complication, there is in the case of many States very little evidence on which to base an estimate of their probable attitude.
 - 2. Three possible proposals have been considered:
 - (i) Partition into two independent States
 - (ii) A unitary independent State
 - (iii) Provincial autonomy, put forward with the avowed intention of placing Palestine under trusteeship.
- 3. It is assumed in each case that His Majesty's Government would take the initiative by presenting their proposals to the General Assembly. In each case a two-thirds majority of those present and voting would be required for approval.
- 4. There are now 55 member States. It follows that our proposals could be blocked by 19 adverse votes if every delegation cast a vote; or by less than 19 adverse votes if there were abstentions.
- 5. <u>Proposal (i) partition</u>. It is estimated that there would be 17 adverse votes.

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- 6. Proposal (ii) a unitary independent State.

 It is estimated that there would be 16 adverse votes.
- 7. Proposal (iii) provincial autonomy under trusteeship. It is estimated that there would be 17 adverse votes.
- 8. On each of the three hypotheses, it is probable that there would be a number of abstentions. It follows that, if these estimates of the negative votes proved to be correct, any of the three British proposals would be defeated.
- 9. The attitude of the United States would be of great importance. It was assumed, in making the calculations summarised above, that the United States vote would be cast against the second but not against either the first or the third proposal. If the United States were to vote against either the first or the third proposal, the number of adverse votes would be considerably larger. Conversely, if the United States were to abstain from voting against the second proposal, the opposition to it would be appreciably reduced.
- 10. It must be repeated that these figures are highly speculative. If a more solidly based forecast is needed, it could perhaps be provided by Sir Alexander Cadogan.
- 11. The attached list shows in detail the calculations of probable negative votes made for the purposes of this paper.

H. Berley

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

16th January, 1947.

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Attempt to forecast voting in General Assembly.

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An attempt to forecast the possible result of reference to the United Nations.

- the Colonial Office. The estimates of voting which it contains are highly speculative. In reality a vote on the issue of Palestine would depend to some extent on the atmosphere created in the General Assembly by discussion of other issues, which cannot be foreseen. Apart altogether from this complication, there is in the case of many States very little evidence on which to base an estimate of their probable attitude.
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- 3. It is assumed in each case that His Mejesty's Government would take the initiative by presenting their proposals to the General Assembly. In each case a two-thirds majority of those present and voting would be required for approval.
- 4. There are now 85 member States. It follows that our proposals could be blocked by 19 adverse votes if every delegation cast a vote; or by less than 19 adverse votes if there were abstentions.
- 5. Proposal (1) partition. It is estimated that there would be 17 adverse votes.

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- 7. Proposal (111) provincial autonomy under trusteeship. It is estimated that there would be 17 adverse votes.
- 8. On each of the three hypotheses, it is probable that there would be a number of abstentions. It follows that, if these estimates of the negative votes proved to be correct, any of the three British proposals would be defeated.
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- 10. It must be repeated that these figures are highly speculative. If a more solidly based forecast is needed, it could perhaps be provided by Sir Alexander Cadogan.
- 11. The attached list shows in detail the calculations of probable negative votes made for the purposes of this paper.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

16th January, 1947.

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SECRETARY OF STATE

PALESTINE

The Colonial Secretary's paper (C.P.(47) 31) argues for partition on two main grounds:

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- (i) That it would meet with a greater measure of approval from public opinion both in this country and in the United States than any other policy.
- (ii) That its enforcement would be accompanied by less disorder in Palestine than the enforcement of any alternative policy.

It is probably true that partition would be more widely supported in this country than any other policy, but it also seems likely that public opinion in general would support the Government in the adoption of any firm policy in Palestine.

So far as the situation in Palestine is concerned, it cannot be denied that the introduction of either provincial autonomy or of transitional measures leading to the establishment of a Unitary State would be met with violent resistance. On the other hand the Colonial Secretary seems to have under-estimated the risk of violence during the period between the announcement of partition as His Majesty's Government's policy and its application. There would be an inevitable delay while the assent of the United Nations was sought for this solution; further time would be consumed by the demarcation of the frontiers, and during the whole of this period the civil and military authorities

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would be faced possibly by a continuance of Jewish terrorism and almost certainly by an Arab rising on a considerable scale. The Arabs were able to continue the rebellion which started in 1936 almost uninterruptedly until it was brought to an end by the outbreak of war in September 1939; they are now in a better position to defy the Government than they were during those years.

The adoption of partition would be regarded by all Arabs as a capitulation by His Majesty's Government to Zionist pressure. Anglo-Arab relations would be affected not only by the initial enforcement of the policy but also by the continuing friction between the Jewish State and its Arab neighbours. It is misleading to speak of partition as a final solution. Certainly it is final in the sense that it would put an end to the necessity for British Administration in Palestine, but it would create in the Middle East a frontier which would be constantly challenged from both sides and would consequently be a factor of instability.

To how great an extent partition would result in an estrangement between Great Britain and the Arab peoples it is not possible to estimate. But the consequences of such an estrangement would be so grave that the risk of it should be a major consideration in the examination of partition as a possible policy. The loss of Arab good will would mean the elimination of British influence from the Middle East to the great advantage of Russia. And this in turn would greatly weaken the position of the British Commonwealth in the world. The Chiefs of Staff hold the view that the maintenance of the British position in the Middle East is vital to the safety of the Commonwealth.

At no time have His Majesty's Government promised to

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establish a Jewish State. In the Balfour Declaration itself, the undertaking to facilitate the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people was qualified by the pledge that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine. Any policy which would involve placing a large number of Arabs under the rule of an independent Jewish State would be liable to challenge as inconsistent with our past undertakings.

The position which would arise if the United Nations Assembly were called on to approve partition has been discussed in another paper. $\mathcal{R} \mathcal{M} \mathcal{M} \mathcal{M}$

21st January, 1947.

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PALESTINE

H.M for Policy on Palestine, (Conference)

(Minutes.)

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61858

(Action completed.) Next Paper.

32003 F.O.P

Returned from Private Secretary Jan 25

Secretary of State

E 895

PALESTINE

Conference with the Arabs

It will be necessary to reach a decision before the weekend on the way in which the opening stages of the Conference
with the Arabs are to be conducted. This will of course
depend upon the outcome of the Cabinet discussions. The
purpose of this minute is to consider the situation that will
arise

- (1) if the Cabinet takes a decision in favour of Partition;
- (2) if the Cabinet does not reach any conclusion on its future policy in Palestine.

If a decision to recommend Partition to the United Nations were to be taken in advance of the opening of the Conference, this decision would presumably have to be communicated to the Arab Delegates at an early stage in the discussions. The British Delegation would no doubt be in a position to say that, although Partition was decided upon in principle, there was room for negotiation over the frontier and other aspects of the policy. It is in the highest degree unlikely that the Arabs would take advantage of this invitation. They would probably confine themselves to formal declarations rejecting the proposal of His Majesty's Government and announcing their intention of resisting it, e.g. in the United Nations, after which the Conference would break up and the Arabs would go home.

If, on the other hand, a decision had not been taken by the Cabinet, it would be the task of the British Delegation to resume the discussion at the point at which it was broken off last October. At that time the Arab Delegations had submitted

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In these circumstances, the statement might continue, His Majesty's Government felt bound to seek the opinion of the United Nations on the future of Palestine before committing themselves finally to their future policy. They accordingly suggested that the most profitable use of the opportunity now presented for Anglo-Arab consultation would be to study the procedure by which the problem should be submitted to the

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United Nations, and if possible to reach agreement on this limited and preliminary question. If it was necessary for the Delegation of the United Kingdom and the Delegation of the Arab States to part company when, in the course of the General Assembly's debate, specific solutions for the Palestine problem came under review, it would nevertheless be of great advantage to both parties if they could agree in advance on the form which they wished the debate to take. It could then be hoped that the General Assembly would either state certain general principles on which a settlement should be based or indicate some procedure which should be followed as a means of arriving at a just settlement. In either event, reference to the United Nations might have the result of establishing a foundation upon which negotiations between British, Arab and Jewish representatives could be resumed with a greater chance of success.

22nd January, 1947.

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AMMAN

17th January, 1947.

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\ 29 JAN

Dear Banta.

with reference to your (E/12254/4/31) of (3 copies) the 7th of January, 1947, I enclose a further memorandum by Glubb on the subject of Palestine which is in continuation of that to which you refer in your letter.

C.W. Baxter, Esq., C.M.G., M.C., The Foreign Office, LONDON, S.W.1.

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TOP SECRET

A NOTE

ONTHE

EXACT SITING OF THE

FRONTIER IN THE

EVENT OF THE

ADOPTION

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PARTITION

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PREFACE

I have of course no knowledge whether partition is to be adopted as the solution for Palestine or not. Indeed it seems probable that no decision has yet been taken. But I have taken the liberty to write on the method of implementation of Partition and incorporation of the Arab State in Trans-Jordan, because it is the only solution which directly affects the Arab Legion and myself. If some other solution be adopted, I have neither the right nor the desire to submit suggestions, for it will not be our business to implement any other.

I have recently received the impression, rightly or wrongly, that partition may well be adopted, but that the frontier between Jews and Arabs may be more unfavourable to the latter than I had hitherto envisaged. The object of this note is to consider the possibility or implementing a frontier more favourable to the Jews than that envisaged in my previous memoranda.

I have, in previous notes, expressed the opinion that we have heard too much in the past about the conflicting "rights" of Arabs and Jews in Palestine. I have limited myself to the more mundane consideration of what is possible. The present note is strictly limited to this aspect of the matter.

THE DIFFICULT AREAS

I will not repeat the arguments which I have used in my previous memoranda on the subject of what I call the difficult areas. A summary of the recommendations previously submitted on this subject is as follows:

- Jerusalem to be garrisoned by British Troops, and administered in the name of the three religious communities Jews, Christians and Muslims. The Jerusalem enclave to be limited to the Municipal Area.
- (b) Haifa to remain a British Military and Naval Base, with equal commercial facilities for all.
- (c) The city of Jaffa to be retained in the Arab State.
- (d) The Acre, Nazareth and Safad sub-districts to form part of the Arab State, with access to the main area of the Arab State by some machinery of corridors or through Haife.

THE SELF SETTLED FRONTIER

Apart from these complications, the frontier between Jews and Arabs very nearly demarcates itself. It is true that there are a few distant and isolated colonies cut off from the main Jewish areas. Most of these have been deliberately placed where they are for political reasons. An example is Hanuta, on the crest of a rocky ridge precisely on the Lebanese frontier, and obviously put there as a point of entry for illegal immigrants. Or the one or two little colonies near Beersheba, intended to support the argument that the Jews can make even the desert blossom.

Excluding these "freak" colonies, the Jewish "front line" is fairly well demarcated. Left to itself, a boundary commission would merely have to make minor adjustments or exchanges so as to straighten a few kinks in the line, or extract a few Arab or Jewish settlements which are a few miles in front of or behind the general alignment.

Apart then from the extremely complicated hinterland of Jaffa, it is not anticipated that the actual siting of the frontier would be very complicated. The frontier having thus more or less fixed the situation as it is at present, the remaining outstanding problem would be that of dealing with the considerable areas of Arabland left well within the Jewish State. I have already suggested that these Arab owners would have to be bought out and settled elsewhere, a process requiring large sums of money.

I have no statistics as to what area of Arab owned lands will fall irretrievably within the Jewish State, but the area will undoubtedly be very great. Thus to fix the present front line as the final frontier does not mean that the Jews would be confined to the area they now hold. They would receive an immense increase of land, by the migration of the Arabs whose land is now behind the front line.

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It may however, be desired to give the Jews even more than this, presumably in order to win American support, or to get the scheme through U.N.O., or for some other external political motive. To do this, it would be necessary to take an area of "virgin" Arab land - not yet penetrated by Jews in any considerable numbers - evict its Arab inhabitants and hand it over to the Jews. It is the feasibility of an operation of this nature, which is considered in this paper.

IMPORTANCE OF SUCCESS

One of the principal contributory causes to the present situation in Palestine is the fact that His Majesty's Government have, on previous occasions, announced the absolutely final and irrevocable solution of the Palestine problem. The solution has always been opposed by one party or the other, and as a result of this opposition, His Majesty's Government have reversed the previous "irrevocable" decision, and have issued a new final settlement diametrically opposed to its predecessor.

As a result, no decision on the subject of Palastine is ever received with acquiescence. Both sides are always convinced that a fresh outbreak of violence will cause the new "solution" also to be abandoned as impossible of implementation. When the forthcoming decision is issued, it will doubtless be met with violent resistance by one side or the other. It is absolutely essential this time to break this tradition of vacillation and actually to enforce what we announce. By corollary, it is supremely vital not to announce anything which we have not the physical power to enforce. Hence the need for caution.

I believe that (except for the complicated question of Jaffa) we could enforce a frontier based approximately on the I doubt whether we have the physical power existing front line. to enforce a frontier which would give the Jews an added area of land, beyond the present front line. Desirable as it may be to secure American or other outside support, it would obviously be a mistake temporarily to secure such support at the cost of promising to do something which we ultimately found ourselves unable We should by such a failure not only sacrifice the outside support which we had won by the promise, but we should have added one more to the already long list of "final solutions" which we never implemented, and thereby render the implementation of the It is therefore, essential to take ultimate solution even greater. careful stock of what we can physically perform, before publishing our proposals.

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REFUSAL OF ARAB CO-OPERATION

The solution envisaged in this note is partition, and the incorporation of the Arab part of Palestine in Trans-Jordan. It is the that a scheme of this nature can only be carried out if the Trans-Jordan Government is willing to co-operate. Should the solution announced be so unfavourable to the Arabs (in their view) that nine Arabs out of ten would categorically reject it, it is possible that the Trans-Jordan Government itself would refuse to co-operate. In this case, the whole proposal would obviously be an ignominicus failure from the moment of its announcement. His Majesty's Government have great influence over the Government of Trans-Jordan, and King Abdulla has for 20 years been an unwavering supporter of Great Britain. But it is conceivable that to support the British scheme might involve him, not only in the hostility of the Palestine Arabs, but in internal disturbances in Trans-Jordan itself. In such circumstances, the Trans-Jordan Government might well ask to be excused.

Common prudence would seem to dictate that before announcing a scheme to which the co-operation of the Trans-Jordan Government was essential, the agreement of that Government should be obtained. If this were impossible for reasons of secrecy, the scheme must obviously be such that the co-operation of the Trans-Jordan Government was a foregone conclusion.

FAILURE OF THE TRANS-JORDAN GOVERNMENT

The second possibility which would have to be envisaged is the acceptance (under protest) of the British proposals by the Trans-Jordan Government, but the eventual inability of the Trans-Jordan Government to implement them, and its final abandonment of the attempt. In this connection, the following points may be noted:

(1) The people of Trans-Jordan sympathize strongly with the Arabs of Palestine. Thus the acceptance by the Trans-Jordan Government of co-operation in a scheme which seemed to the Arabs very unfavourable, might not only involve the Trans-Jordan Government in difficulties in Palestine, but also lose it its popularity at home.

It must also be remembered that King Abdulla has a number of enemies, notably the Syrian Government and Ibn Saud. These people will(apart from their indignation against the Jews) be annoyed if partition means an increase in strength to King Abdulla. They will therefore quite possibly (at any rate the Syrians) urge the people of Palestine and Trans-Jordan to oppose King Abdulla should be agree to co-operate with Great Britain in implementing partition. It is noticeable that the Syrian Government professes to His Majesty's Minister in Damascus to be strongly pro-British, but at the same time the chief plank in their propaganda against King Abdulla is the the is subservient to Great Britain.

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The Trans-Jordan Government would have to establish itself in the portion of Palestine handed over to it, with the support of the moderate Palestine parties. These parties are now completely overshadowed by the Mufti's party, but they could easily be revived by the support of Government. But if the siting of the frontier is such that all Arabs reject it, it will not be possible to form a moderate Arab party to support partition. No Government, whether autocratic or democratic in form, can function, if the whole population is unwilling to co-operate with it. No amount of soldiers, British or Arabs, can enforce partition if a great majority of the Arabs refuse to co-operate.

The second possibility is therefore, that the Trans-Jordan Government might agree to co-operate, but that the proposals might give rise to a great out burst of Arab nationalism. This out break would be supported by the other Arab countries, and might paralyse the Trans-Jordan Government.

- Appeals to fanaticism in other Arab countries, and Arab protests before U.N.O., would be immensely weakened if the moderate Arab parties in Palestine could be persuaded to support the proposals, and boldly declare their acceptance. This would almost scotch U.N.O. and Russian intervention.
- In brief, therefore, it is absolutely essential that the partition proposals should be able to command a measure of Arab support. Otherwise no power in the world can enforce the scheme. I believe that partition on the lines of the existing front line could be enforced, but that the surrender of further territory (still Arab) to the Jewish State could not be enforced.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JEWISH AND ARAB OPPOSITION

It is worth noting that Jewish and Arab resistance are of a fundamentally different nature. Jewish resistance draws its principal strength from foreign diplomatic support, and political pressure in Britain and America. Jewish terrorist activity is annoying, but is not a serious military problem.

The Arabs on the other hand have little or no international influence, but are a more serious military threat on the ground, because they are not all confined to Palestine where British troops can operate. If the Arabs were to rebel and be hard pressed by British troops, they could dodge across any of the frontiers of Palestine for a rest, and come back when the pressure was relaxed. Perhaps even more serious would be the possibility of out breaks of rioting, and attacks on British subjects and installations in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Egypt

The fact that the Arabs are not indulging in violence just at this minute, should not cause us to forget that an cut break of Arab violence would be much more serious than Jewish terrorism.

FORCIBLE TRANSFER OF POPULATIONS

. But even if we assume that the Trans-Jordan Government agreed to co-operate in the British scheme for partition and was able to find a number of Palestinians to support it, and a general Arab revolt did not result - even so we are not out of the wood. to be noted that the proposals for partition put forward in previous memorandas did not involve the forcible transfer of any of the If the boundary be drawn on the basis of the "existing population. front line", members of either side who find themselves residing on the wrong side of the boundary will be given the chance to opt for the Should they do so, then the boundary commission will other state. give them land or premises in exchange in the other state, or each compensation, or will use any other method for facilitating the move for which they have opted. Apart from this, however, His Majesty's Government or British troops will not be concerned with moving anybody - certainly not their forcible eviction from their homes.

If, however, some area now supporting a solely Arab population — and on the Arab side of the existing front line — is to be allotted to the Jewish state, an entirely different state of affairs will arise. Such an area (on the Arab side of the front line) will be in physical contact with other Arab areas almost all round. The inhabitants will refuse to recognize the validity of the decision, and will refuse to recognize the jurisdiction of the Jewish Government-over them. They will boycott any attempts by the Jewish authorities to collect taxes or to administer them in any way. They will also of course refuse to abandon their homes and migrate. A complete deadlock will therefore be reached.

It is inconceivable that British troops be used to evict them from their homes. Such things can be done by Germans or Russians but there is no use in our attempting to use frightfulness. British troops are not capable of being frightful enough, and to be a little bit rough is fatal. It merely rouses resentment and fanaticism, without inspiring terror.

To attempt forcibly to transfer large blocks of Arabs by using Jewish troops would lead to civil war, and troops of the Arab State would refuse to do it. The inevitable conclusion therefore, seems to be that large blocks of population cannot be moved, and hence that the only frontier which can in practice be implemented is one running approximately along the existing front line.

The situation of isolated communities is quite different, and it is not thought that it will be necessary to use force to move them. Isolated Jewish colonies well inside Arab areas, or Arab communities left behind in the middle of the Jewish area, will probably opt to move, if not at once, at least in a year or two.

JAFFA

The above argument applies, however, to the city of Jaffa, which is one of the major problems of partition. To move the inhabitants of Jaffa by force would obviously be impossible. If the city were left behind in the Jewish state, it would boycott any attempt by Jews to control and administer it and street fighting would inevitably result, leading to the arrival of Jewish and Arab reinforcements from outside, and a communal civil war. There would, therefore, seem to be no practical alternative to leaving the Arabs in Jaffa.

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In my former memorandum, I suggested that the frontier be made to pass between Jaffa and Tel Aviv, then making a detour to the south so as to bring at least Rehoveth and Rishon le Zion into the Jewish State. Even so, however, a number of Jewish colonies remain south of the border, and these cannot be moved by force.

In these circumstances, I formerly suggested that there is a considerable area of coastal plain with good Arab agricultural land, lying north of Lydda, which might perhaps be amicably exchanged for the colonies south of Rishon. But such a solution obviously depends on the possibility of arbitration and agreement. Should this prove impossible, the alternative (which I have not previously suggested) might be to give the coast line south of Jaffa to the Jews also, for a distance of about sixteen miles, but to-leave Jaffa as an Arab port, with an access corridor to git along the Ramle - Jaffa ro This would mean the minimum amount of moving populations. I had previously endeavoured to avoid this solution, owing to the complications of introducing so many corridors. Perhaps it will be inevitable, in any case, I am convinced that to give Jaffa to the Jews would be a impracticable solution.

THE SOUTHERN DESERT

In my previous memoranda, I have never referred to the possibility of giving a part of the southern Desert (usually referred to as the Negeb) to the Jews. Such a proposal seemed to me altogether too fanciful. But as I see in the press that the Jews are still referring to it, it may be advisable to discuss it.

I do not know why the Jews demand this area. Perhaps they have knowledge of some mineral wealth there, but this seems unlikely. The statement that this desert is agriculturally valuable (or could be made so) is almost certainly false, and conceals some other motive, probably of a political or strategic nature.

There are already only too many corridors in any form of partition. But a corridor from Jenin to Nazareth across the plain of Esdraelon would be only nine miles long. A corridor leading into Jaffa would only cross about two miles of Jewish land. Such corridors can be canalized.

But if the members of the Jewish State possessed a right to visit a Jewish area south of Beersheba they would have to cross fifty miles of Arab territory.

If the Jews had a right to visit Jerusalem and Beersheba, the Arab Government would be unable to prevent them from over-running the whole of Southern Palestine, under the pretext of transit to Beersheba and Jerusalem. Perhaps the Jews are (as the Arabs suspect) only agreeing to partition as a temporary measure, and once it is established will set themselves to push the frontier forwards by undermining the Arab State.

Whatever the real object of their demand for the Negebmay be, it is most undesirable that it be acceded to, because it would almost certainly contain the seeds of future trouble. COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

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It may be noted that there are a few artificial and uneconomical Jewish colonies in the Beersheba area now, which could not be evicted by force, if they chose to stay. But this is a very different matter from constituting a portion of the Jewish State in this area. An isolated bit of Jewish state in the Negeb would presumably involve the RIGHT of transit backwards and forwards between it and the remainder of the Jewish state, and would thus render passport and customs control for the Arab state extremely difficult.

With Jews constantly coming and going across Southern Palestin they would inevitably try and get in touch with Arabs on the way, lend them money, embark on shady business transactions, and generally throw a spanner in the works. If the Arab Government were unable to deny them passage, and became aware of their intrigues, a reversion to terrorism might result, Jews crossing southern Palestine be murdered and the Beersheba colonies attacked. It is sincerely to be hoped, therefore, that His Majesty's Government will not entertain the idea of an isolated piece of Jewish State in the desert.

HAIFA

I have not in any of my previous memoranda, suggested any alternative for Haifa, except its transformation into a British base. This solution seems essential for external reasons — it is the Port for Iraq and Trans—Jordan, as well as for Falestine, and it is an increasingly important international oil depot.

Haifa to either the Arab or the Jewish State, would confront us again with the insoluble problem of moving a large block of population, belonging to one race or the other, or of allowing them to resist or boycott the Government of the State to which they have been allotted, thereby, leading to street fighting, the arrival of reinforcements to both sides from the hinterland and communal civil war.

ONLY THE FRONT LINE SOLUTION CAN BE IMPLEMENTED

The more I think of it, therefore, the more I am convinced that only a frontier based on the "existing front line" of Jewish penetration can in practice be implemented. No disaster could be more fatal than to announce a decision, and then find ourselves physically unable to implement it.

This physical inability might result from:

- (a) The refusal of the Trans-Jordan Government to co-operate.
- (b) The inability of the Trans-Jordan Government to secure any support in Palestine, and even its loss of popular support in Trans-Jordan itself.
- (c) The impossibility of forcibly moving any community of either race, but particularly an Arab community situated at present on the Arab side of the "existing front-line".

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THE FRONTIER ZONE

The more I consider the problem of Jaffa, the suburbs of Haifa, and the indentations of the existing front line, the more strongly do I feel myself in favour of the proposal for a frontier Zone, submitted in my last memorandum.

The struggle for the exact Siting of the frontier is sure to be severe. It is, therefore, most advisable to secure the acceptance of the principle of partition, and to implement it in areas the allotment of which is obvious, before facing up to the fresh storm of propaganda, violence and intrigue which will be let loose when the exact siting of the frontier has to be decided. Let us then at least keep both sides guessing as to the exact site of the frontier, until we have got the principle accepted by U.N.O., and until we have so far implemented partition that to turn back is not longer possible.

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TOP SECRET & PERSONAL

HQ ARAB LEGION AMMAN TRANSJORDAN. ALC/31

16th January, 1947.

Dear Beelly 940 115/31

I hope you will excuse my bombarding you with so many treatises, but it is impossible to avoid a certain anxiety here.

We still have no idea of what the solution in Palestine is to be but there are many rumours that it will be partition, but (under American pressure) a frontier favourable to the Jews.

We of course, may tend to err on the side of the practical, but then we think that Mr. Truman may err too much on the theoretical side so perhaps we can balance up!

The question I always ask myself is "Can it be done?" rather than "should it be done?" A few days ago, a senior officer said to me "The Arabs must realize that they will have to give up Jaffa, so that's that!" But how are you going to do ;it? If they barricade the streets and refuse to move or admit the Jews, what do we do? Shall we break in with British troops and drag them from their houses?

The more I think of it, the more I come to the conclusion that we cannot move large blocks of the civil populations by force. Isolated communities left behind in the other state will I think want to move or can be frozen out by administrative means. But yesterday an article in the Press said that the Jews would insist on the Acre sub-district being "given" to them. All these people (including the U.S.A.) seem to assume that His Majesty's Government can hand large areas of country to either side as they see fit. How CAN we give the Acre sub-district to the Jews, any more than we can "give" Tel Aviv to the Arabs?

Excuse my writing at such length, but I am so afraid that we may find ourselves committed to a course of action which is militarily impossible.

> Jom srewelf (J.B.Glubb)

Harold Beeley, Esq., Foreign Office, Whitehall, London. S.W.1.

Encl 2 Copies

OUT FILE

POREIGN OFFICE, 8.W.1.

1st Feburary 1947.

Dear Glubb,

Thank you very much for your letters of December 14 and January 16, enclosing copies of two memoranda about Palestine.

You say that you hesitated to bembard me with these papers, but I hope you will not allow this unjustified modesty to prevent me from seeing your ideas when you have time to put them down.

The first paper in particular was of great interest not only to me personally, but to the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office. Ther is obviously much force in your arguments against the Arab Plan, and In your suggestions as to how those arguments should be presented.

As for Partition, the reports that H.M. have taken a decision of principle in favour of this solution are at least premature. attitude may be clearer by the time this letter reaches you, but at present it cannot be said the they have come down finally either for or against In any case, it is clear that a policy of Partition sould not be applied on the ground unti it had first received the approval of the United Nations given by a two-thirds majority of the This of course means that General Assembly. there would be a long period of discussion and agitation between the announcement that H.M.G. favoured such a policy and the time it was possible to put it into effect.

Brigadier J.B.Glubb Pasha, C.M.G., O.B.E.,

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
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one idea which had occurred to me and which finds some support from one or two of the remarks you make in your second memorandum is that the absorption of the Arab parts of Palestinto the State of Trans-Jordan might represent a danger rather than an advantage for King Abdull is it not likely that the tail would wag the dog and that the Mufti (whether physically in Jerusal or in Gairo) would prove to be the more powerful of the two?

Thank you again for stimulating my rather jaded wits by your papers.

Yours ever



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PALESTINE: Reference to the United Nations.

There is one point to which attention has not yet been drawn in our discussion of the possible reference of the Palestine problem to the United Nations. This is the applicability of the "Declaration regarding non-self-governing Territories" which forms Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter.

The two Trusteeship Chapters, XII and XIII, are of course irrelevant unless and until it is decided that Palestine shall be placed under Trusteeship. But I think there can be no doubt that Chapter XI has applied to Palestine since the ratification of the Charter by H.M.G. and its coming into force. Of particular importance is the opening phrase of Article 73, which reads as follows:-

"Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognise the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount..."

If any discussion on Palestine is initiated in the General Assembly, some Delegations will no doubt direct the Assembly's attention to the prelevance of this obligation to H.M.G.'s intentions in Palestine.

H.Beeley

United NATion Date

31st January, 1947.

I am not sure what useful comment can be made/

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made on Mr. Beeley's minute, but the following observations are perhaps relevant. Although Palestine is still under mandate and is, therefore, different from the territories which are generally recognised as falling under Chapter XI, a case could well be made for the argument that the provisions of Chapter XI apply. Certainly the Trusteeship Chapters XII and XIII do not apply at present. The opening phrase of Article 73 would probably not be the ground for an attack on our administration in Palestine. The provisions under Article 73(e), that is the provision of information of a technical nature relating to economic, social and educational conditions in the territory, might provide a better opportunity for attack. An occasion for this might arise earlier than the General Assembly, namely at the meeting some weeks before the Assembly of the ad hoc Committee set up to consider the Secretary-General's analysis of the reports made under Article 73(e). I do not know whether the C.O. have this danger in mind or whether they have considered it and decided that the question will not arise, but it might be worth consulting them on the point. So far as I know we have no intention of admitting any obligation to transmit such information in respect of Palestine, though we have submitted it in respect of colonial territories.

HAT. Smith

(H.F.T. SMITH)

4th February, 1947.

(لله خاستالم ir no authority to which we a reponsible es mand atom power

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while to worth while to you are to. for their view of the position a to check if that if we have any obligations, they are being fulfilled Moronson

In Bully

(SD)P.H.GORE-BOOTH lagree. Thesen 4.2

I am sorry this paper has been left on one side during the ment pressur y work. ? now submit a draft on the point mad of Mr. [Heathert] Smith, additional paragraph drawing attention

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attention to my own point, which ? am apaid ? did not make sufficiently clear.

Hisely 5) 3

I think a point which has
been overlooked is that in the Resolution
of the Final League, Assembly passed on
April 18 in last the following passage occurs:
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"The Assembly)... takes note of the apprecess
intentions of members of the league now adwitentions of members of the league now admissions truitonies when manufact to continue
to administer them for the well-being a development
of the Deoples Concerned in accordance with the
obligations Contained in respective mandato....

this, taken in Conjunction with the rest of the resolution does wifly a continuing obligation the resolution does wifly a continuing obligation to submit reports on Palestine to Someone 9 this could only be to the UN - Horvever, this could only be to the UN - Horvever, as is known, Palestine presents a special as is known, Palestine presents a special case, the more so in risk of our recent decision

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delision to submit the whole problem to the UN. - For this 7 other reasons Co. have written to good of Palerrie saying that no report should be pepared. I saw 7 approved the letter in draft of a copy of if to being sent to the F.O, 7 should trum up in a few days.

I therefore suppers this, letter to Co. be held up, 9 if it is necessary we can write to Co. later should any points require clarification.

Christiathiste Just

C. B. B. HEATHCOTE-SMITH

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b.v. when in necess letter referred to at X above.

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Mr. J.S. Bennett, COLONIAL OFFICE.

(From Mr. Mason)

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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

March, 1947.

Now that we have referred the problem of future policy in Palestine to the United Nations, I have been wondering whether the question of our present obligations under the Charter in respect of Palestine is likely to be raised at the General Assembly.

I assume that Chapter reven of the Charter has applied to Palestine since the ratification of the Charter by H.M.G. and its entry into force. So far as I know, you do not intend to transit to the Secretary-General information about Palestine of the kind provided for in Article 73(e). It is, I suppose, possible that we may be criticised on that score, but no doubt you have considered this possibility and have decided that the balance of advantage is against the submission of such information.

Delegation which cared to base its arguments on Chapter leven of the Charter might lay stress on the introductory phrase of Article 73, recognising the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and might put forward the view that this Article, which subordinates the interests of Jews not now resident in Palestine to those of the present inhabitants of the country, must be taken into account in assessing the relative weight/attached to our mandatory obligations:

(1) to promote the growth of the Jewish Home.
National Fund and (ii) to protect the interests of the non-Jewish inhabitants.

H-13.43

Minutes.



PHG-B/GMW. UN.

E 1582 GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE PALESTINE QUESTION.

The paper on Palestine assumes that if and when the Palestine question is brought before the United Nations, the right body to deal with it is the General Assembly. Two possible alternatives would be the Trusteeship Council and the Security Council.

Trusteeship Council.

It has always been intended that the functions of the Council (set out more fully in Article 87 of the Charter) should be exercised exclusively in respect of territories already put under trusteeship. It has never been the intention that the Trusteeship Council should become involved in questions other than those dealt with in approved trusteeship agreements. Moreover it would be very much contrary to the policy and interests of the United Kingdom Government to encourage any such development since it would form a precedent leading towards entrusting the Trusteeship Council with the power to intervene, not only in trusteeship territories but in all colonial territories from which it is at predent excluded. The fact that Palestine is a Mandated Territory does not give the Trusteeship Council any automatic standing in regard to the future of the Territory. Apart from anything else the Trusteeship Council will only hold its first constituent meeting in March of this year; it has no experience of operation and has important matters already before it arising out of the last General Assembly.

Security Council.

- The one great advantage of putting the Palestine problem before the Security Council is that it is so organised as to function continuously. Consequently there need be no delay in consideration of the Palestine question such as tends on reference to the Assembly.
- Reference to the Security Council is, however, undesirable for the following reasons:
 - (a) Reference of any question to the Security Council implies that that question constitutes or implies an imminent threat to peace and security. It is not on the basis of an immediate threat of a dispute between two states that this problem is being presented to the United Nations, but / rather as a broad political problem demanding solution by the combined wisdom

/of the ...

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of the nations. The Security Council is a body of eleven members; the problem is one which justifies a certain delay in order to enable it to be considered by all fifty-five members of the United Nations.

- (b) While a decision of the Security Council has more force under the Charter than a recommendation of the Assembly, there is a much more dangerous disadvantage in the Security Council that a solution acceptable to the majority may be vetoed by one of the Great Powers. A procedure not involving the veto is therefore to be preferred.
- (c) If the Security Council were seized of the question and appointed a commission to study it, it would seem impossible under Article 12(i) of the Charter to transfer the matter to the General Assembly without the consent of the Security Council, which could not be guaranteed.

Pulmiton

P. H. Gore-Booth.) 13th February, 1947.

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Mr. Baxter

Many thanks for letting me see this paper. I imagine that the exact means of approaching the United Nations will be discussed later. If so, I should like to be there.

I take it that it is realised that if we really ask the Assembly for its advice we are

- (a) quite unlikely to/two-thirds exhibition of opinion in favour of any particular course and will be lucky if we get a simple majority, and
- (b) whatever resolution is passed by the Assembly has no binding force on the minority, which will presumably include the Arab States.

I suppose also the possibility of our relinquishing the Mandate and suggesting that it should be transformed into a Trusteeship in which we might have either no or only a partial share has been examined. "Collective" trusteeships are of course permissible under the Charter, but in this case we should, of course, have to put up a scheme for submission to the Trusteeship Council and to the Assembly.

I should welcome a talk with you and Mr. Beely on this subject at your leisure.

15th February 1947

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Mr Beebrum Debr)
We Cres un Debr)
White Charles

DominiShot ment Dominions Office, 202 Downing Street. 19th February, 1947.

We understand that the possibility is under consideration of bringing the Palestine question before the Trusteeship Council, rather than the General Assembly of U.N.O., as this would have the advantage of getting it dealt with earlier by U.N.O.

- This course would, however, also have at least one serious disadvantage, in that it would create the precedent that the Trusteeship Council could concern itself with territories which are not trust territories. The Union of South Africa administers the mandated territory of South-West Africa but has decided not to put it under trusteeship, despite a strong invitation from U.N.O. to do so. It would be very awkward for the Union of South Africa if the United Kingdom were to subscribe to the view that the Trusteeship Council can deal with a mandated territory that has not been put under trusteeship. We should be glad if this consideration could be brought to the notice of those in the Foreign Office who are handling this aspect of the Palestine problem.
- I am sending a copy of this letter to Poynton (Colonial Office).

Yours sincerely,

P. MASON, ESQ. FOREIGN OFFICE.

Dear Shanner, May 9 refer you to your letter of February 19th, on the possibility that the Palistine question might h referred to the Trustushing bouncil of the United Nations. you will / how seen that our intention is to refer the matter to the General Assembly, and that we have in fact rejected an American suggestion that it should go to the Trustushing bouncil. Then is thus no need for anxiety on that of the Union of South Africa. Yours sincerely

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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.l.

(E.1669/115/31).

22nd March, 1947.

Dear Shannon,

May I refer you to your letter of the 19th Pebruary, on the possibility that the Palestine question might be referred to the Trusteeship Council of the United Hations.

You will since have seen that our intention is to refer the matter to the General Assembly, and that we have in fact rejected an American suggestion that it should go to the Trusteeship Council. There is thus so need for anxiety on behalf of the Union of South Africa.

Yours sincerely

(Sqd.) (P. Mason)

G. B. Shennon, Baq., Dominions Office

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
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Next Paper.



r G. S. Sherman,

Secretary,

to Planning Staff.

A message was received from the Joint Planning Staff on Saturday, asking that they might be supplied with copies of the revised plan of partition referred to in paragraph 13 of the Colonial Secretary's memorandum C.P. (47) (32).

With his permission, I enclose four copies (one only with maps) of a note on the subject prepared in this office. has not yet been finally considered by the. Secretary of State, and he has not yet decided exactly what scheme he will recommend to the Cabinet for adoption in the event of partition being accepted in principle as the basis of future policy.

Yours sincerely,

(Sa) D.G. Harris

FURTHER ACTION.

Issued 21/1/47

PALESTINE: FUTURE POLICY Note by the Colonial Office

In the Secretary of State's memorandum CP(47)32,

1t was suggested that we should attempt to prepare a scheme

of partition which did the maximum possible justice to both

Arabs and Jews and then stand upon that scheme as the basis of

our future policy in Palestine. In this note, the scheme

referred to in paragraph 13 of the Secretary of State's memorandum

is described, with a brief account of the stages by which it has
been reached.

- Royal Commission of 1936. This plan is of more than historical interest since the Jews are likely to adopt it as the basis of any proposals for boundaries which they may put forward, claiming that, if any portion of the Royal Commission's proposed Jewish State is denied them, they should be given compensation elsewhere. It will thus probably be made the yard-stick of their demands. For reasons given in this note, it will be impossible to admit this claim.
- 3. The Royal Commission's Jewish State, the general outline of which is shown in Map No. 8 appended to their Report, was to be 1940 square miles in extent and included two and a half times as much Arab as Jewish land. Its population comprised 429,000 Jews and 377,000 Arabs.
- 4. There were two main defects in the Royal Commission's proposals, namely:-
 - (a) The inclusion in the Jewish State of the whole of Galilee west of Safad, a purely Arab area containing 122,000 Arabs and less than 3,000 Jews. It was this proposal which was the main cause of the insurrection in Galilee in 1937.
 - (b) The treatment of Jaffa, the largest Arab town in Palestine. Jaffa was to be administered by the Arab State, although not physically connected with it.

A mandated corridor was to join it to

Jerusalem, which corridor cut the Jewish State

into two parts. The arrangement visualised

is shown in the map referred to.

produce a detailed scheme which satisfied the conditions laid down by the Government of the day, partition remained in abeyance until 1943, when a Cabinet Committee was appointed to report on long-term policy for Palestine. This Committee was asked to start by examining the Royal Commission's Report and to consider whether that scheme, or some variant of it, could not now be adopted.

6. The Cabinet Committee produced a revised plan of partition based on that of the Royal Commission, but with the following important differences:-

- (a) Western Galilee was to be excluded from the Jewish State and constituted as an island appendage of the Arab State. Gertain other areas were to be added to the Jewish State in part compensation.
- (b) The mandated corridor was to be eliminated and Jaffa included in the Jewish State.
- (c) The Jerusalem State was to be enlarged so as to include:-
 - (1) the road and railway from Tel Aviv to
 Jerusalem, so that Jews could proceed
 direct to Jerusalem without passing through
 Arab territory;
 - (ii) Ramallah, which is, in effect, an outlying suburb of Jerusalem; and
 - (111) the source of the Jeruselem water supply at Ras el Ein.

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- (d) The waste area of the Negeb, the waterless, soilless wilderness in the south of Palestine, was to be kept under mandatory control until a survey had shown whether or not any type of development was possible there.
- 7. The boundaries proposed by the Cabinet Committee are shown in Map I. The Jewish State was to be 1,479 square miles in extent, or 25 per cent smaller than that proposed by the Royal Commission, but, owing to the inclusion of Jaffa and certain other valuable areas, its property tax assessment was some 10 per cent greater. Its population comprised 448,000 Jews and 571,000 Arabs.
- 8. No action was taken on the Cabinet Committee's report; before it was finally considered by the War Cabinet the murder of Lord Moyne took place and the Prime Minister (Mr. Churchill) considered the time inappropriate for the introduction of a scheme of this kind.
- would be resisted by both Arabs and Jews, by the Jews on account of the restricted size of the Jewish State and by the Arabs because of the undoubted disabilities to which they would be subjected. In these circumstances it was contemplated that partition should be imposed, if necessary by force. It was of the essence of the plan that lengthy discussion should not be permitted. On the appointed day, the Jerusalem State would be set up and the Amir of Trans-Jordan invited to annex the Arab area, whether the immediate liked it or not. An Administrator would be appointed to administer the Jewish area on a care-and-maintenance basis, and all immigration and development would be stopped until the Jews, in their own interests, consented to take over charge.

- partition can be imposed, the whole question will have to be thrashed out in the United Nations Assembly. Apart from any objections to the principle of partition, the Arabs might be expected to voice the following objections to the Cabinet Committee's particular plan, were that advanced as the proper solution by His Majesty's Government:-
 - (a) That 371,000 Arabs would be included in the Jewish State.
 - (b) That, of a total population of 1,211,000 Araba, only 618,000, or 51 per cent, would obtain independence, the remainder being subjected for ever to foreign domination in either the Jewish State.
 - possible of the Jewish land in the Jewish State was inequitable, since, owing to the disposition of the Jewish settlements, this entailed the inclusion also of a much larger area of the best Arab land in Palestine and the great length of the sea-board.
 - (d) That, out of 140,000 dunums of Arab owned citrus, the most important and only export crop of Palestine, only 29,000 dunums would be in the Arab State.
 - (e) That, of £331,000 paid by the Arabs in property texation, only £92,000 would accrue to the Arab State compared with £137,000 to the Jerusalem State.
 - (f) That Jaffa, the largest Arab town in Palestine with 66,000 Arab inhabitants, was included in the Jewish State.

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- (g) That the Arab State, as constituted, would be wholly unable to support itself without outside assistance and that its independence would thus be severely qualified.
- (h) That Galilee would be left as an "island" area,
 separated from the Arab State by a strip of
 Jewish State land, and that its administration
 in such circumstances would cause serious difficulty.
- (i) That the land left in the Arab State was so poor and the area of Jewish land in that State so small that there was no scope for either development or exchange which would enable some at least of the Arab minority in the Jewish State to be removed into the Arab area.
- 11. These objections can all be substantiated and make a formidable list. It seems almost certain that their recital would have its effect on the Assembly and that, even if that body accepted partition in principle, we should be told that we must attempt to devise some detailed scheme of partition less demonstrably unfair to the Arabs.
- 12. A scheme was therefore prepared with a view to meeting these objections so far as might be possible; the resulting boundaries are shown in red in Map II. The main changes made in the Cabinet Committee's plan are the following:-
 - (a) The Huleh Salient in the extreme north east of Palestine and one of the two areas in the country where flow irrigation is available (the other, Beisan, remains in the Jewish State) is transferred from the Jewish to the Arab State. The salient contains 58,000 Arabs owning 346,000 dunums of land and 7,000 Jews owning 116,000 dunums. This transfer has two advantages, namely:-

- (i) the salient is capable of large-scale development and, if so developed, would provide an area to which a considerable number of Arabs from the Jewish State could in time be removed for settlement; and
- (ii) Galilee would no longer be an island but would be physically connected with Syria, by which it would be annexed and administered.
- (b) The Jewish State is truncated at Tel Aviv, and Jaffa and the valuable area of the coastal plain to the south is transferred from the Jewish to the Arab State. This southern area contains 43,000 Arabs owning 342,000 dunums and 29,000 Jews owning 114,000 dunums. In addition to greatly improving the economic position of the Arab State, this transfer would enable an exchange to be effected of the Jews and Jewish land in the area for Arabs and Arab land in the Jewish State.
- (c) A portion of Western Galilee is transferred from the Arab to the Jewish State. It has been assumed in the past that the Arab portion of Palestine would be annexed by Trans-Jordan and that His Majesty's Government Would acquire by Treaty the same strategic position in it as they enjoy in the latter country. But under the plan now proposed, Galilee would form part of Syria and it cannot be assumed that there would be any disposition to afford strategic facilities to His Majesty's Government. It therefore seems essential (subject to what is said in paragraph 21 below) to include in the Jewish State sufficient of the hinterland of Haifa to admit of its effective defence.

The resulting Jewish State has an area of 13. 1,191 square miles; it is thus less than two thirds of the size of the Jewish State proposed by the Royal Commission and about 20 per cent smaller than that proposed by the Cabinet Committee. Most of the objections likely to be raised against the latter are met, in part at least. The number of Arabs in the Jewish State is reduced from 371,000 to 266,000, the number of Arabs in the Arab State, who will gain independence on partition, is increased from 618,000 to 709,000. Scope is afforded, by way of development and exchange, for a considerable further decrease in the former and increase in the latter number. The area of citrus in the Arab State is increased from 29,000 to 94,000 dunums. Of the property taxation paid by the Arabs, £124,000 would accrue to the Arab, £104,000 to the Jewish and £103,000 to the Jerusalem State, a much fairer distribution than that resulting from the Cabinet Committee s proposals and referred to in paragraph 10 (e) above; the figures for taxation payable in the Jewish and Jerusalem States are necessarily high as they include taxetion on the many Arab properties in Haifa and Jerusalem, respectively. Jaffa is included in the Arab State and the question of a Galilee island no longer arises.

would materially affect the viability of the Jewish State or its capacity to absorb new immigrants, except in agricultural occupations. When it is remembered that all Palestine north of the Negeb wilderness is very little larger than Yorkshire, it will be realized that any Jewish State must inevitably be small and must depend, not upon agriculture for which there can at best be little room, but upon industry, transport and the like, in fact, upon the type of economic activity which will allow of a high concentration of population in a very limited area. At present, 461,000 Jews or 83 per cent of the Jewish population

of Palestine are town dwellers and are living on an area of about 90 square miles, including the rural area farmed by the inhabitants of the smaller towns. In the light of these figures it is difficult to argue that a State containing nearly 1,200 square miles affords, on the ground of size, no scope for a further substantial increase of population by way of immigration.

- from this plan would be self-supporting; the finding of the Partition Commission, that it is impossible to carve two self-supporting states out of palestine, has never seriously been challenged. The most that can be said is that its economic prospects would be greatly improved and its dependence on outside assistance correspondingly reduced.
- It should not be impossible to convince the United Nations that a plan of this kind was not so detrimental to Arab interests as to be inacceptable as a solution of the whole difficult problem.
- being acceptable to the Zionists, who are demanding a Jewish State on an altogether different scale. It would almost certainly meet with determined and violent resistance. Apart from the small size of the resulting State, the plan would be attacked on two main grounds. First, that it deprived the Jews of the Huleh Salient, the development of which would permit of the settlement on the land of a substantial number of new immigrants. Secondly, and even more important, that it left in the Arab State the large areas of Jewish land south of Jaffa and, in particular, the two old established and flourishing Jewish townships of Rehovot and Rishon le Zion, with populations of 10,000 and 8,000 Jews, respectively. The loss of these townships would be resented and resisted so keenly that

there

there would be no hope of peace in Palestine while the grievance remained unredressed.

- 18. A further plan, with boundaries as shown in red in Map III, has therefore been prepared which retains Rehovot, Rishon le Zion and their environs in the Jewish State. The opportunity has been taken to improve the northern boundary of the Jewish State by:-
 - (a) extending that State northwards to the Lebanese boundary, thus eliminating the narrow corridor of Arab land between them; and
 - (b) reducing the depth of the salient thrust southwards from Galilee into the Jewish State, a salient which can hardly be avoided owing to the necessity, in deference to Christian sentiment, of excluding Nazareth and Mount Tabor from the Jewish State.
- 19. Below are given certain figures which compare the effects of this plan with those of the Cabinet Committee's plan and of the plan shown in Map II.

	<u>Cabines</u> Committee	Med II	Map III
Area of Jewish State in square miles	1,479	1,191	1,306
Population of Jewish State. Jews	448,000	399,000 266,000	428,000 294,000
Population of Arab State. Arab	A AAA	709,000 50,000	693,000 24,000
Citrus area in Arab State	29,000	94,000	45,000
Jewish land in Arab State in dunums	137,000	356,000	278,000
Distribution of property that paid by Arabs in & Arab State State Journalem State	e 137,000	124,000 104,000 103,000	124,000 105,000 102,000
Total property tax assessment	103,000	166,000	154,000
of Arab State in £	•	•	20./

SO° The plan shown in Map III is, of course, a compromise and suffers from the defects of a compromise. It retains Jaffa in the Arab State with a physical, if awkward connection with that State. It affords the opportunity for the removal of some of the Arabs in the Jewish State to the Huleh Salient on the development of the latter, but reduces the scope of a possible exchange of land and population. It leaves the Arab grievance regarding the loss of their citrus area largely unredressed and meets to a smaller extent their complaints regarding the large Arab minority left in the Jewish State and the comparatively small proportion of the total Arab population who will secure independence under the plan. To this extent, the Arabs will have a stronger case to urge against it before the United Nations than they would have against the plan shown in Map II.

Nevertheless, it is suggested that the importance 21. of retaining Rehovot and Rishon le Zion in the Jewish State is so great that this is the plan which should be adopted. One modification of it might be possible. The inclusion in the Jewish State of the defence area of Haifa is a blemish dictated entirely by strategic considerations; this area is almost wholly Arab, containing 53,000 Arabs owning 428,000 dunums of land, 2,000 Jews owning 12,000 dunums, and 8,000 dunums of citrus, all Arab-owned. This defence area was demarcated by the military authorities in 1938 but the conditions of warfare have changed so greatly since then that it may now be quite inadequate for the purpose and so hardly worth preserving. This is a matter for the Chiefs-of-Staff to consider. Should they advise that the reservation is unnecessary, it would be possible, by transferring this area to the Arab State and truncating the Jewish State on the red dotted line shown in Map III, to reduce the Arab minority in the Jewish State to 241,000 and to increase to 746,000 the Arabs who will gain independence under the plan.

22, It will, it is thought, be clear from this note that to adopt partition as the policy to be followed is only the first stage in a process; it is necessary also to decide exactly what plan of partition shall be adopted. Partition in the abstract means different things to different people. It may be taken that there is no plan of partition which, on the one hand, will satisfy Zionist aspirations and which, on the other, we could hope to defend with any chance of success before the United Nations as not demonstrably unfair to the Arabs. Any plan adopted must therefore be a compromise; it will thus inevitably be the object of attack by both Arabs and Jews, The plan illustrated in Map III seems to be as fair to both communities as any plan we can devise. If more were given to the Arabs, the Jewish State would be so restricted that the hope of a peaceful settlement with the Zionists would disappear; if more were given to the Jews we should provide the Arabs with such weighty arguments against the plan that it would probably be rejected on the score of inequity by the United Nations.

the United States to support a policy of partition we should simultaneously let them know the plan of partition which we have in mind. It would be fatal to get them committed to partition as a policy and then find that they were not prepared to endorse the type of partition which we consider it possible to implement. We do not want a repetition of what happened in connection with immigration. There was no difference between the two Governments as to the principle that Jewish immigration into Palestine must continue; there was, however, a wide difference between their views as to the rate and extent of the immigration to be permitted. It is useless to obtain agreement to a principle if there is no agreement as to its detailed application.

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1947

PALESTINE

Registry E/7/9/115/31 FROM 4. O. Minuto No. Dated Received in Registry) 19. Feb/947 26 Feb/1944	The Palestine Policy. Toporal D' Tamali asked on feb 14 fer ty of man of last British proposals for the cantonication of Policies which to tod been told had been shown to the Tears.
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Last Paper.

1671

References.

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Off. D' Fadlil

Tamali

(Action completed.)

Next Paper.

E 2242.

(Minutes.)

H-B. 13/

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61858

32003 F.O.P

E 1719
26 FEB

Dr. Jamali asked me on the 17th February if he could be given a copy of the map of the last British proposals for the cantonisation of Palestine which he had been told we had shown to the Jews. I told Dr. Jamali that I thought there was only one copy in existence but that we were having it copied and I would send him a copy through the Embassy in Bagdad.

R.S.H

19th February, 1947.

9 submit a trafé les Don gamali

H.Berley 21/2

Sin R. Howe

OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No. E1119/115-/31 Dear Dr. Jamali, I am enclosing two whis of the White Paper on Paluoline which has just been issued here. from Sin Robert I hope this will enable you to Howe) & 6 add on to your private library on the subject. You may remember awking me about the man which was shown to representative of the greech Agency during our neent informal talks with them This was identical with the may accompanying the provincial auteriony plan, and now myroduced

Restricted.

Jamali

To be sent this is when I have be and .

H.B. 21/2

H.E. Dr. Fadhil

three following changes:

- (i) This was no reporte district y gensalem
- (ii) Then was no separate district of the Neget.
- (iii) Jeffa was connected to the not of the Anat and by means of a comidor; the southern part of the Jurish area was thus isolated.

He explained, to when showing this may to the purish representative that it was not yet in its final from and that in might introduce further modifications of the provincial autonomy boundaries in the light of our discussions with both parties

> Yours Sincerely (Std (R. G. Howe

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

101.

8th March, 1947.

(E 1719/115/31)

Dear Dr. Jamali,

I am enclosing two copies of the White Paper on Palestine which has just been issued here. I hope this will enable you to add one to your private library on the subject.

You may remember asking me about the map which was shown to representatives of the Jewish Agency during our recent informal talks with them. This map was identical with the one accompanying the provincial autonomy plan, and now reproduced in the white Paper, except for the three following changes:

- (1) There was no separate district of Jerusalem.
- (2) There was no separate district of the Negeb.
- (3) Jaffa was connected with the rest of the Arab area by means of a corridor; the southern part of the Jewish area was thus isolated.

We explained, when showing this map, to the Jewish representative, that it was not yet in its final form and that we might introduce further modifications of the "provincial" autonomy" boundaries in the light of our discussions with both parties.

Yours Sincerely

(R.G.Howe)

Dr. Fadhil Jamali.

RECORD

17	E	E 2242
1947		14 MAR
Registry Number 2242/15/3/ TELEGRAM FROM No. On Chica Dated Received in Registry 12 Mod 1944 14 May 1944	Polistial, Reference to Following hom windle Las drawn betintion of al. report - Fines of Mor. 6 fer of U. N. Las apparent soroneff to take charge bournission this guies hear loving to influence he over on Polistial Commission, on	to effect and register that he had been to support experience of the s
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E 22-2

103

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM SALONICA TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

His Majesty's Consul General.

No. 108.

D. 11.8 a.m. 12th March 1947.

12th March 1947.

R. 1.35 p.m. 12th March 1947.

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York. Athens.

0:0:0:0

SECRET.

GIANT.

Frontier Commission.

Following from Windle.

Columbian delegate has drawn attention of United States delegate and myself to the report in "The Times" of March 6th to the effect that the Secretary General of United Nations has appointed Assistant Secretary General Soboleff to take charge of the Palestine Enquiry Commission. Although this is not strictly any concern of ours, our experience with Secretariat personnel on this Commission, which formed the subject of Salonica telegram No. 63, gives us reason to suspect that undue Soviet influence be exercised through Secretariat on Palestine Commission, as it has been on this Commission.

Foreign Office please pass to New York as my telegram

Foreign Office please pass to New York as my telegram No. 19.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York].



32003 F.O.P

Next Paper.

E2359

105

M.D.C. Mcalpine, Esq., Foreign Office.

Conca.

with r. J.M. Addis's Compliments.

E 2309

10, Downing Street, Maitehall, S.W.1.

15th Larch, 1947.

ence:

371

10, Downing Street, Whitehall, S.W.l.

Carter

106

13th March, 1947.

New Smith,

I am sorry that we did not send you earlier the enclosed copy of a letter dated March 10th from the Prime Minister to Mr. Churchill about the possibility of expediting the reference of the Palestine question to U.N.O.

You will see that Mr. Attlee has promised to communicate again with Mr. Churchill as soon as there is anything further to report. Will you and the Foreign Office, therefore, please ensure that we are informed immediately of any new development?

I am sending a copy of this to Mcalpine (Foreign Office).

Yours sinearely

(Sgd) J.H. ADDIS.

T. Smith, Esq., Colonial Office.

₩ ~ 1858

CONFIDENTIAL

10, Downing Street, Whitehall, S.W.1.

107

10th March, 1947.

My dear Churchill,

After the Colonial Secretary's statement on the 4th March you asked whether there would be anything further to say about the possibility of expediting the reference of the Palestine question to U.N.O. if you asked a Question in about a week's time; and I understand that you have now asked whether a statement could be made tomorrow.

The position is that we have suggested the immediate setting up of an ad hoc Commission of Enquiry, which would get to work at once and report to the General Assembly. I understand that this proposal is acceptable to the Secretary-General of U.N.O. and to the French, the Chinese and the Russian representatives. Unfortunately,

however....

however, the Americans have raised certain

difficulties. The Foreign Secretary hopes that
he will be able to dispose of these by discussion
with General Marshall in Moscow and it may
therefore be possible to make a further statement
in a few days, but I think you will understand
that anything said now might well increase the
difficulties. I hope that in these circumstances
you will be willing to defer your request for a
statement. I will, of course, communicate with
you again as soon as there is anything further
to report.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) C.R.ATTLEE.

The Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill, O.M., C.H., F.R.S., M.P.

Top Secret. Secret.

Confidential. Restricted.

Open.

MARGIN

WRITTEN

Mr. Addis. 10, Downing St.

From Private Secretary)

OUT FILE 18t April.

Please refer to your letter of the 13th March to Trafford Smith at the Colonial Office, about the possibility of expediting the reference of the Palestine problem to the United Nations.

It has since been agreed between the Colonial Office and ourselves that we should provide you with the information for which you asked in that letter.

The present position is as follows. The Americans maintained their objection to the appointment of a committee by the Secretary- General, and the Secretary-General has now agreed to the convening of a special session of the Assembly itself for the purpose of appointing a committee which would report back to the regular session of the Assembly in The Secretariat are now September. sounding the Russian, French and Chinese delegates/

Wt. 26469/

NOTHING

delegates in New York on this proposal. Sir A. Cadogan has been given authority to make a formal request for the special . session as soon as these consultations are concluded.

So far as Parliament is concerned, we would prefer to postpone an answer on this subject until Sir A. Cadogan's note has actually been delivered.

CM14 CM14

MARGIN. WRITTEN NOTHING

OUT FILE

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.,

111

1st April, 1947.

E 23**6**9/115/31.

Please refer to your letter of the 13th March to Trafford Smith at the Colonial Office, about the possibility of expediting the reference of the Palestine problem to the United Nations.

It has since been agreed between the Colonial Office and ourselves that we should provide you with the information for which you asked in that letter.

The present position is as follows. The Americans maintained their objection to the appointment of a committee by the Secretary-General, and the Secretary-General has now agreed to the convening of a special session of the Assembly itself for the purpose of appointing a committee which would report back to the regular session of the Assembly in September. The Secretariat are now sounding the Russian, Franch and Chinese delegates in New York on this proposal. Sir A. Cadogan has been given authority to make a formal request for the special session as soon as these consultations are concluded.

So far as Parliament is concerned, we would prefer to postpone an answer on this subject until Sir A. Cadogan's note has actually been delivered.

(Sch.) R. D. C. McALPINE

J.M. Addis, Esq., 10 Downing Street, S.W.1. COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

1 2 3 4 5 6 Reference: C 371 61858

Eastern Dept.

CMCA.

3/4.

INDEXED

10, Wohrning Street, Mhitehall.

112

2309 115 31 Mc Alpine,

2nd April, 1947.

Thank you for your letter (E 2309/115/31) of April 1st about the reference of the Palestine question to the United Mations. am sure that you will let me know as soon as it is possible for the Prime Minister to give any further information to Fr. Churchill. view of the past correspondence on this subject,

it is particularly important that Mr. Attlee

Yours sincerely, MADDIS

should be able to imform Lr. Churchill in advance

R.D.C. McAlpine, Esc., Foreign Office.

of any publicity.



OUT FILE

FOREIGN CAFICE, S.W.1

113

4th April 1947

With reference to our telephone conversation this morning, I suggest that the Prime Minister might wish to write to Mr. Churchill in more or less the following terms.

agreement arrived at in New York for a special session of the United Nations Assembly on Palestine should have reached you first through the Fress and not from me. The informal consultations in New York ended more quickly than we had expected, and a letter which was in preparation for sending to you was overtaken by events.

"The special session was formally requested in a note from Sir A. Cadogan to the Secretary General on the 2nd April, and a few nours later the Secretariat despatched a telegram to all other members of the United Nations asking for their agreement, to the summoning of a special session. It is stated in this telegram that the special session is proposed for the purpose of constituting and instructing a special committee to prepare for the consideration of the above question (i.e. Palestine) at the next regular session'.

of Procedure, the member states have 50 days in which to answer the Secretary General, but that he is bound to convene the special session within 15 days as soon as he has the approval of a simple majority. It is possible, therefore, that the special session may begin its work before the end of April."

THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, 61858

to appoint a formulter, receive its report and

1 arrive

E 25-91

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arrive et a decision sen their para. 3). In our view this is over-oftimistic. It seems mon probeth that, embes proparation work is dom about the Secretarial level before next September, the Assembly will protopone a se decision on its recommendations until September 1948. The Australians should appreciate our reluctance to face this prospect.

V.N. Dept. Novas

mm Tu 19/3

7. Beeley 187

Dominion Opin are answring thin, and the Baseley has seen the draft.

An. Finch 20/3

H.B.21/3

In-1.1. 0.0 tel to aust' 5-4 and N. X. 48 2/3

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116

INWARD TELEGRAM

CYPHER (TYPEX)

E_2359

FROM:

AUSTRALIA (GOVT.)

18 MAR

<u>TO:</u>

D.O.

RPTD: NEW ZEALAND (GOVT.)
D. 17th Mar., 1947, 6.20 p.m.

R. 17th " 2.35 p.m.

IMMEDIATE
No. 68

Addressed to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, No. 68, repeated to External Wellington No. 64.

Your D. 227. Palestine. E 1231/2/3/

The proposal for the establishment by the Secretary General of an ad hoc Committee on Palestine, while it might appear to be a time-saving device, raises several difficulties. We consider it would be bad tactics, and be a great blow to British prestige.

- 2. The Charter Confers no (repeat no) power on the Secretary General to summon such a Committee as proposed by the United Kingdom. The scope of the Secretary General's powers is clearly set out in chapter XV of the Charter. Accordingly, if a Committee were formed in the manner suggested, its status could be challenged at the General Assembly. In addition to United Kingdom scheme provides no machinery for determining the proposed Committee's terms of reference, powers, composition and procedure, particularly to whom and how it makes its report and recommendations.
- 3. We believe that, if the matter is to go to the Assembly, the Assembly itself should appoint a fact-finding Committee to take evidence from all interested parties, organisations and individuals, and to report back while the Assembly is in session. On the basis of the report, the General Assembly could them make a decision.
- 4. The only alternative to this would be to place matter before Security Council, under article 35, which could report to Assembly when a course of action had been decided upon.

Copy to:-

Foreign Office

Mr. J.P.G. Finch

ROLOT SUL OTTIGG

Mr. H. Beeley

Colonial Office

Mr. Trafford Smith

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Reference: 371 61858

We have compliments of the Under-Secretary of State for Dominion

Affairs.

23 MAR 1947

(This is an unparaphrased version of a Secret cypher message and unless it is marked O.T.P. (One Time Pad) the text must first be paraphrased if it is essential to communicate it to persons outside British and United States Government Services.)

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

INDEXED

CYPHER (TYPEX)

FROM: D. 0. 1359 115 31

RPTD:

AUSTRALIA NEW ZEALAND (GOVT.)

(Sent 6.15 p.m., 21st Mar., 1947.)

No. 54 No. 48 SECRET

Canberra No. 54, repeated Wellington No. 48.

Your telegram 17th March No. 68 repeated External Wellington No. 64. Palestine.

We agree that United Nations Charter does not specifically empower Secretary General to summon ad hoc Committee of the type proposed, but, on the other hand, there is nothing in Chapter XV which would In fact, although Secretary specifically debar him from so doing. General has asked that this proposal should come officially from United Kingdom Government, he originally suggested it himself, in conversation with United Kingdom representative to the United Nations, as an alternative to summoning Special Assembly, to which he objected on grounds of expense.

- We appreciate, however, force of arguments in your paragraph 2 about possibility that Committee's status might be challenged in Assembly and you will see from my telegram D.No. 268 that we are at present considering suggestions for overcoming this difficulty.
- As regards your paragraph 3, we consider it essential that preparatory work should be done before Assembly meets in September. It seems most unlikely that Assembly would be able to reach any decision on Palestine this year if fact-finding Committee were not appointed until Assembly had actually met and we are anxious to avoid recommendations on Palestine question being postponed until 1948 Assembly.
- As regards your paragraph 4, objections to placing Palestine. question before Security Council under Article 35 are that it would have to be submitted as a situation or dispute and it would, moreover, rest with Security Council to decide whether matter should be referred It would, in our view, be applying too narrow a to Assembly at all . criterion to Palestine question to treat it as a dispute or situation. Our object is that, as United Kingdom Government is in present circumstances no longer prepared to carry out the Mandate, the United Nations should determine the future of the Mandate, the interpretation to be placed on it and/or the date of its super-session by a government of the people of Palestine. Most appropriate body to consider matter on these lines is clearly the General Assembly, which could do so under Article 10 of the Charter.

Copy to:-

Foreign Office

Sir D. Scott Mr. J.P.G.Finch (8) Mr. H. Beeley

Mr. Trafford Smith

OFFICE, 6185

PUBLIC

Colonial Office

With the Compliments of the Under-Jourday, or state for Dominion

Affairs.

(This is an unparaphrased version of a Secret cypher message and unless it is marked O.T.P. (One Time Pad) the text must first be paraphrased if it is essential to communicate it to persons outside British and United States Government Services.)

INWARD TELEGRAM WEEKED

2319 115 21

CYPHER (TYPEX)

AUSTRALIA (GOVT.) FROM:

<u>TQ</u>:

D.O.

D. 25th Mar., 1947, 4.20 p.m. R. 25th " 2.00 p.m.

No. 75

Palestine. Your D. No. 268 and No. 54.

We note with interest United States agreement with our view that an ad hoc committee may not be regarded as satisfactory.

- We note also that your concern is to have matter settled at this coming assembly meeting, and that you consider therefore a fact-finding committee should carry out proliminary work before the assembly meeting.
- 3. In these circumstances we consider that United States proposal for a special assembly meeting is perhaps the best solution. The Secretary General's complaint regarding expense can be met by allowing this special meeting of the assembly to discuss, not only Palestine, but also the financing of the United Nations which apparently is at present a matter of concern to the Secretary General.
- We suggest therefore that the United Kingdom and the United States both immediately endeavour to obtain the consent of a majority of the members of the United Nations in accordance with article 20 for the calling of a special session. An alternative which you might consider is to refer the matter immediately to the Security Council, with a request that they ask the Secretary General to call a special session.

Copy to:-

Foreign Office

Sir D. Scott

Mr. J.P.G. Finch (δ)

Mr. H. Beeley

Colonial Office

Mr. Trafford Smith

THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON 61858

With the Compliments of the

Under-Secretary of State for Dominion 3

Affairs.

This is an unparaphrased version of a Secret cypher message and unless it is marked O.T.P. (One Time Pad) the text must first be paraphrased if it is essential to communicate it to persons outside British and United States Government Services.)

OUTWARD T'ELEGRA

INDEXED

F.2780/21 CYPHER (TYPEX) - 2359 115-131

FR CM:

AUSTRALIA (GOVT.)

(Sent 5.15 p.m. 2nd Apr., 1947.)

No. 63 SECRET.

Your telegram 25th March No. 75. Palestine.

We agree that, in the circumstances, best solution would be to revert to our original proposal for summoning of special Assembly to appoint fact-finding Committee and we are glad to note that you would support this. United States Government and Secretary-General have now indicated that they would be prepared to agree to this course and latter is now consulting representatives of other permanent members of the Security Council. We have therefore authorised United Kingdom Representative to United Nations to request Secretary-General to seek concurrence of majority of Member States in special Assembly, as required by Article 20 of Charter.

- In these circumstances we do not (repeat not) think it necessary to suggest that special Assembly should also discuss United Nations budget. We feel, in any case, that it is desirable to confine agenda to single issue of Palestine. This would ensure that session would be short and inexpensive and could be attended by permanent representatives in New York. To suggest any other item for agenda might open door to further expansion of agenda, involving a long and expensive session and sending of full delegations. Anything approaching full-scale Assembly would not (repeat not), in our view, command general support.
- As regards your paragraph 4, we consider it preferable that special Assembly should be summoned in accordance with Rule 4 of Assembly's provisional rules of procedure. To take Palestine question to Security Council, even under Article 20 of Charter, might be regarded as prima facie admission that Security Council is an appropriate body to deal with Palestine. It might moreover be difficult to avoid substantive discussion in Security Council, which might prejudice subsequent discussions in September Assembly.

Copy to: -

Foreign Office

Mr. F. T. A. Ashton-Gwatkin

Mr. J.P.G. Finch (8)

Mr. H. Beeley

Colonial Office

Mr. Trafford Smith

E 2501 25 Mists

1947

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Dated

New York.

Received in Registry }

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Last Paper.

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References.

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
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(Action completed.) Next Paper.

E 4216

32003 F.O.P.



CYPHER/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL NO 2

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From Permanent United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations)

No. 977 24th March 1947

D. 10.11. p.m. 24th March 1947 25th March 1947. R. 5.5. a.m.

Repeated to Washington Moscow.

HHHH

IMMEDIATE

PALESTINE

Secretary General tells me it is essential for him to go to Oslo for a few days to testify before a Government commission of enquiry into conduct of Foreign Policy during the war.

- He will have to start on March 27th.
- of a decision before that date on the question of the approach to the United Nations on the question of Palestine.
- He tells me that he has been under heavy fire from Arabs and to some extent also from Jews and he seems therefore to be coming round to idea that a special assembly should be summoned to appoint the proposed committee about whose status there could then be no question.
- 5. If the decision is finally in favour of summoning a special assembly procedure would be fairly simple and Secretary General could give necessary instructions from Oslo.
- I take this opportunity to recall that time Special assembly might not I underis running short. stand be able to meet until 45 days after the date of the request for its meeting i.e. about the middle of May. That probably means that committee could not begin functioning much before June. Their report should be circulated about a month before meeting of the regular assembly and thus they will have not too-much time in which to do their work.




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If partition which may help them
to decide whether the momentum

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My dear gamen,

As you probably know a "Study of Partition; being a comparative examination of four possible plans for the division of Palestine, has been prepared by Sir Douglas Harris and with Beeley's co-operation printed by the Foreign Office Press. The main object of this work is to have readily available for the investigating committee of the United Nations all the statistics relating to partition and enable them to assess the merits and demerits of any partition plan they may be called on to consider. We have now received from Palestine the specially printed maps for inclusion in the study and have sent them to Gates of the Foreign Office Press under cover of a minute of which I enclose a copy. We have asked for ten copies of the study, without maps, to send to Palestine and thirty copies, with maps, for our own use. We propose of these to send ten copies to Martin for the use of the United Kingdom Delegation. We feel that we are not yet in a position to make recommendations regarding the tactical use of this document but you should know that it is now ready for employment when required.

Jang we,

FOREIGN OFFICE PRESS

Study of Partition

Two cases, containing 200 copies of each of eight different maps, are sent herewith.

The maps are entitled as follows:-

Index Map	Royal Commission
ditto	First Revision
ditto	Second Revision
dit to	Jewish Agency
Detailed Map	Royal Commission
ditto	First Revision
ditto	Second Revision
ditto	Jewish Agency

One copy of each of the four Index Maps has been placed at the top of the small case and one copy of each of the Detailed Maps at the top of the larger case.

210 copies of the "Study of Partition" were to be printed with pockets for the reception of the maps.

It is requested that the maps may be folded and a copy of each of the eight different maps inserted in the pockets of 200 copies of the Study.

Ten copies will thus be without maps.


Middle East Department, Colonial Office, will be glad to receive as soon as possible - 30 copies with maps, and the 10 copies without maps.

The other 170 copies (with maps) may kindly be retained in the Press for the time being. Arrangements for their distribution will be made in consultation with the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office and, when these arrangements have been settled, instructions to the Press will be given accordingly.

Colonial Office, Downing Street, S.W.1. 13th May, 1947.

~7 6185





13 JUN 1947

Downing Street.

S.W.1.

// June, 1947.

My dear Garran,

Please refer to my letter 75872/154/4/47 of the 16th May about the "Study of Partition". As there was no certainty that the documents would reach Martin in New York before he left, and as it seemed improbable that they would be required for issue to the Committee before it reached Palestine, we have sent a further ten copies to Jerusalem and none to New York. Copies will thus be available for the Committee if it is decided to release the document during the Jerusalem session.

Tour eve, WM Pathusin

I.P. GARRAN, ESQ.,

FOREIGN OFFICE.

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PALESTINE

A STUDY OF PARTITION

PALESTINE A STUDY OF PARTITION

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Part II.	Index maps and Comparative Statement explaining and giving the more important statistics of four typical plans of partition	5
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Part IV.	Appendices containing statistics of four typical plans of partition	19
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PART I

FOREWORD

This study does not purport to deal with the general question whether or not partition is likely to prove a satisfactory solution of the Palestine problem. It assumes acceptance of partition as a practical proposition and is confined to a discussion of how, in that event, partition might be effected.

- 2. The study has been undertaken with two main objects in view. The first object is to show, by analysing four typical partition plans, the difficulties inherent in the drawing of boundaries and, where possible, to make suggestions as to how these difficulties can be surmounted or, if not surmountable, at least diminished. The second object is to give statistics of the four plans in such detail that corresponding statistics of any desired variant can be readily calculated.
- 3. Palestine could, of course, be partitioned in any one of innumerable different ways. There are, however, certain areas which, under any logical plan, must be included in Jewish territory; similarly there are others which, being wholly Arab, could not appropriately be so included. This consideration limits the number of variants which can be regarded as practicable. It seems probable that, if Palestine is to be partitioned, the plan of partition ultimately to be adopted will approximate fairly closely to one of the four plans discussed in this study.
- 4. In Part II, index maps of the four plans are given and some of the more important statistics relating to them are discussed in a comparative statement. The points there examined are those which are likely to be raised on the Arab side if partition comes to be considered in detail by the United Nations. It is improbable that that Organisation will be prepared to support any recommendation which can be clearly shown to be unfair to Arab interests, and it is therefore important to scrutinise the various plans from this point of view. It appears that the main difficulty likely to arise will be to produce a plan which, while not demonstrably unfair to the Arabs, will in any way satisfy Zionist aspirations.
- 5. Part III contains notes on certain important matters which arise in connection with partition and with the preparation of statistics for any desired plan.
- 6. Part IV contains the statistics of the four plans examined. There are three Appendices relating to each plan. Appendix I gives the statistics of the villages intersected by State boundaries (see note 2 in Part III). Appendix II gives, in the fullest detail available, the statistics of each State (and in some cases of portions of the State) visualised in the plan concerned. This Appendix enables statistics to be prepared for any variant of the plan by the simple process of adding or subtracting the corresponding figures given in the "Village Statistics" (see note 1 in Part III) in respect of any town or village which it may be desired to include in or exclude from the area under consideration. The figures in Appendix II are, however, somewhat more detailed than are required for a general conspectus of the effects of the plan, and therefore the more important totals (shown in italics) are carried forward into Appendix III, the Summary of Statistics, where the statistics of each plan are given in a condensed and simple form.
- 7. Part V contains detailed maps of the four plans, showing the towns and villages included in each partition area and thus enabling variants to be readily prepared.

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PART II

In	dex maps (in pocket a	it end) :—						•	•	Page
	Royal Commission			•		•				
	First Revision				•		;	•		•
	Second Revision	,	•					t v		e I
	Jewish Agency				,		r.			•
Co	mparative Statement	of Partition	Plans	•••	• • • • • •	•••	•••		 •••	6

Comparative Statement of Partition Plans

		Jewish Agency.	,
Silving a marginal and second	Second Bosinion	COOLIN INGVISIOII.	rigin and Description of Plan
	First Revision.		Origina
	Royal Commission.		

accompanying it. No exact boundaries were delimited by the Commission. The boundaries shown in Map A in Part V show the interpretation placed by the Government of Palestine on the description of the frontiers given in the Commission's The plan of partition recommended by the Royal Commission is described in Chapter XXII of the Commission's report and is illustrated roughly in Map No. 8 accompanying it. No exact boundaries were delimited by the Commission. The

The Commission contemplated the division of Palestine into an Arab State, a Jewish State and two mandated Enclaves, round Nazareth and Jerusalem, respectively.

The Jewish State was to include the whole of Galilee, the plains of Esdraelon and Jezreel, and the coastal plain as far south as Isdud, except for the corridor mentioned in the following paragraph.

a revised plan of partition (designated for the purpose of this study as the First Revision) was prepared. It was based upon the Royal Commission's plan with certain modifications designed to obviate difficulties Commission were re-examined sed plan of partition (designated arpose of this study as the F the recommendations inherent in the latter. n 1943, Royal C revised

Following the general lines recommended by the Royal Commission, it was proposed that Palestine should be divided into an Arab State, a Jewish State, a Jerusalem Enclave and a southern mandated territory, comprising the waste lands of the Negeb (see Note 3 in Part III).

minor modifications of boundary, substantially the same area as proposed by the Royal Commission, with the exception of western Galilee, which was to be excluded from the Jewish State and constituted as an island appendage to the Arab State. Certain other areas, in particular southern Beisan and the mandated corridor to Jaffa, were, however, to be added to the Jewish State in company. The Jewish State was to cover, subject to Certain other areas, in Beisan and the mandate were, however, to be a State in compensation.

While representatives of the Jewisu Agency have stated that they are prepared to consider an offer of "a viable Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine," they have consistently refused to produce a map showing what they regard as included in this description. In the course of distribution however, they indicated roughly cussion, however, they indicated roughly the boundaries which they had in mind. These boundaries were marked on a small-scale map and shown to them and they agreed, without committing themselves to details, that the map correctly illustrated their intentions. Map D in Part V is an enlargement of this map. The plan designated as the Second Revision is an attempt to meet, so far as is possible, the main objections which would probably be raised by the Arabs to the First Revision, while still providing a Jewish State which would be viable and would afford reasonable scope for development.

The plan provides for an Arab State and a Jewish State, special arrangements to be made for the administration of that portion of the city of Jerusalem which contains the Holy Places.

The division of Palestine would be on the same general lines as proposed in the First Revision.

(b) A portion of the coastal plain south of Tel Aviv.

The Jewish State would include the Jewish State as delimited by the Royal Commission, with the addition of :—

(a) The Nazareth Enclave.

(b) The area east of the Jordan in the vicinity of Lake Tiberias, which was assigned by the Royal Commission to the Arab State.

(c) Southern Beisan.

(d) The Jaffa corridor, excluding the town of Jaffa.

(e) The remainder of the Gaza Sub-district.

(e) The remainder of the Gaza Cu.
(f) The Beersheba Sub-district, including the Negeb.

he eastern portions of the Hebron and Jerusalem Sub-districts. (g) The

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The Jerusalem Enclave was to include Serusalem and Bethlehem, and was to be extended to the Mediterranean by means of a corridor terminating at Jaffa and cutting the Jewish State into two parts.

The Jerusalem Enclave was to be enlarged.

It was considered that its boundaries should be so delimited as to include:—

(a) The road and railway from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, thus making it possible for Jews to proceed direct from the Jewish State to Jerusalem without passing through Arab territory.

(b) The town of Ramallah, 10 miles north of Jerusalem, where numbers of workers in Jerusalem reside.

(c) The source of the Jerusalem water supply at Ras el Ein.

The mandated corridor was to be eliminated and Jaffa included in the Jewish State.

the

comprise

\$

was

Arab

remainder of Palestine, including the Negeb. Jaffa, although not physically connected with the Arab State, was to be administered

by that State.

The Arab State was to include the remainder of Palestine, except the waste lands of the Negeb. It would be divided into two portions by a strip of Jewish territory. The southern boundary of Galilee, which forms the northern portion of the State, was to be so drawn that Nazareth and Mount Tabor would fall within it, thus obviating the necessity for the Nazareth Enclave. Neither the Royal Commission nor those responsible for drawing up the First Revision regarded the inclusion of these Holy Places in a Jewish State as practicable, in deference to Christian sentiment.

The southern mandated territory was to include the waste area of the Negeb, south of the furthest limits of cultivation. This area was to be retained under mandatory control until a survey had shown whether or not any type of development was possible there.

B 4

Agency's intention that Jewish Agency's intention that Jewishaling the Arab suburbs, a Jewish municipality covering the Arab suburbs, a Jewish municipality covering the Jewish suburbs, and an area, which would include the Holy Places, to be administered by some form of Trustee Administration. The Arab and Jewish municipal areas would be physically connected with, and form part of, the Arab and Jewish States, respectively.

As, however, figures for the area and population of these municipalities are not available, Jerusalem has been shown as a separate entity in the statistics of the plan in Part IV. is understood that it is the Jewish Subject to a very small rectification in the south, the Jerusalem Enclave would be as delimited in the First Revision.

The Arab State would consist of the central hill country lying between Jenin in the north and Hebron in the south, The town of Jaffa would be administered by the Arab State but would have no physical connection with it, being entirely ringed by Jewish State land. The Arab State would be as delimited in the First Revision, with the addition of the two areas, above referred to, to be trainsferred from the Jewish State and a small area to be transferred from the Jerusalem Enclave.

The southern mandated territory would be as delimited in the First Revision.

Reference

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Comparative Statement of Partition Plans

	Jewish Agency.	
	Second Revision.	and Galilee
	First Revision.	The Treatment of Jaffa
Royal Commission		

The placing in the Jewish State of Jaffa, the largest Arab town in Palestine, the only Arab port and the most important centre of Arab industry, would seriously impair the economic position of the Arab State. The population of Jaffa comprises 63,610 Arabs and only 9,200 Jews. Its inclusion in Jewish territory would be fiercely resented by the preserve Jaffa as an Arab town could not but cause serious administrative inconvenience. Jaffa would have no physical connection with its parent State and not only would the suggested corridor divide the Jewish State into two parts, but it would terminate at Jaffa in a complex tangle of international boundaries. The arrangement proposed in order to

The inclusion in the Jewish State of western Galilee, which is almost wholly Arab, having a population of 122,150 Arabs and only 2,960 Jews, would be strongly resented by the Arabs. The proposal that it should be so included was one of the main causes of the insurrection in Galilee in 1937.

Jaffa would form part of the Arab State, with which it would be physically connected to the south, thus obviating the necessity for a corridor.

(b) Galilee

Arabs.

The whole of Galilee, eastern and western, containing 162,550 Arabs and 9,870 Jews, would be excluded from the Jewish State and thus given a direct physical connection with Syria. The latter State would probably welcome a proposal that it should absorb Galilee and no opposition to such absorption would be likely to be experienced from the inhabitants of the tract. Western Galilee would be excluded from the Jewish State and treated as an island appendage to the Arab State. The inconvenience of this arrangement is obvious. The Arab inhabitants of Galilee would almost certainly be unwilling to be included in the Lebanon (with which State Galilee is in physical connection) and the Lebanon would probably be equally unwilling to take them, as their inclusion would affect the delicate balance between Moslems and Christians in that territory. Galilee should properly be joined with Syria or administered by the Arab State, from both of which, however, it would be separated by a strip of Jewish State land.

of Jaffa, an island about 6 square miles in extent, wholly surrounded by Jewish State land, would present a difficult problem. Indeed, it is open to question whether, in the conditions contemplated, Jaffa could politically, strategically or economically maintain its connection with the Arab State for any length of time. the Arab State administration by

8 The same remarks apply as to the Royal Commission's plan.

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Andrew Commission In Section またとう TO SECTION SECTION THE STATE OF

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442,880 Jews. 619,850 Arabs.

The population of the Jewish State would comprise

The population of the Jewish State would comprise The population of the Jewish State would comprise:—

The Size of the Arab Minority in the Jewish State

of the population would be

45. per cent.

Nearly 47 per cent: of the population would

428,610 Jews. 376,990 Arabs.

comprise

The population of the Jewish State would

This large Arab minority constitutes a valid Arab objection to the plan.

Arab

minority remains substantially under the Royal Commission's

A 26,180 Jews.
235,510 Arabs
Arabs would form rather more than one-third of the population.
It will be seen that the modifications

It will be seen that the modifications proposed in the First Revision result in a reduction of the Arab minority by 135,990, while excluding only 21,330 Jews formerly included in the Jewish State. Of the latter number, 9,200 are residents of Jaffa.

It is doubtful whether the Arab minority can be reduced much below the figure reached under this plan without either mutilating the Jewish State or drawing its boundaries so tightly as severely to restrict

More than 58 per cent. of the population would be Arabs.

Even if the 97,000 Jews living in Jerusalem (and by no means all live in the Jewish suburbs) were added to the population of the State, there would still be an Arab majority of 79,970.

The Jewish, Agency representatives have stressed that it is their intention that the administration of the Jewish State shall be conducted on normal democratic lines. It follows that, if the Jews are to have a working majority in their own State, it would be necessary to admit a couple of hundred thousand immigrants into Palestine before partition took place.

There would be in the Jewish State.
376,990 Arabs, and
3,008,578 dunums of Arab land,
while there would be in the Arab State
18,970 Jews, and
176,648 dunums of Jewish land.
No exchange could materially affect the

There would be in the Jewish State 235,510 Arabs, and 1,228,268 dunums of Arab land, while there would be in the Arab State 27,000 Jews, and 302,290 dunums of Jewish land. The possibilities of exchange would, in the case of population, be somewhat, and in the case of land, appreciably greater than under the Royal Commission's plan or under the First Revision.

There would be in the Jewish State 619,850 Arabs, and 7,114,806 dunums of Arab land, while there would be in the Arab State 13,720 Jews, and 57,965 dunums of Jewish land. The possibility of affecting the size of the Arab majority in the Jewish State by an exchange of population would thus be negligible.

Possibility of Reducing the Arab Minority in the Jewish State

further development.

(a) By Exchange of Population and Land

371,500 Arabs, and
1,916,294 dunums of Arab land,
lle there would be in the Arab State
5,670 Jews, and
136,619 dunums of Jewish land.
s possibilities of exchange would thus be
n smaller than under the Royal Com-There would be in the Jewish State 371.500 Arabs. and 1,916, while there

mission's pla The possibil

size of the Arab minority.

PART II—continued

-continued Comparative Statement of Partition Plans-

Second Revision.	
First Revision.	
Commission.	

(b) By Development

The pc

which could be developed with a view to the removal thereto of Arabs from the lewish State, namely, the coastal plain south of Isdud, where water can be obtained by pumping from the sub-soil and, more important, southern Beisan, where flow irrigation is available. It is impossible to say how many additional Arabs these two areas, if fully developed, could absorb, but it would almost certainly not be sufficient to reduce the Arab minority in the Jewish State to a figure which could be contemplated with equanimity. areas in the Arab State two There

extreme north and south wo of intensive development.

This figure is of importance, as the main claim of the Arabs is to independence, which will only be achieved by those Arabs included in the Arab State. The remainder will continue subject to foreign domination in either the Jewish State or the mandated Enclaves. The number of Arabs in the Arab State under this plan is

or 52 per cent. of the Arab population of Palestine. 635,700

There would be no possibility of intensive development in the hill regions of which the Arab State would consist, more than half of which is uncultivable. Indeed, it is highly probable that the Arab State would be unable to support even the natural increase of its population, which would be forced to emigrate. The transfer of eastern Galilee to the Arab State would place in that State the Huleh Salient, a tract in which water is plentiful and flow irrigation is available. The Huleh Salient is capable of large-scale development and, if so developed, would provide an area in which a considerable number of Arabs from the Jewish State could in time be settled. The area in the southern coastal plain available for development would also be substantially enlarged, with a similar effect. The possibility of removing Arabs from the Jewish State to developed areas in the Arab State would be much reduced by the exclusion from the latter of southern Beisan and the inclusion of that tract in the Jewish State. Of the Arab State contemplated under this plan, only the coastal plain in the extreme north and south would be susceptible

Arab Population of the Arab State

The number of Arabs in the Arab State under this plan is

the Arab population of 618,210 cent. of or 51 per Palestine. or 51

The number of Arabs in the Arab State under this plan is

or 62 per cent. of the Arab population of

be materially increased under any logical plan of partition otherwise than by greatly reducing the size of the Jerusalem Enclave and interposing two Arab frontiers between the Jewish State and Jerusalem. Any such arrangement would be liable to cause friction and would almost certainly be opposed by the Jews. It is doubtful whether this number can materially increased under any logical

The number of Arabs in the Arab State under this plan is

530,990

44 per cent. of the Arab population of Even if all the 60,080 Arabs resident in Jerusalem were regarded as subjects of the Arab State, the figure would only be increased to 591,070, or 49 per cent. of the Arab population. or 44 per Palestine.

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Area of Arab Land in Jewish State

The Jewish State would contain 1,196,294 dunums of Arab land and 1,309,473 dunums of Jewish land.

There would be 1½ times as much Arab as Jewish land in the State.

The Jewish State would contain 3,008,578 dunums of Arab land and 1,249,560 dunums of Jewish land.

The State would thus contain 2½ times as much Arab as Jewish land, a proportion which the Arabs would certainly regard as

inequitable.

The Jewish State would contain 1,228,268 dunums of Arab land and 1,143,802 dunums of Jewish land.

Arab and Jewish holdings in the State would thus be approximately equal.

The Jewish State would contain 7,114,806 dunums of Arab land and 1,428,282 dunums

of Jewish land.

There would be 5 times as much Arab as Jewish land in the State, a very difficult proportion to defend.

The citrus area would be divided 21,299 dunums in the Arab State. 260,149 dunums in the Jewish State.

quality export. follows Citrus is the most important and only export crop of Palestine and is thus the source on which an independent Arab State would have to rely in the main for foreign exchange. Of 281,448, dunums of citrus in Palestine, 140,283 dunums are Arab owned, 139,728 dunums are Jewish owned, and 1,437 dunums are grown on public land. The citrus area would be divided as

29,037 dunums in the Arab State.
216,598 dunums in the Jewish State.
35,813 dunums in the Jerusalem Enclave.
The loss to the Arab State of so large a proportion of the Arab citrus would constitute a valid Arab grievance.

citrus area would be divided as The

Distribution of the Citrus Area

29,231 dunums in the Arab State.
231,114 dunums in the Jewish State.
21,103 dunums in the Jerusalem Enclave.
Nearly a third of the citrus included in the Arab State under this plan would be Galilee citrus, which is much inferior in quality and, in general, unsuitable for be divided

would

The

follows:—
53,039 dunums in the Arab State.
207,337 dunums in the Jewish State.
21,072 dunums in the Jewish State.
While the proportion of the citrus area in the Arab State would still be small, it would be almost double that assigned to the State under the Royal Commission's plan or under the First Revision. Owing to the fact that Arab and Jewish groves are almost inextricably intermixed throughout the coastal plain, any very large transfer of citrus area from the Jewish to the Arab State is impossible without mutilating the former.

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Comparative Statement of Partition Plans—continued

Jewish Agency.			The amount paid by Arabs in property taxation would accrue as follows:— In the Arab State In the Jewish State In Jerusalem In Jerusalem The total property tax assessment of the Jewish property tax assessment of the Jewish property included in that State would be £123,285, to which Jewish property included in that State would contribute £15,697. If, as proposed in this plan, the Arab Suburbs of Jerusalem were merged, in the Arab State, a portion of the amount shown above as accruing in Jerusalem would accrue to the Arab State.
Second Revision.	f Arab Assets		The amount paid by Arabs in property taxation would accrue as follows:— In the Arab State In the Jewish State In the Jewish State In the Jerusalem Enclave Jin that State would contribute 126 614. These figures show at least a more equitable distribution than do those of the First Royal Commission's plan or those of the First Revision. The property taxation paid by Arabs in the Jewish State and the Jerusalem Enclave is necessarily high, as it includes taxation on the considerable Arab properties in Haifa and Jerusalem.
First Revision.	Distribution of Arab Assets		The amount paid by Arabs in property taxation would accrue as follows:— In the Arab State In the Jewish State In the Jewish State In the Jerusalem Enclave (191,901) The total property tax assessment of the Arab State would be (102,603, to which Jewish property included in that State would contribute (5,558 only. Under this plan the Arabs would be paying more in taxation in both the Jewish State and the Jerusalem Enclave than in their own State.
Royal Commission.		The finding of the Partition Commission that it is impossible to carve two self-supporting States out of Palestine has never been seriously challenged. No practicable plan of partition would result in a viable Arab State. The Arab State would have to be subsidised and its independence would be qualified by this fact. This consideration underlies one of the main Arab objections to partition. The Arabs pay. £331,046 in property	by Arabs in te as follows: te as follows: te as follows: tax assessment following tax assessment

12

The Jewish State would be 4,967,655 dunums or 1,940 square miles in extent.

The viability of the Royal Commission's Jewish State could hardly be called in question.

The Viability of the Jewish State

The Jewish State would be 3,759,559 dunums or 1,469 square miles in extent.

The alterations made in the Royal Commission's plan would not affect the viability of the State. Although the State envisaged in the First Revision would be smaller in area by 25 per cent. than that proposed by the Royal Commission, its taxable capacity would be nearly 10 per cent. greater.

The Jewish State would be 2,728,631 dunums or 1,066 square miles in extent.

In spite of this further reduction in area, the Jewish State would certainly remain viable. It would contain 77 per cent. of the Jewish population of Palestine and an area of land nearly double that which Jews at present own throughout the country. It would contain the two industrial cities of Tel Aviv and Haifa, and the only deep-water port in Palestine at the latter place. Almost all the Jewish industries (the only important exception. being the potash works on the Dead Sea) would be within the State and many of the Arab industries as well. The State would contain most of the best land in Palestine, including an area of citrus half as large again as the citrus area now in Jewish possession. The value of the Jewish State can be judged from the fact that its property tax assessment would be considerable scope for expansion within the Ystate. The Hays-Savage scheme contemplates the expenditure of some tens of millions of pounds on irrigation and the generation of hydro-electric power in the area included within it.

The Jewish State would be 10,521,325 dunums or 4,110 square miles in extent (excluding the Negeb).

Having discarded the most unproductive portion of the inhabited area of Palestine, the Jewish State would be considerably better off than is Palestine as a whole at present.

Reference 3**7**1

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PART III

NOTES ON CERTAIN IMPORTANT MATTERS WHICH ARISE IN CONNECTION WITH PARTITION

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PART III

NOTES ON CERTAIN IMPORTANT MATTERS WHICH ARISE IN CONNECTION WITH PARTITION

Note 1. The Basis of the Statistics

The statistics are based on a village by village estimate of population and land ownership as they were on April 1st, 1945. The detailed figures are contained in the printed volume "Village Statistics: April 1945" prepared by the Government of Palestine.

Population

The population statistics of Palestine are based on religion and not (as are the land statistics) on race. The non-Jewish population of Palestine is shown as divided between Moslems, Christians and Others, as follows:—

Moslems		1,061,270
Christians	•••	135,550
Others	•••	14,100
Total	•••	1,210,920

The category "Others" are mostly Druze by religious profession.

At the last census, 99.6 per cent. of the settled Moslems (who number 994,720) and all the unsettled Moslems (who number 66,550) declared themselves as Arabs: 82 per cent. of the Christians and 90 per cent. of the "Others" also described themselves as Arabs. The remainder of the Moslems were mainly Egyptians and Turks, and of the Christians mainly Armenians and members of European races.

Assuming this distribution still to exist, and there is no reason to assume the contrary, the composition of the population by race is now roughly as follows:—

					•		Distribution by race			
	Religion	÷.			Total	Per cent.	Arabs	Per cent.	Others	
Moslems (settled Moslems (unsettl Christians Others	(ed) 	••••			994,720 66,550 135,550 14,100	99·6 100 82 90	990,740 66,550 111,150 12,690	0·4 18 10	3,980 24,400 1,410	
•	Total		•	•••	1,210,920	97.5	1,181,130	2.5	29,790	

In the Summaries of Statistics (Appendix III to each plan examined) the population is shown as divided between "Arabs and Others" and Jews. From the above figures it will be seen that the category "Arabs and Others" consists as to about 97½ per cent. of Arabs and as to about 2½ per cent. of "Others".

Land

Land ownership is shown in the statistics as divided between "Arabs and Others," Jews and Public. The public lands of Palestine fall mainly in two categories. The first category comprises land which was formerly the personal property of the Sultan and which was taken over by the Government of Palestine at the time of the Occupation; this category includes the bulk of the cultivable public land. It is leased out to Arabs or Jews for cultivation on various forms of tenure ranging from long-term concessions to annual leases. The second category consists of mewat or "dead" land, that is to say, waste land which is not cultivated and which is, in general, unfit for cultivation. It consists largely of eroded hill-sides, sand dunes and the like and includes the waste area of the Negeb, described in note 3 below. Considerable tracts of such land have been notified as forest reserves, the object being to check erosion and gradually to restore a covering of humus. Most of the uncultivable public land shown in the statistics is of the mewat category.

General

The "Village Statistics" are now two years out of date, but this fact is not likely materially to affect any conclusions drawn from them. During the period land transfers have been restricted by the operation of the Land Transfers Regulations. As regards population, though the absolute figures would be larger, it is probable that the proportion between the non-Jewish and the Jewish sections is still approximately the same as it was two years ago, the limited Jewish immigration permitted being compensated for by the greater birth-rate of the larger Arab population.

Note 2. Divided Villages

In general, the statistics of any State or other area are obtained by summing the statistics of the individual towns and villages included within the boundary of such State or area.

It occasionally happens that a boundary intersects a village leaving the village site with part of the village lands on one side of the boundary and the remainder of the village lands on the other. In such cases an estimate is made of the area lying on either side of the boundary. Unless there is evidence to the contrary, it is assumed that the land of each category is divided between the two parts in the same proportion as is the whole village. The area representing the village site will, however, always lie wholly on one side of the boundary or the other, according to the exact location of the village site within the village lands and, where a village includes both Arab and Jewish land, it is usually known in which portion the Jewish land is situated. The estimate is, in such cases, adjusted accordingly.

A statement showing all villages intersected by boundaries is given in Appendix I to each plan examined. This statement shows the population, area (by categories and ownership) and property taxation of the two portions into which each village is divided. Knowledge of these statistics is essential if figures have to be prepared for a variant of the plan which does not involve the same divisions.

The following is a list of the villages intersected by boundaries in each of the four plans examined, showing the Appendix in which the relevant statistics will be found:—

	Village			Royal Commission	First Revision	Second Revision	Jewish Agency
Service Annalist Control of the Cont					. 44 % 344		<u> १८७७ संस्थान वेच्या २०००</u> .
Zirin	•••	•• •••	•••	IA	IA	IA	$\mathbf{I}\mathbf{A}$
Ti'innik			•••	IA	• • •		ĪA
Zububa	•••		•••	IA			ĪĀ
Rummana	•••	••	•••	IA	•••		ΪA
Umm el Fahm	•••		•••	IA	•••	1	ΪA
Ar'ara	•••			IA			IA
Tulkarm (rural)			•••	IA	IA	IA	IA
Irtah				IA	IA	ĬA	IA
Farun			• •	IA	ΪA	IA	T/A
Taiyiba	•••			ΙA	ΪA	IA	IA IA
Qalqiliya	•••			ĪA		,	IA
Majdal Yaba	•••			ĪA			IA
Muzeiria	•••			IA		***	IA IA
Kafr Ana	•••			IA	•••	. · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	er d iff ankli
Shafa Amr (rural		• •••		<i>'</i>	IB	ïB	
Ajjur				•••	IB ·	ļ·	
Yahudiya			•••	•••	IB	IВ	
Rishon le Zion (r			•••	•••	1	IC	
TANK TO TOO (urai)	• • • •	•••	•••	•••	TC I	•••

In a few cases, where a village is so intersected that the smaller of the two portions into which it is divided is of negligible size, no account has been taken of the intersection in compiling the statistics.

Note 3. The Negeb

The word "Negeb" is an old Hebrew appellation meaning "the South" and covers no defined area. For the purpose of the statistics it is applied to the waste land, 9,677,000 dunums in extent, in the Beersheba Sub-district south of the furthest limit of cultivation.

The Negeb, as thus defined, consists of a wild confusion of bare limestone hills, ranging up to 3,300 feet in height, from which practically all traces of soil have disappeared as the result of thousands of years of erosion by wind and water. No portion of it has an average annual rainfall of more than four inches, while much of it has less than two; in other words it is practically rainless. Some of the valleys have retained a little soil in their beds; in a few cases this is sufficient to support small areas of precarious cultivation, but for the most part it does no more than bear a scanty growth of scrub, which provides winter pasture for the goats and camels of a few poor tribes. The extreme scarcity of water operates to reduce population to a minimum; the total population of the tract is believed not to exceed 1,000 nomads.

The whole area of the Negeb is classed as uncultivable public land.

Where, in any plan examined, the Negeb is included in one of the States, the statistics of that State are given both with and without the Negeb. All the indications are that the inclusion of the Negeb merely swells the size of the State without in any way increasing its value.

Note 4. The Partition of Jaffa

For the purpose of any scheme of partition which placed Jaffa in the Arab State, the municipal boundary would be adjusted so as to detach the two northern suburbs, known as the Florentin and Shapiro quarters, from Jaffa and to attach them to Tel Aviv.

1 2 3 6 Reference: (2) 37) / 61 358

It is thus necessary, for the purpose of the statistics, to make an estimate of the population, area and taxation of these quarters. Certain information on this subject is given in the "Survey of Palestine," Vol. II, Chapter XXII, page 939.

Population

The estimated population of the quarters in 1939 was:—

Florentin Shapiro	•••	•••	•••	Arabs 800 1,500		Jews 12,500 3,500
	To	otal	•••	2,300		16,000
of Jaffa as a w	hole v In 193				80,300	

The population

In 1939 In 1945	•••	•••	80,300 94,310
Increase	•••	•••	14,010

Assuming that the population of the two quarters has increased at the same rate, namely, by $17\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., it should be now—

Arabs ... 2,300 + 400 = 2,700Jews ... 16,000 + 2,800 = 18,800

According to the Village Statistics, the Arab population of Jaffa is divided in the proportion of 51 Moslems to 15 Christians. Assuming the same proportions, the 2,700 Arab inhabitants of the two quarters should comprise 2,090 Moslems and 610 Christians.

The population of the quarters has therefore been taken as follows:—

Moslems	Christians	Others	Total Arabs and Others	Jews	Total
2,090	610	• •••	2,700	18,800	21,500

Land

In Jaffa as a whole public lands amount to 4 per cent. and roads, etc., to 19 per cent. of the land privately owned. In the two quarters, 964 dunums are privately owned, 569 dunums by Arabs and 395 dunums by Jews. Allowing for public lands and roads at the above percentages, the total area of the two quarters may be taken to be :-

Arab	Others	I otal Arabs and Others	Jewish	Public	Roads, etc.	Total
569	• • •	569	395	39	183	1,186

Property Taxation

Jews own 1,374 dunums of land in Jaffa as a whole and pay £20,488 in urban property tax, an average of £15 a dunum. This may be taken as the rate applicable to Jewish suburbs. The taxation of the two quarters, the areas being as given above, will then be :-

Arabs	Others	Total Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Total
£ 8,535	£	8, 5 35	$\overset{\it f.}{5,925}$	£ 585	£ 15,045

Summary

Using the figures given above, the distribution of the population, area and taxation of the municipal area of Jaffa between the Arab and the Jewish States will be as follows:-

Population

	h		Moslems	Christians	Others	Arabs and Others	Jews	Total
Arab State Jewish State	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •		48,790 2,090	14,790 610	30	63,610 2,700	9,200 18,800	72,810 21,500
Total	•••	•••	50,880	15,400	30	66,310	28,000	94,310

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,	Lan	d
		•

	Arabs	Others	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Roads, etc.	Total
Arab State	 8,443	307	8,750	979	379	1,777	11,885
Jewish State	 569	•••	569	395	39	183	1,186
*Total	9,012	307	9,319	1,374	418	1,960	13,071

Taxation

					-			
•			Arabs	Others	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Total
Arab State Jewish State	•••	•••	29,857 8,535	4,160	34,017 8,535	14,563 5,925	1,995 585	50,575 15,045
Tota	al	• • •	38,392	4,160	42,552	20,488	2,580	65,620

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1 2 3 4 5 6 Reference: FO 371 61858

PART IV

APPENDICES

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APPENDIX I A

ROYAL COMMISSION Statistics of "Divided" Villages

Rural Population

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16 9,133 395 9,690 13,9690 13,309 6,613 1,7341 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,306 8,459 19,690 1,306
3 9 9 9 3 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
4,966 4,966 2,652
16 9,133 392 9,687 2,301 8,309 1,584 12,312 12,312 12,328 5,779 13,286 5,779
Arab Arab Arab Arab Arab Arab
3,921 1 4,153 1 4,153 2,084 2,084 2,084 3,032 3,032 3,032 3,032 3,032 3,032 3,032 3,032 3,032 65 54,069
99 99
3,032 3,032 3,032 3,032 3,032 3,032 3,032 3,032 3,332 3,330 13,486 47,818
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Jewish
ons 9–13) able 1.44–15) able 1.44–15) able 1.413) 1.413) 1.413)
Plantations Cereals (9-13) Uncultivable Built-on Cereals (9-13) Cereals (14-15) Uncultivable Built-on Plantations Cereals (9-13) Cereals (9-13) Cereals (9-13) Uncultivable
Total Ruinniana Total Total

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66	1,724 20,560	13,022	35,339	2,339 12 276 28 956	1,667	32,610	39 212 280	418	2,949	390	1,958	8,851	1,878	3,276 28,243 · 174	6,763	40,625	3,638 63	273 3,232 16,197	4,512	27,915	2,387	59	13,906 10,076	26 639	1.311	25.55 55.55	45 6,952	2,464	10,822	2,377 90	597 13,194 1.095	17,353
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33	20,560	027,1	1,678	24,718	639	27,295	212 2,216	72	2,539	390. 6,447	904	1		23,286	0/2'6	3 170	63	3,232 15,502	/0c/c	26,056	775.7	59 110	13,08 5 9,369	25,044	821	888	5,857 1 2,134				11,022 2	
33	8,204 2,204	14 136	240	 28 2,827	166	3,261	1,122	505	1,475	24 273 4,529	1,370		281		_			6,315		0 .			9,716 1	18,642			2,766 986	+			3,985 1	5,206
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33	8,204 2,888	11,815	168	25 2,473 64	2.730	33	105 1,090 36	1 270	9.4	4,508	5,438	129	731	5,368 40 1,212	7,761	1,455	273	1,293 6,287 1,405	10,738	1,656	99	77	6,558	17,948	481 10	18	2,751 854	4,139	1 99	179	3,334	4,308
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1,034	12,356 7,813	21,203	2,159	25,429 1,501	29,349	107	1,158	1,474	. :	117 1,950 588	2,655	1,749	2,545	134 5,212	32,500	2,183	30	9,882 2,707	16,749		87 :	33	3,023	7,990	15	27	4,186 1,478	6,493	! -	418	766	12,147
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1,034	4,332	17,722	1,510	22,245 575	24,565	107	1,126 36	1,269	:	117 1,939 271	2,327	430			24,989	2,024	6:6;	9,215	15,318	671	3 : 8	3,553	2,811	080,	15				1,550			10,050
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APPENDIX I A—contd.

ROYAL COMMISSION—contd.

Statistics of "Divided" Villages-contd.

Rural Property Tax

	Total	£ 378 569 569 218 218 250 250 350 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 4
	Others	
Total	Public	ж ! ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
	Jews	£ 26 46 37 37 46 5 10 17 36
	Arabs	, £ 352 523 523 523 520 710 250 304 42 88 88 397 400 221 93
	Total	265 265 455 153 153 218 218 22 22 22 63 91 165 165 165 165 165
	Others	~ ~:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
	Public	A:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
Part II	Jews	£ ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
	Arabs	265 265 265 455 153 218 213 100 30 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 63 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81
	State	13 Arab
	Total	£ 113 114 65 54 6497 130 315 216 22 335 344 70 67
	Others	£
	Public	£
Part I	Jews	£ 26 46 46 33 36 10 10 17
	Arabs	£87 68 68 65 65 65 150 274 21 21 21 21 23 89 69 89 81 88
	State	Jewish Jewish Jewish Jewish Jewish Jewish Jewish Jewish Jewish Jewish Jewish Jewish Jewish Jewish Jewish Jewish Jewish
		11111111111
Village		Zirin Ti'innik Zububa Rummana Rummana Umu Ar'ara Tulkarm (rural) Irtah Taiyiba Qalqiliya Majdal Yaba Mazeiria Kar Ana Taixiba Kar Ana

Reference: FO 371 / 61858

APPENDIX II A

ROYAL COMMISSION

DETAILED STATISTICS

(a) Arab State

Population

					•	Moslems.	Christians.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Total.
Urban Rural		•••		•••		174,710 431,830	22,540 6,260	300 60	197,550 438,150	9,280 9,690	206,830 447,840
T	rotal	•••	•••	•••		606,540	28,800	360	635,700	18,970	654,670

Land

	Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Roads, etc.	Total.
Citrus	27,145	196	27,341	1,360	336		29,037
Bananas Plantations Fishponds	1,591 702,458 	123 2,832 	1,714 705,290 	561 9,895 2,358	532 20,496 		2,807 735,681 2,358
Total: Other Plantations	704,049	2,955	707,004	12,814	21,028		7,40,846
Cereals (9–13) Cereals (14–15)	3,825,779 613,408	16,955 669	3,842,734 614,077	143,518 2,159	102,723 73,287		4,088,975 689,523
Total: Cereals	4,439,187	17,624	4,456,811	145,677	176,010		4,778,498
Total Cultivable	5,170,381	20,775	5;191,156	159,851	197,374	•••	5,548,381
Urban Areas Village Sites Uncultivable	33,398 17,432 3,696,605	516 76 31,542	33,914 17,508 3,728,147	1,095 1,352 14,350	3,343 241 11,109,194	5,766 41,424	44,118 19,101 14,893,115
Total Uncultivable	3,747,435	32,134	3,779,569	16,797	11,112,778	47,190	14,956,334
Total Land	8,917,816	52,909	8,970,725	176,648	11,310,152	47,190	20,504,715

Property Taxation

			······································		Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Total.
Urban Rural	•••				53,210 59,739	4,515 462	57,725 60,201	14,661 4,766	4,494 2,388	76,880 67,355
Total	•••	•••		•••	112,949	4,977	. 117,926	19,427	6,882	144,235

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APPENDIX II A-contd.

ROYAL COMMISSION—contd.

DETAILED STATISTICS—contd.

(b) Jewish State

Population

,		•		Moslems.	Christians.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Total.
Urban Rural			 	54,050 249,950	32,710 16,670	1,380 12,230	98,140 278,850	349,670 78,940	447,810 357,790
Total	• • •	•••	 	314,000	49,380	13,610	376,990	428,610	805,600

Land

	Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Roads, etc.	Total.
Citrus	78,873	4,358	83,231	132,834	533		216,598
Bananas Plantations Fishponds	230 259,359 	287 2,997	517 262,356 	518 79,896 2,465	25,497 	·	1,037 367,749 2,465
Total: Other Plantations	259,589	3,284	262,873	82,879	25,499		371,251
Cereals (9—13) Cereals (14—15)	1,586,968 158,450	31,505 14	1,618,473 158,464	700,345 63,939	46,018 3,936		2,364,836 226,339
Total: Cereals	1,745,418	31,519	1,776,937	764,284	49,954		
otal Cultivable	2,083,880	39,161	2,123,041	979,997	75,986		2,591,175
Jrban Areas Village Sites Uncultivable	11,044 12,094 842,779	8,879 954 9,787	19,923 13,048 852,566	64,564 33,859 171,140	9,898 120 524,897	11,219 87,397	3,179,024 105,604 47,027 1,636,000
otal Uncultivable	865,917	19,620	885,537	269,563	534,915	98,616	
Total Land	2,949,797	58,781	3,008,578	1,249,560	610,901	98,616	1,788,631 4,967,655

Property Taxation

	Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Total.
Urban Rural	58,758 32,461	22,237 1,078	80,995 33,539	372,521 22,433	15,740 1,398	469,256 57,370
Total	91,219 ·	23,315	114,534	394,954	17,138	526,626

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1 2 3 4 5 6 Reference: 371 61858

ROYAL COMMISSION—contd.

DETAILED STATISTICS—contd.

(c) Mandated Enclaves

Population

	·				Moslems.	Christians.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Total.
Urban Rural			•••		 65,980 74,750	55,390 1,980	130	121,500 76,730	102,300 3,720	223,800 80,450
Total	•••	•••	•••	•••	 140,730	57,370	130	198,230	106,020	304,250

Land

	Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Roads, etc.	Total.
Citrus	29,350	361	29,711	5,534	568		35,813
Bananas Plantations	, 90,405	5,399	26 95,804	4,376	11 1,725		37 101,905
Total: Other Plantations	90,427	5,403	95,830	4,376	1,736		101,942
Cereals (9-13) Cereals (14-15)	240,599 51,188	15,314 590	255,913 51,778	25,246 1,741	5,699 1		286,858 53,520
Total: Cereals	291,787	15,904	307,691	26,987	5,700		340,378
Total Cultivable	411,564	21,668	433,232	36,897	8,004		478,133
Jrban Areas Village Sites Jncultivable	17,691 4,001 273,905	4,253 239 4,200	21,944 4,240 278,105	9,040 6,484 13,070	1,101 22 20,478	5,718 12,318	37,803 10,746 323,971
Cotal Uncultivable	295,597	8,692	304,289	28,594	21,601	18,036	372,520
Total Land	707,161	30,360	737,521	65,491	29,605	18,036	850,653

Property Taxation

			Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Total.		
Jrban Rural	•••	•••	•••	•••	59,589 7,523	31,054 420	90,643	74,987 2,006	5,503 95	171,133 10,044
Total	·	•••	•••	•••	67,112	31,474	98,586	76,993	5,598	181,177

61858

APPEN

ROYAL

Summary

					Population				
		Urban			Rural		Total		
	Arabs and Others	Jews	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Total
Arab State : Excluding Negeb Negeb	197,550	9,280	206,830	438,150	9,690	447,840	635,700	18,970	654,670
Total: Arab State Jewish State Mandated Enclaves	197,550 98,140 121,500	9,280 349,670 102,300	206,830 447,810 223,800	438,150 278,850 76,730	9,690 78,940 3,720	447,840 357,790 80,450	635,700 376,990 198,230	18,970 428,610 106,020	654,670 805,600 304,250
All Palestine	417,190	461,250	878,440	793,730	92,350	886,080	1,210,920	553,600	1,764,520

			- <u> </u>				La	and						
· ·			Cit	rus			Other Plantations				Cereals			
		Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Total	
Negeb	:::	dnnims 27,341 	dumms 1,360 	dımınıs 336 	dunums 29,037 	dunums 707,004	dunums 12,814	dunums 21,028	dunums 740,846	dunums 4,456,811	dunums 145,677	dunums 176,010	dunums 4,778,49	
ewish State	::: 	27,341 83,231 29,711	1,360 132,834 5,534	336 533 568	29,037 216,598 35,813	707,004 262,873 95,830	12,814 82,879 4,376	21,028 25,499 1,736	740,846 371,251 101,942	4,456,811 1,776,937 30 7 ,691	145,677 764,284 26,987	176,010 49,954 5,700	4,778,49 2,591,17 340,378	
ll Palestine		140,283	139,728	1,437	281,448	1,065,707	100,069	48,263	1,214,039	6,541,439	936,948	231,664	7,710,05	

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DIX III A

COMMISSION

of Statistics

					1	Property	Taxatio	n				
•		Urb	oan			Rura	al			Tot	al	
	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Total
Arab State:	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
Excluding Negeb Negeb	57,725 	14,661	4,494 	76,880 	60,201 	4,766 	2,388	67,355 	117,926 	19,427	6,882	
Total: Arab State Jewish State Mandated Enclaves	57,725 80,995 90,643	372,521	4,494 15,740 5,503	469,256	60,201 33,539 7,943	4,766 22,433 2,006	2,388 1,398 95		117,926 114,534 98,586		6,882 17,138	
All Palestine	229,363	462,169	25,737	717,269	101,683	29,205	3,881	134,769	331,046	491,374	29,618	852,038

•							L	and						
		Total (Cultivable			Une	cultivable			1	•	Total		
	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Roads,	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Roads,	Total
Arab State : Excluding Negeb Negeb	dunums 5,191,156 		dunums 197,374 	dunums 5,548,381 	dununis 3,779,569 	dınums 16,797	dunums 1,435,778 9,677,000	dınums 47,190	dunums 5,279,334 9,677,000	dunums 8,970,725	dımums 176,648	dunums 1,633,152 9,677,000	dunums 47,196	dunums 10,827,71 9,677,00
otal: Arab State ewish State landated Enclaves	5,191,156 2,123,041 433,232	159,851 979,997 36,897	197,374 75,986 8,004	3,179,024	885,537	16,797 269,563 28,594		47,190 98,616 18,036		3,008,578	176,648 1,249,560 65,491	11,310,152 610,901	47,190	20,504,71, 4,967,655
ll Palestine	7,747,429	1,176,745	281,364	9,205,538	4,969,395	314,954	11,669,294	163,842	17,117,485	12,716,824	1,491,699	11,950,658	•	26,323,02

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Part 11		State Moslems Jews Christ- Others Total Moslems Jews Christ-	lans Curers	5,630 150 20			Total State Arabs Jews Public Others Roads, Total Arabe Louis	6 Arab 52	309 488	11,655 39,864 2,413 4,627 5,032 309 83 83	16,200 52,755 23,683 2,142 34,107 9,157 141 26,184 2,367	Jerusalem 2,142 81,068 58,345 7,621 28,935 9,367	607 2,428	22,686 4,236 3,320 6,263 24,885 2,2686	43,556 13,280 3320 3320 13,280 13,280 23	Jerusalem 1,918 110 91 91 13,280 23	2,049 3,836 220 43	76 47 305 7,283 12,260 915 1,202 88	305 10.270 17.320 1.02	Tropeny Lax	Part II	Ctots		Arab 626 22 64.0
	Christ- Others T		20 5		<u> </u>	Public Ott	Officers	:	: : :	2,501 225	2,764 225	:		:	17	22	601 44	000	906 306			lic Others Total		12 1 283 12 1 1 179
Part I	Moslems Jews		3,720 5,630 150		. Part I	Arabs lews		9 :		141	7,621	1,821			: 5	509	6,080 457	8,684 567		Part I		Arabs Jews Public	70 181	:
	State	Jewish	Arab			State		nas Jewish	ns -13)	LIVADIE	00 1 1 mg h		Cereals (14–15) Uncultivable		Jewish		Uncultivable					State Ara		::
Village		ır (rural)	diya		Village		ä	(rural). Bananas Built-on	Plant: Cereal	Total	1	Planta Cereals	Cereals Uncult	:	Yahudiya Citrus	Plantatic		lotal			YEAR.	у шаде	Shafa 'Amr (rural)	: :

Rural Population

Statistics of "divided" villages

FIRST REVISION

APPENDIX I B

FIRST REVISION

DETAILED STATISTICS

(a) Arab State

Population.

						Moslems.	Christians.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Total.
Urban Rural					•••	134,780 438,720	15,090 19,680	1,030 8,910	150,900 467,310	1,580 4,090	152,480 471,400
To	tal	•••	•••	•••		573,500	34,770	9,940	618,210	5,670	623,880

Land

		• '					
	Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Roads, etc.	Total.
Citrus	27,588	371	27,959	951	321		29,231
Bananas Plantations Fishponds	1,170 732,406	204 2,739 	1,374 735,145 	12 6,312 65	513 16,057 		1,899 757,514 65
Total: Other Plantations	733,576	2,943	736,519	6,389	16,570		759,478
Cereals (9–13) Cereals (14–15)	4,054,687 655,091	16,704 665	4,071,391 655,756	103,269 7,695	95,696 73,339		· 4,270,356 736,790
Total: Cereals	4,709,778	17,369	4,727,147	110,964	169,035		5,007,146
Total Cultivable	5,470,942	20,683	5,491,625	118,304	185,926		5,795.855
Urban Areas Village Sites Uncultivable	26,727 19,674 3,943,490	1,374 237 28,320	28,101 19,911 3,971,810	2,107 400 15,808	3,333 199 1,612,637	4,261 39,576	37,802 20,510 5,639,831
Total Uncultivable	3,989,891	29,931	4,019,822	18,315	1,616,169	13,837	5,698,143
Total Land	9,460,833	50,614	9,511,447	136,619	1,802,095	43,837	11,493,998

Property Taxation

			Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Total.
Urban Rural	 		 26,612 63,343	1,372 574	27,984 63,917	3,270 2,288	2, 963 2,181	34,217 68,386
Total	 •••	•••	 89,955	1,946	91,901	5,558	5,144	102,603

APPENDIX II B—contd.

FIRST REVISION—contd.

DETAILED STATISTICS—contd.

(b) Jewish State Population

				Moslems.	Christians.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Total.
Urban Rural	•••	•••		 106,300 214,410	44,040 2,720	650 3,380	150,990 220,510	362,650 84,860	513,640 305,370
Total	•••		• • •	 320,710	46,760	4,030	371,500	447,510	819,010

Land

	Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Roads, etc.	Total.
Citrus	89,229	2,976	92,205	137,962	947		231,114
Bananas Plantations Fishponds	551 144,892 	177 1,624	728 146,516 	1,066 84,779 4,758	32 31,122 	•••	1,826 262,417 4,758
Fotal: Other Plantations	145,443	1,801	147,244	90,603	31,154	•••	269,001
Cereals (9—13) Cereals (14—15)	1,216,280 72,314	12,607 14	1,228,887 72,328	748,221 58,335	52,976 3,882		2,030,084 134,545
Total: Cereals	1,288,594	12,621	1,301,215	806,556	56,858		2,164,629
Cotal Cultivable	1,523,266	17,398	1,540,664	1,035,121	88,959	•••	2,664,744
Jrban Areas Village Sites Jncultivable	18,779 8,282 336,976	9,136 · 7 2,450	27,915 8,289 339,426	67,545 39,352 167,455	10,209 161 331,791	13,709 88,963	119,378 47,802 927,635
Cotal Uncultivable	364,037	11,593	375,630	274,352	342,161	102,672	1,094,815
Total Land	1,887,303	28,991	1,916,294	1,309,473	431,120	102,672	3,759,559

Property Taxation

					Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Total.
Urban Rural	•••	•••	•••	•••	86,527 24,083	26,245 431	112,772 24,514	389,304 26,042	17,334 1,579	519,410 52,135
Total	•••	•••	•••		110,610	26,676	137,286	415,346	18,913	571,545

FIRST REVISION—contd.

DETAILED STATISTICS—contd.

(c) Jerusalem Enclave

Population

						Moslems.	Christians.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Total.
Urban Rural	•••	•••	•••	•••	•••	63,660 103,400	51,510 2,510	130	115,300 105,910	97,020 3,400	212,320 109,310
Tot	tal	•••	• •••	•••	•••	167,060	54,020	130	221,210	100,420	321,630

Land

	Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Roads, etc.	Total.
Citrus	18,551	1,568	20,119	815	169		21,103
Bananas Plantations Fishponds	122 174,924 	33 6,865 	155 181,789	3,076 	 539 		156 185,404
Total: Other Plantations	175,046	6,898	181,944	3,077	539		185,560
Cereals (9–13) Cereals (14–15)	382,379 95,641	34,463 594	416,842 96,235	17,619 1,809	5,768		440,229 98,047.
Total: Cereals	478,020	35,057	513,077	19,428	5,771		538,276
Total Cultivable	671,617	43,523	715,140	23,320	6,479		744,939
Urban Areas Village Sites Uncultivable	16,627 5,571 532,823	3,138 1,025 14,759	19,765 6,596 547,582	5,047 1,943 15,297	800 23 33,141	4,733 12,600	30,345 8,562 608,620
Total Uncultivable	555,021	18,922	573,943	22,287	33,964	17,333	647,527
Total Land	1,226,638	62,445	1,289,083	45,607	40,443	17,333	1,392,466

Property Taxation

				Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Total.
Urban Rural	•••	•••	 	58,418 12,297	30,189 955	88,607 13,252	69,595 - 875	5,440 121	163,642 14,248
Total	•••		 •••	70,715	31,144	101,859	70,470	5,561	177,890

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APPENDIX II B (I)

FIRST REVISION

DETAILED STATISTICS OF GALILEE

Population

Moslems. Christians. Others. Arabs and Others. Jews.	
Urban	Total.
Rural 16,870 12,490 780 30,140 1,500	02,020
Total 85,950 26,540 9,660 122,150 2,960	93,470

Land

Citrus 8,371 249 8,620 197 Bananas 46 81 127 12 Plantations 871 126,182 1,415 <t< th=""><th>8,81 13 128,31</th></t<>	8,81 13 128,31
Bananas 46 81 127 12	13
Fishponds 125,311 871 126,182 1,415 721	13 128.31
Cereals (9-13) 442,999 12,340 455,339 8,625 5,937 Cotal: Cereals 530,072 12,340 542,412 14,413 5,991 Cotal Cultivable 663,800 13,541 677,341 16,037 6,712 Gillage Sites 4,623 1,272 5,895 1,992 4075	-,
Cereals (9-13) 442,999 12,340 455,339 8,625 5,937 Cotal: Cereals 530,072 12,340 542,412 14,413 5,991 Cotal Cultivable 663,800 13,541 677,341 16,037 6,712 Illage Sites 4,623 1,272 5,895 1,992 407	•••
Sereals (14-15) 87,073 12,340 455,339 87,073 8,625 5,788 5,937 54 Sotal: Cereals 530,072 12,340 542,412 14,413 5,991 Sotal Cultivable 663,800 13,541 677,341 16,037 6,712 Irban Areas 4,623 1,272 5,895 1,992 407	128,45
Otal : Cereals 530,072 12,340 542,412 14,413 5,991 Otal Cultivable 663,800 13,541 677,341 16,037 6,712 Irban Areas 4,623 1,272 5,895 1,992 407	469,90
otal Cultivable 663,800 13,541 677,341 16,037 6,712 rban Areas 4,623 1,272 5,895 1,992 407	92,915
rban Areas 4,623 1,272 5,895 1,992 407	562,816
illage Sites 4,623 1,272 5,895 1,992	-
	700,090
ncultivable 499,671 7,472 507,143 13,501 200,514	9,053 5,313
otal Uncultivable 509 250 8,093	735,283
Total Land 15,672 207,035 8,772	749,649
Total Land 1,173,050 22,461 1,195,511 31,709 213,747 8,772	1,449,739

Property Taxation

					· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	•				
. —				· ·	Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Total.
Urban Rural		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •			6,513 10,547	1,193 355	7,706 10,902	3,177 244	819	11,702 11,223
Total	•••	•••	•••	:	17,060	1,548	18,608	3,421	896	22,925
										,0.00

FIRST REVISION

DETAILED STATISTICS OF ARAB STATE (EXCLUDING GALILEE)

Population

						Moslems.	Christians.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Total.
Urban Rural	•••	•••		•••		117,910 369,640	2,600 5,630	250 30	120,760 375,300	80 2,630	120,840 377,930
To	tal		•••	•••	•••	487,550	8,230	280	496,060	2,710	498,770

Land

4	Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Roads, etc.	Total.
Citrus	19,217	122	19,339	754	321		20,414
Bananas Plantations Fishponds	1,124 607,095 	123 1,868 	1,247 608,963	4,897 65	513 15,336		1,760 629,196 65
Total: Other Plantations	608,219	1,991	610,210	4,962	15,849	••• ,	631,021
Cereals (9–13) Cereals (14–15)	3,611,688 568,018	4,364 665	3,616,052 568,683	94,644 1,90 7	89,759 73,285	•••	3,800,455 643,875
Total: Cereals	4,179,706	5,029	4,184,735	96,551	163,044	•••	4,444,330
Total Cultivable	4,807,142	7,142	4,814,284	102,267	179,214		5,095,765
Urban Areas Village Sites Uncultivable	22,104 14,718 3,443,819	102 61 20,848	22,206 14,779 3,464,667	115 221 2,307	2,846 197 1,406,091	3,582 31,483	28,749 15,197 4,904,548
Total Uncultivable	3,480,641	21,011	3,501,652	2,643	1,409,134	35,065	4,948,494
Total Land	8,287,783	28,153	8,315,936	104,910	1,588,348	35,065	10,044,259

Property Taxation

											. "
						Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Total.
Urban Rural	•••			•••	·	20,099 52,796	179 219	20,278 53,015	93 2,044	2,144 2,104	22,515 57,163
Tot	tal	•••	•••	•••	•••	72,895	398	73,293	2,137	4,248	79,678

APPEN

FIRST

Summary

					Population	ì	•		
•		Urban			Rural			Total	
	Arabs and Others	Jews	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Total
Arab State : Excluding Galilee Galilee	120,760 30,140	80 1,500	120,840 31,640	375,300 92,010	2,630 1,460	377.930 93,470	496,060 122,150	2,710 2,960	498,770 125,110
Total: Arab State Jewish State Jerusalem Enclave Negeb	150,900 150,990 115,300	1,580 362,650 97,020	152,480 513,640 212,320	467,310 220,510 105,910	4,090 84,860 3,400	471,400 305,370 109,310	618,210 371,500 221,210	5,670 447,510 100,420	623,880 819,010 321,630
All Palestine	417,190	461,250	878,440	793,730	92,350	886,080	1,210,920	553,600	1,764,520

						L	and	•		^		
		Cit	rus			Other Pla	ntations			Cerea	als	
	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Total
Arab State: Excluding Galilee Galilee	 dunums 19,339 8,620	dunums 754 197	dunums 321 .:.	dunums 20,414 8,817	dunums 610,210 126,309	dunums 4,962 1,427	dunums 15,849 721	dunums 631,021 128,457	dunums 4,184,735 542,412	dunums 96,551 14,413	dunums 163,044 5,991	dunums 4,444,336 562,810
Total: Arab State lewish State lerusalem Enclave Negeb	 27,959 92,205 20,119	951 137,962 815	321 947 169	29,231 231,114 21,103	736,519 147,244 181,944	6,389 90,603 3,077	16,570 31,154 539	759,478 269,001 185,560	4,727,147 1,301,215 513,077	110,964 806,556 19,428	169,035 56,858 5,771	5,007,14 2,164,62 538,27
All Palestine	 140,283	139,728	1,437	281,448	1,065,707	100,069	48,263	1,214,039	6,541,439	936,948	231,664	7,710,05

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DIX III B

REVISION

of Statistics

				· · · · ·	Pı	operty T	axation					
	\	Urb	an			Rui	al			Tot	al	
	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Total.
Arab State: Excluding Galilee Galilee	20,278 7,706		2,144 819	22,515 11,702	53,015 10,902	£ 2,044 244	2,104 77	£ 57,163 11,223	£ 73,293 18,608	£ 2,137 3,421	£ 4,248 896	£ 79,678 22,925
Total: Arab State Jewish State Jerusalem Enclave Negeb	27,984 112,772 88,607	389,304	2,963 17,334 5,440	519,410	63,917 24,514 13,252 	2,288 26,042 875	2,181 1,579 121	68,386 52,135 14,248	91,901 137,286 101,859 	5,558 415,346 70,470	18,913	
All Palestine	229,363	462,169	25,737	717,269	101,683	29,205	3,881	134,769	331,046	491,374	29,618	852,038

<u> </u>													···	
							La	and			•		•	
		Total Cu	ltivable			Ū	Incultivable	2				Total		
	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Roads,	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Roads, etc.	Total
Arab State : Excluding Galilee Galilee	dunums 4,814,284 677,341	dunums 102,267 16,037	dunums 179,214 6,712	dunums 5,095,765 700,090	dumums 3,501,652 518,170	dunums 2,643 15,672	dunums 1,409,134 207,035	dunums 35,065 8,772	dunums 4,948,494 749,649		dunums 104,910 31,709	dunums 1,588,348 213,747		dunums 10, 044,259 1,449,739
Total: Arab State Jewish State Jerusalem Enclave Negeb	5,491,625 1,540,664 715,140		185,926 88,959 6,479			18,315 274,352 22,287	1,616,169 342,161 33,964 9,677,000	43,837 102,672 17,333	1,094,815	9,511,447 1,916,294 1,289,083	136,619 1,309,473 45,607		102,672 17,333	
All Palestine	7,747,429	1,176,745	281,364	9,205,538	4,969,395	314,954	11,669,294	163,842	17,117,485	12,716,824	1,491,699	11,950,658	163,842	26,323,023

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STATISTICS OF "DIVIDED" VILLAGES

Rural Population

SECOND REVISION

APPENDIX 1 C.

State Moslems Jews Christ- ians Total State Moslems Jews Christ- ians Others Total Moslems Jews Others .ural) Arab	Village			Part I						Part II						Total		
Jewish	200000	State	Moslem	ıs Jews	Christ- ians	Others	Total	•	Moslems	Jews	Christ- ians	1	Total	Moslenis		Christ- ians	Others	Total
	Rishon le Zion (rural)			:	:	:	:		:		:	:	÷	:	:	:	:	:

1	[a]	7,833 2,500 1,340 507 18,590
	s, Total	
	Roads etc.	:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
al	Others	
Total	Public	7,980
	Jews	7,833 2,500 3 1,337 200 9,730
	Arabs	3 200 203
	Arabs Jews Public Others Roads, Total Arabs Jews Public Others Roads, etc.	7,833 2,500 1,340 507 7,790
	Roads,	:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
	Others	::::::
11	Public	:::::
Part II	Jews	2,500 3 1,337 200 6,910 203 19,087
	Arabs	.:. 3 200 203
	State	Jewish
	Total	10,800
	Roads, etc.	::::::
	Others	: : : : : :
1.1	Public	7,980
Part I	Jews	2,820 7,980
	Arabs Jews Public Others Roads, Total	:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
	S	Arab
	Category	Citrus Plantations Cereals (14–13) Cereals (14–15) Uncultivable
Village	, make	Rishon le Zion Citrus Arab Cercals (9–13) Cercals (14–15) Uncultivable

Rural Property Tax

Village			Part I						Part II						Total		
V IIIago	State	Arabs	Jews		Public Others Total	Total	State	Arabs	Jews	Public	Others	Total	Arabs	Jews	Public	Others	Total
Kishon le Zion (rural) Arab		 	:	:	:	:	Jewish	-	462	:	:	463	1	462	:	:	463

APPENDIX II C

SECOND REVISION

DETAILED STATISTICS

(a) Arab State Population

			•	Moslems.	Christians.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Total.
Urban Rural		 	•••	192,670 502,710	30,310 20,040	1,060 8,910	224,040 531,660	15,180 11,820	239,220 543,480
Total	•••	 		695,380	50,350	9,970	755,700	27,000	782,700

Land

	Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Roads, &c.	Total.
Citrus	45,259	470	45,729	6,917	393		53,039
Bananas Plantations Fishponds	1,171 806,448 	206 3,640 	1,377 810,088 	107. 30,078 1,226	513 40,573 	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	1,997 880,739 1,226
Total: Other Plantations	807,619	3,846	811,465	31,411	41,086	•••	883,962
Cereals (9–13) Cereals (14–15)	4,402,787 683,788	36,611 665	4,439,398 684,453	176,883 29,750	114,342 75,035		4,730,623 789,238
Total: Cereals	5,086,575	37,276	5,123,851	206,633	189,377	•••	5,519,861
Total Cultivable	5,939,453	41,592	5,981,045	244,961	230,856		6,456,862
Urban Areas Village Sites Uncultivable	36,174 22,403 4,163,375	1,688 251 40,670	37,862 22,654 4,204,045	5,346 3,173 48,810	3,981 239 1,728,798	7,045 56,046	54,234 26,066 6,037,699
Total Uncultivable	4,221,952	42,609	4,264,561	57,329	1,733,018	63,091	6,117,999
Total Land	10,161,405	84,201	10,245,606	302,290	1,963,874	63,091	12,574,861

Property Taxation

					Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Total.
Urban Rural				 	57,832 71,445	5,549 935	63,381 72,380	21,345 5,269	5,166 3,187	89,892 80,83 6
To	tal		•••	 •••	129,277	6,484	135,761	26,614	8,353	170,728

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SECOND REVISION—contd.

DETAILED STATISTICS—contd.

(b) Jewish State Population

		1		Moslems.	Christians.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Total.
Urban Rural			 	48,410 151,790	28,820 2,490	620 3,380	77,850 157,660	349,050 77,130	426,900 234,790
Total	•••	•••	 	200,200	31,310	4,000	235,510	426,180	661,690

			Lana				
	Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Roads, etc.	Total.
Citrus	71,558	2,908	74,466	131,996	875		207,337
Bananas Plantations Fishponds	550 71,545 	175 1,515 	725 73,060 	971 61,013 3,597	32 6,606 		1,728 140,679 3,597
Fotal: Other Plantations	72,095	1,690	73,785	65,581	6,638		146,004
Cereals (9–13) Cereals (14–15)	881,836 43,703	4,909 14	886,745 43,717	674,607 36,280	34,330 2,186		1,595,682 82,183
Total: Cereals	925,539	4,923	930,462	710,887	36,516		1,677,865
otal: Cultivable	1,069,192	9,521	1,078,713	908,464	44,029		2,031,206
Jrban Areas Village Sites Jncultivable	9,332 5,576 125,229	8,822 7 589	18,154 5,583 125,818	64,306 36,579 134,453	9,561 121 219,060	10,925 72,865	102,946 42,283 552,196
Cotal: Uncultivable	140,137	9,418	149,555	235,338	228,742	83,790	697,425
Total Land	1,209,329	18,939	1,228,268	1,143,802	272,771	83,790	2,728,631

Property Taxation

				Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Total.
Urban Rural	•••	•	•;•	 55,307 16,171	22,068 299	77,375 16,470	371,229 23,061	15,131 573	463,735 40,104
Total	•••	•••		 71,478	22,367	93,845	394,290	15,704	503,839

SECOND REVISION—contd.

DETAILED STATISTICS—contd.

(c) Jerusalem Enclave

Population

						Moslems.	Christians.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Total.
Urban Rural		•••	•••	•••	•••	63,660 102,030	51,510 2,380	130	115,300 104,410	97,020 3,400	212,320 107,810
· Tot	tal		•••	• • •	•••	165,690	53,890	130	219,710	100,420	320,130

Land

	Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Roads, etc.	Total.
Citrus	18,551	1,537	20,088	815	169	gr	21,072
Bananas Plantations Fishponds	122 174,229 	33 6,073 	155 180,302 	3,076 	 539 		156 183,917
Total: Other Plantations	174,351	6,106	180,457	3,077	539		184,073
Cereals (9–13) Cereals (14–15)	368,723 95,555	22,254 594	390,977 96,149	17,619 1,809	5, 7 68 3		414,364 97,961
Total: Cereals	464,278	22,848	487,126	19,428	5,771		512,325
Total: Cultivable	657,180	30,491	687,671	23,320	6,479	•••	717,470
Urban Areas Village Sites Uncultivable	16,627 5,548 524,685	3,138 1,011 4,270	19,765 6,559 528,955	5,047 1,943 15,297	800 23 29,711	4,733 12,228	30,345 8,525 586,191
Total: Uncultivable	546,860	8,419	555,279	22,287	30,534	16,961	625,061
Total Land	1,204,040	38,910	1,242,950	45,607	37,013	16,961	1,342,531

Property Taxation

						Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Total.
Urban Rural	•••	•••				58,418 12,107	30,189 726	88, 6 07 12,833	69,59 5 875	5,440 121	163,642 13,829
To	tal	•••	• • •	•••	•••	70,525	30,915	101,440	70,470	5,561	177,471

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APPENDIX II C (1)

SECOND REVISION DETAILED STATISTICS OF GALILEE

Population

						Moslems.	Christians.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Total.
Urban Rural				•••		25,970 99,760	12,920 14,240	780 8,880	39,670 122,880	3,900 5,970	43,570 128,850
Tot	tal	•••	•••	•••	•••	125,730	27,160	9,660	162,550	9,870	172,420

Land

	Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Roads, etc.	Total.
Citrus	8,559	256	8,815	263	•••		9,078
Bananas Plantations Fishponds	47 182,383 	83 970 	130 183,353 	106 23,293 1,161	16,563 		236 223,209 1,161
Total: Other Plantations	182,430	1,053	183,483	24,560	16,563		224,606
Cereals (9-13) Cereals (14-15)	554,638 114,255	15,350 	569,988 114,255	55,440 27,843	11,653 1,171		637,081 143,269
Total: Cereals	668,893	15,350	684,243	83,283	12,824		780,350
otal: Cultivable	859,882	16,659	876,541	108,106	29,387		1,014,034
Jrban Areas Village Sites Jncultivable	5,614 6,696 670,044	1,279 176 9,317	6,893 6,872 679,361	2,145 2,185 42,612	551 22 256,816	893 15,669	10,482 9,079 994,458
otal: Uncultivable	682,354	10,772	693,126	46,942	257,389	16,562	1,014,019
Total Land	1,542,236	27,431	1,569,667	155,048	286,776	16,562	2,028,053

Property Taxation

							•		•	
·					Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Total.
Urban Rural	•••				7,870 14,136	1,210 414	9,080 14,550	4,129 2,614	965 647	14,174 17,811
Total	•••	•••	•••	• • •	22,006	1,624	23,630	6,743	1,612	31,985

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SECOND REVISION DETAILED STATISTICS OF ARAB STATE (EXCLUDING GALILEE)

Population

						Moslems.	Christians.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Total.
Urban Rural	•••	•••	•••	•••		166,700 . 402,950	17,390 5,800	280 30	184,370 408,780	11,280 5,850	195,650 414,630
Tota	al	•••	•••	• •,•	•••	569,650	23,190	310	593,150	17,130	610,280

Land

	. Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Roads, etc.	Total.
Citrus	36,700	. 214	36,914	6,654	393		43,961
Bananas Plantations Fishponds	1,124 624,065 	123 2,670	1,247 626,735	1 6,785 65	513 24,010		1,761 657,530 65
Total: Other Plantations	625,189	2,793	627,982	6,851	24,523		659,356
Cereals (9-13) Cereals (14-15)	3,848,149 569,533	21,261 665	3,869,410 570,198	121,443 1,907	102,689 73,864	•••	4,093,542 645,969
Γotal: Cereals:.	4,417,682	21,926	4,439,608	123,350	176,553	•••	4,739,511
Fotal: Cultivable	5,079,571	24,933	5,104,504	136,855	201,469	•••	5,442,828
Urban Areas Village Sites Uncultivable	30,560 15,707 3,493,331	409 - 75 31,353	30,969 15,782 3,524,684	3,201 988 6,198	3,430 217 1,471,982	6,152 40,377	43,752 16,987 5,043,241
Total Uncultivable	3,539,598	31,837	3,571,435	10,387	1,475,629	46,529	5,103,980
Total Land	8,619,169	56,770	8,675,939	147,242	1,677,098	46,529	10,546,808

Property Taxation

					i	Arábs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Total,
Urban Rural	•••	•••	•••	•••		49,962 57,309	4,339 521	54,301 57,830	17,216 2,655	4,201 2,540	75,718 63,025
Tot	al	•••	•••	•••		107,271	4,860	112,131	19,871	6,741	138,743

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APPEN

SECOND

SUMMARY OF

	-			I	Population				
		Urban	4		Rural		1.	Total	
	Arabs and Others	Jews	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Total
Arab State : Excluding Galilee Galilee	184,370 39,670	11,280 3,900	195,650 43,570	408,780 122,880	5,850 5,970	414,630 128,850	593,150 162,550	17,130 9,870	610,280 172,420
Total: Arab State Jewish State Jerusalem Enclave Negeb	224,040 77,850 115,300	15,180 349,050 97,020	239,220 426,900 212,320	531,660 157,660 104,410	11,820 77,130 3,400	543,480 234,790 107,810	755,700 235,510 219,710	27,000 426,180 100,420	782,700 661,690 320,130
All Palestine	417,190	461,250	878,440	793,730	92,350	886,080	1,210,920	553,600	1,764,520

	•						L	and		·			
			Cit	rus			Other Pl	antations	-		Cer	eals	
		Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Total
Arab State: Excluding Galilee Galilee		dunums 36,914 8,815	dunums 6,654 263	dunums 393	dunums 43,961 9,078	dunums 627,982 183,483	dunums 6,851 24,560	dunums 24,523 16,563	dunums 659,356 224,606	dunums 4,439,608 684,243	dunums 123,350 83,283	dunums 176,553 12,824	dunums 4,739,511 780,350
Total: Arab State Jewish State Jerusalem Enclave Negeb		45,729 74,466 20,088	6,917 131,996 815	393 875 169	53,039 207,337 21,072	811,465 73,785 180,457	31,411 65,581 3,077	41,086 6,638 539	883,962 146,004 184,073	5,123,851 930,462 487,126	206,633 710,887 19,428	189,377 36,516 5,771	5,519,861 1,677,865 512,325
All Palestine		140,283	139,728	1,437	281,448	1,065,707	100,069	48,263	1,214,039	6,541,439	936,948	231,664	7,710,051

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DIX III C .

REVISION

STATISTICS

					Prop	erty Ta	kation					
		Urt	an			Ru	ral			То	tal	
	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Total
Arab State : Excluding Galilee Galilee	54,301 9,080	£ 17,216 4,129	£ 4,201 965	£ 75,718 14,174	57,830 14,550	£ 2,655 2,614	£ 2,540 647	£ 63,025 17,811	112,131 23,630	£ 19,871 6,743	£ 6,741 1,612	138,743 31,985
Total: Arab State Jewish State Jerusalem Enclave Negeb	63,381 77,375 88,607		5,166 15,131 5,440	463,735	72,380 16,470 12,833	5,269 23,061 875	3,187 573 121	80,836 40,104 13,829	135,761 93,845 101,440	26,614 394,290 70,470	8,353 15,704 5,561	
All Palestine	229,363	462,169	25,737	717,269	101,683	29,205	3,881	134,769	331,046	491,374	29,618	852,038

							La	and						
		Total C	ultivable				Uncultivat	ble	•].		Total		
	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Roads,	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Roads, etc.	Total
Arab State : Excluding Galilee Galilee	dunums 5,104,504 876,541	dunums 136,855 108,106	dunums 201,469 29,387		dunums 3,571,435 693,126	dunums 10,387 46,942		dunums 46,529 16,562	dunums 5,103,980 1,014,019		dunums 147,242 155,048			dunums 10,546,80 2,028,05
Cotal: Arab State ewish State erusalem Enclave Vegeb	5,981,045 1,078,713 687,671		230,856 44,029 6,479	2,031,206		57,329 235,338 22,287	228,742	63,091 83,790 16,961	6,117,999 697,425 625,061 9,677,000	1,242,950	302,290 1,143,802 45,607	272,771	83,790 16,961	12,574,86 2,728,63 1,342,53 9,677,00
ll Palestine	7,747,429	1,176,745	281,364	9,205,538	4,969,395	314,954	11,669,294	163,842	17,117,485	12716,824	1,491,699	11,950,658	163,842	26,323,02

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APPENDIX ID

JEWISH AGENCY

STATISTICS OF "DIVIDED" VILLAGES

NIL

Note.—The statistics of all villages divided under this plan are given in Appendix I A

APPENDIX II D

JEWISH AGENCY

DETAILED STATISTICS

(a) Arab State

Population

•						Moslems.	Christians.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Total.
Urban Rural		•••	•••	•••	•••	139,870 345,000	38,550 .7,260	300 10	178,720 352,270	9,220 4,500	187,940 356,770
To	tal	•••	•••	•••	•••	484,870	45,810	310	530,990	13,720	544,710

Land

	**	` `				=	***
	Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Roads, etc.	Total.
Citrus	17,873	331	18,204	2,621	474	•••	21,299
Bananas Plantations Fishponds	1,097 704,479 	63 7,754 	1,160 712,233 	1 4,644 	513 9,964 		1,674 726,841
Total: Other Plantations	705,576	7,817	713,393	4,645	10,477	•••	728,515
Cereals (9-13) Cereals (14-15)	1,460,404 605,241	31,246 1,005	1,491,650 606,246	27,079 3,545	37,302 65,549		1,556,031 675,340
Total: Cereals	2,065,645	32,251	2,097,896	30,624	102,851	•••	2,231,371
Total Cultivable	2,789,094	40,399	2,829,493	37,890	113,802	•••	2,981,185
Urban Areas Village Sites Uncultivable	27,029 17,535 2,685,817	787 234 29,703	27,816 17,769 2,715,520	1,014 1,855 17,206	940 87 312,066	4,268 24,182	34,038 19,711 3,068,974
Total Uncultivable	2,730,381	30,724	2,761,105	20,075	313,093	28,450	3,122,723
Total Land	5,519,475	71,123	5,590,598	57,965	426,895	28,450	6,103,908

Property Taxation

						Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Total.
Urban Rural	•••	•••	•••	•••	•••	51,468 45,166	5,100 796	56,568 45,962	14,627 1,070	3,697 1,361	74,892 48,393
To	tal	•••	•••	•••	•••	96,634	5,896	102,530	15,697	5,058	123,285

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JEWISH AGENCY—contd.

DETAILED STATISTICS—contd.

(b) Jewish State

Population

			•			Moslems.	Christians.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Total.
Urban Rural	•••	•••	•••	•••	•••	134,240 411,530	42,740 17,650	1,410 12,280	178,390 441,460	355,030 87,8 50	533,420 529,310
To	tal	•••	•••	•••	•••	545,770	60,390	13,690	619,850	442,880	1,062,730

Land

	Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Roads, etc.	Total.
Citrus	117,495	4,584	122,079	137,107	963		260,149
Bananas Plantations Fishponds	746 347,564 	351 3,457 	1,097 351,021 	1,078 89,523 4,823	32 37,754 		2,207 478,298 4,823
Total: Other Plantations	348,310	3,808	352,118	95,424	37,786		485,328
Cereals (9–13) Cereals (14–15)	4,192,221 217,805	32,510 268	4,224,731 218,073	841,705 64,294	117,138 11,675	•••	5,183,574 294,042
Total: Cereals	4,410,026	32,778	4,442,804	905,999	128,813	•••	5,477,616
Total Cultivable	4,875,831	41,170	4,917,001	1,138,530	167,562	•••	6,223,093
Urban Areas Village Sites Uncultivable	27,366 15,992 2,127,412	10,176 1,035 15,824	37,542 17,027 2,143,236	68,638 39,779 181,335	12,846 296 11,842,486	15,130 116,917	134,156 57,102 13,783,974
Total Uncultivable	2,170,770	27,035	2,197,805	289,752	11,355,628	132,047	13,975,232
Total Land	7,046,601	68,205	7,114,806	1,428,282	11,523,190	132,047	20,198,325

Property Taxation

	-					Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Total.
Urban Rural	•••	•••				72,544 54,543	23,383 1,163	95.927 55,706	377,947 28,121	17,230 2,520	491,104 86,347
Tot	al	•••	•••	•••	•••	127,087	24,546	151,633	406,068	19,750	577,451

Reference:

1 61858

APPENDIX II D—contd.

JEWISH AGENCY—contd.

DETAILED STATISTICS—contd.

(c) Jerusalem

Population

-						Moslems.	Christians.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Total.
Urban Rural	•••	•••		•••		30,630	29,350 		60,080	97,000 	157,080 _x
Tot	tal	•••	•••	•••	•••	30,630	29,350	100	60,080	97,000	157,080

Land

	Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Roads, etc.	Total.
Citrus	•••	•••			•••		•••
Bananas Plantations Fishponds	 179 	 17	196		•••		196
Total: Other Plantations	179	17	196		•••		196
Cereals (9–13) Cereals (14–15)	721	18	739	325	···		1,064
Total: Cereals	721	18	739	325	•••		1,064
Total Cultivable	900	35	935	325	•••		1,260
Urban Areas Village Sites Uncultivable	7,738	2,685 2	10,423 62	5,047 61 19	556 17	3,305 ₄₀	19,331 61 , 138
Total Uncultivable	7,798	2,687	10,485	5,127	573	3,345	19,530
Total Land	8,698	2,722	11,420	5,452	573	3,345	20,790

Property Taxation

	 			Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Total.
Urban Rural	··· .	 		47,545 14	29,323 1	76,868 15	69,595 14	4,810	151,27 3 2 9
Total	 •••	 •••	•••	47,559	29,324	76,883	69,609	4,810	151,302

APPENDIX II D (1)

JEWISH AGENCY

DETAILED STATISTICS OF JAFFA (URBAN AND RURAL)

Population

			-			Moslems.	Christians.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Total.
Urban	•••	•••	•••	•••	•••	48,790	14,790	30	63,610	9,200	72,810
Rural	•••	•••	•••	•••	•••	•••	•••	•••		•••	• •••
To	tal		•••	•••		48,790	14,790	30	63,610	9,200	72,810

Land

	Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Roads, etc.	Total.
Citrus		•••			•••		•••
Bananas Plantations Fishponds		•••					•••
Total: Other Plantations	•••	• • •	,		•••		•••
Cereals (9–13) Cereals (14–15)	1,095	•••	1,095 	• • •	• • •		1,095
Fotal: Cereals	1,095	•••	1,095		• • •		1,095
Γotal Cultivable	1,095	•••	1,095	•••	•••		1,095
Urban Areas Village Sites Uncultivable	8,443 1,338	307	8,750 1,338	979 1	379 1,996	1,777 9	11,885 3,344
Fotal Uncultivable	9,781	307	10,088	980	2,375	1,786	15,229
Total Land	10,876	307	11,183	980	2,375	1,786	16,324

Property Taxation

					Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Total
Urban Rural	•••	•••	•••	•••	 29,857 20	4,16 0	34,017 20	14,563	1,995 	50,5 75 20
Tot	tal	•••	• • •	•••	 29,877	4,160	34,037	14,563	1,995	50,595

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JEWISH AGENCY

DETAILED STATISTICS OF ARAB STATE (EXCLUDING JAFFA)

Population

						Moslems.	Christians.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Total.
Urban Rural	•••	•••	•••	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	•••	91,080 345,000	23,760 7,260	270 10	115,110 352,270	20 4,500	115,130 356,770
To	tal		•••		•••	436,080	31,020	280	467,380	4,520	471,900

Land

•	Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Roads, etc.	Total.
Citrus	17,873	331	18,204	2,621	474		21,299
Bananas Plantations Fishponds	1,097 704,479 	63 7,754 	1,160 712,233 	4,644 	513 9,964 		1,674 726,841
Total: Other Plantations	705,576	7,817	713,393	4,645	10,477		728,515
Cereals (9–13) Cereals (14–15)	1,459,309 605,241	31,246 1,005	1,490,555 606,246	27,079 3,545	37,302 65,549		1,554,936 675,340
Total: Cereals	2,064,550	32,251	2,096,801	30,624	102,851		2,230,276
Total Cultivable	2,787,999	40,399	2,828,398	37,890	113,802		2,980,090
Urban Areas Village Sites Uncultivable	18,586 17,535 2,684,479	480 234 29,703	19,066 17,769 2,714,182	35 1,855 17,205	561 87 310,070	2,491 24,173	22,153 19,711 3,065,630
Total Uncultivable	2,720,600	30,417	2,751,017	19,095	310,718	26,664	3,107,494
Total Land	5,508,599	70,816	5,579,415	56,985	424,520	26,664	6,087,584

Property Taxation

					Arabs.	Others.	Arabs and Others.	Jews.	Public.	Total.
Urban Rural					 21,611 45,146	940 796	22,551 45,942	64 1,070	1,702 1,361	24,317 48,373
Tot	tal	•••	•••	•••	 66,757	1,736	68,493	1,134	3,063	72,690

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APPEN

JEWISH

Summary

	Population											
		Urban			Rural		Total					
	Arabs and Others	Jews	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Total			
Arab State: Excluding Jaffa Jaffa	115,110 63,610	20 9,200	115,130 72,810	352,270	4,5 00	356,770 	467,380 63,610	4,520 9,200	471,900 72,810			
Total: Arab State	178,720	9,220	187,940	352,270	4,500	356,770	530,990	13,720	544,710			
Jewish State : Excluding Negeb Negeb	178,390	355,030	533,420	441,460	87,850	529,310 	619,850	442,880	1,062,730			
Total: Jewish State	178,390	355,030	533,420	441,460	87,850	529,310	619,850	442,880	1,062,730			
Jerusalem	60,080	97,000	157,080		•••	•••	60,080	97,000	157,080			
All Palestine	417,190	461,250	878,440	793,730	92,350	886,080	1,210,920	553,600	1,764,520			

			Land													
			Citr	us			Other Pla	ntations			•					
		Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Total			
Arab State: Excluding Jaffa Jaffa	•••	dunums 18,204 	dunums 2,621 	dunums 474	dunums 21,299	dunums 713,393	dunums 4,645	dunums 10,477	dunums 728,515	dunums 2,096,801 1,095	dunums 30,624	dunums 102,851	dunums 2,230,276 1,095			
Total: Arab State		18,204	2,621	474	21,299	713,393	4,645	10,477	728,515	2,097,896	30,624	102,851	2,231,371			
ewish State: Excluding Negeb Negeb		122,079	137,107	963	260,149	352,118 	95,424 	37,786	485,328	4,442,804	905,999	128,813	5,477,616			
otal: Jewish State	•••	122,079	137,107	963	260,149	352,118	95,424	37,786	485,328	4,442,804	905,999	128,813	5,477,616			
erusalem		•••	·		•••	196	•••	•••	196	739	325	•••	1,064			
ll.Palestine		140,283	139,728	1,437	281,448	1,065,707	100,069	48,263	1,214,039	6,541,439	936,948	231,664	7,710,051			

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DIX III D

AGENCY

of Statistics

	Property Taxation											
		Urb	an		-	Ru	ral		Total			
	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Total
Arab State: Excluding Jaffa Jaffa	22,551 34,017	£ 64 14,563	£ 1,702 1,995		45,942 20	£ 1,070	£ 1,361	48,373 20	£ 68,493 34,037	£ 1,134 14,563	£ 3,063 1,995	£ 72,690 50,595
Total: Arab State	56,568	14,627	3,697	74,892	45,962	1,070	1,361	48,393	102,530	15,697	5,058	123,285
Jewish State: Excluding Negeb Negeb	95,927	377,947	17,230	491,104	55,706 	28,121	2,520	86,347	151,633	406,068	19,750 	577,451
Total: Jewish State	95,927	377,947	17,230	491,104	55,706	28,121	2,520	86,347	151,633	406,068	19,750	577,451
Jerusalem	76,868	69,595	4,810	151,273	15	14	•••	29	76,883	69,609	4,810	151,302
All Palestine	229,363	462,169	25,737	717,269	101,683	29,205	3,881	134,769	331,046	491,374	29,618	852,038

						L	and								
		Fotal Cultiv	vable _.			Un	cultivable			Total					
	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Roads,	Total	Arabs and Others	Jews	Public	Roads,	Total	
Arab State: Excluding Jaffa Jaffa	dunums 2,828,398 1,095	dunums 37,890	dunums 113,802	dunums 2,980,090 1,095	dunums 2,751,017 10,088	dunums 19,095 980		dunums 26,664 1,786		dunums 5,579,415 11,183	dunums 56,985 980	dunums 424,520 2,375	dunums 26,664 1,786		
Total: Arab State	2,829,493	37,890	113,802	2,981,185	2,761,105	20,075	313,093	28,450	3,122,723	5,590,598	57,965	426,895	28,450	6,103,90	
Jewish State: Excluding Negeb Negeb	4,917,001	1,138,530	167,562	6,223,093	2,197,805	289,752	1,678,628 9,677,000	132,047	4,298,232 9,677,000	7,114,806 	1,428,282	1,846,190 9,677,000	132,047 	10,521,32 9,677,00	
Cotal: Jewish State	4,917,001	1,138,530	167,562	6,223,093	2,197,805	289,752	11,355,628	132,047	13,975,232	7,114,806	1,428,282	11,523,190	132,047	20,198,32	
erusalem	935	325	•••	1,260	10,485	5,127	573	3,345	19,530	11,420	5,452	573	3,345	20,79	
ll Palestine	7,747,429	1,176,745	281,364	9,205,538	4.969,395	314,954	11,669,294	163,842	17,117,485	12,716,824	1,491,699	11,950,658	163,842	26,323,02	

PART V

Maps (in pocket at end)

- Royal Commission.
- B. First Revision.
- Second Revision.
- D. Jewish Agency.

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
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



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
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
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
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









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
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
























































Next Paper.

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working out fearth in proposals, and carely
Hell Jour should heef very clear of that, otherwise
the impression must inevitably be created in
the minds the committee that their hustition
proposal is being put forward with our
approval. The objections to this are set out
clearly in the Belley's drafts, but I have charled
the draft committee of think that we chould
leave the C.O. in no doubt of our views
on the surject.

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
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No dear Beely.

In a letter dated the 9th July Gurney states that the United Nations Committee have agreed to hear the High Commissioner privately and informally at Government House. When he wrote, the Palestine Government had not yet decided whether to give further Government evidence in writing or orally in public. It was clear that they would have to traverse the many statements made in evidence by the Jews but the question of the best way of doing so was not easy to decide.

Gurney reports that there is clear indication of a majority view in favour of partition and he thought Weizmann's evidence (given the day before he wrote) would have strengthened this. He considered the indication sufficiently strong to warrant consideration being given now to the drafting of the partition instruments and, at his request, we are arranging a preliminary discussion with Gibson, the Attorney General (who happens to be on leave), the arrangements which would have to be made for the actual legal drafting consequent upon a partition decision.

Gurney's letter continues:-

"Sandstrom is clearly very keen on getting our ideas as to how in fact the process of partition would be carried out. I have told him that we have a good deal of material on the various aspects of this, such as currency, railways, post office, customs, staff, nationality, etc., and he tells me that this is the sort

H. BEELEY, ESQ., C.B.E.

of information that it would be most helpful to the Committee to get "underground". He has also said that he would like to have similar "underground" consultations with the Jewish Agency. We shall have to be careful about this, but having impressed upon the Committee the importance of fully working out any solution they might arrive at (with which Sandstrom agrees) I feel it is perhaps a little unfair to expect them to think out all these problems for themselves. On the other hand it is not the sort of material on which we can go and give public evidence.

There is still some possibility that the Arab High Committee may respond to the further invitation sent to them yesterday by Sandstrom to present the Arab case, possibly by way of a rapporteur such as Catten.

He was very friendly and frank and told me half in jest that he feared that if the Committee stayed here much longer they would become anti-Semitic. the exception of Guatemala and Urrequay none of them was much impressed by the attacks made by Ben Gurison VED IN C.B. and others on the administration. He added that Ben Gurion had in fact evaded all his questions. He also said that he fully appreciated that the General Officer Commanding's confirmation of the SENT TO DEPI. three death sentences was an act done in the course of his duty and he in no way regarded it as an affrat He hoped, however, that the to the Committee. sentences would not be carried out at least while the Committee were here. He still has very vague ideas as to when they might leave Palestine or when they might require evidence from His Majesty's Government at Geneva. I think, however, that it is fairly clear that they are getting rather tired of listening to past history and want to get down to working out a practical partition solution. It is on this aspect that they would find consultation with a representative of His Majesty's Government at Geneva most valuable."

10 1.17 atri



Colonial Office, Downing Street, 3. W. 1.

July 16. 1947.

75872/154A.

My dear Beeley,

of the 7th July and from Martin's letter to you of the 15th July that the Jonmittee are beginning to study seriously the practicable problems presented by a decision for partition. macGillivray has informed us that he has given Lohn and Bunche confidentially a copy of Harris' memorandum on the various partition plans, with the proviso that it should be communicated to the Chairman and no one else. We propose to inform MacGillivray that we approve this action and that, if he is asked, to make available in Geneva to the full Committee a number of copies

been attempting to obtain from Government by what he calls "underground" approaches the detailed information necessary for a criticism of possible partition plans. The have no idea how far this "underground" activity may have gone since Gurney's letter of the 9th July and we propose to ask for a telegraphic report. The attitude to be adopted by any U.H. delegation which goes to deneva will obviously have to be

/very

The You will have seen from copies you have of the copy of MacGillivray's letter to Martin of this document. You will have seen that the Chairman has

H. D. LANDER TY, LINE, O. B. H.

very carefully considered and perhaps you could be examining in a preliminary way the sort of thing we would be justified in telling the Committee if they ask for our advice on partition schemes.

I enclose a copy of preliminary draft of a telegram which we propose to send to MacGillivray and I should be grateful for your comments on it. It may of course be substantially amended during further submission in this office.

Jour sencerely,

W.A.J. Mathieson)

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Mr. Mathieson /7/47	
Mr	Permt. U.S. of S.
Mr•	Parly. U.S. S.
Mr	Secretary of State.

Your Reference..

DRAFT. TELEGRAM

IMMEDIATE

HIGHCOMA, JERUSALEM. No. ___ Top Secret.

Following from Martin for MacGillivray.
Begins.

Your Top Secret and Personal letter of 7th July. Discussion of Partition.

We fully approve of your action in presenting confidentially copy of "Study of Partition" to Mohn and Bunche and agree that the copy should be made available to Committee in Geneva if analysis of partition is asked for. In a letter to me of 9th July Gurney confirms your view that majority of Committee may tend towards partition In accordance with that letter solution. we hope to arrange for discussion with Gibson before his return of arrangements necessary for drafting of partition instruments. Gurney mentions the difficult problem created for you by Chairman's desire to get "underground" information from Government about detailed implications of partition. Presume you will be fully equipped at Geneva to deal with the detailed problem as inaffects local considerations and if presence of U.K. delegation is required


FURTHER ACTION.

Copy to Mr Beeley,

Foreign Office.

possible. Grateful if you would let me know by telegram if any further confidential discussion with Chairman or Members of Committee has taken place on implications of partition. Please show this telegram to Gurney with reference to his letter of 9th July. Ends.

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91- July, 1947.

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to

My dear Martin,

Mr. Martin,
Colonial Office.

We are frankly
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as is seems to account
not only to a request
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horsible forms publical white is a perfectly lent affectly lent also to an invitation to cooperates with the Committee in the working and a defailed plan of partition. If this were done surely it would in witably

create the impression in the minds of the Committee that in puting forward a furtilion proposal they would be astrip with the approval of AM Gove 1

Thank you for your letter of the 15th

July, in which you pass on Gurney's view

that a majority of the United Nations

Committee are likely to adopt some form of

partition as their recommendation for a

Solution of the Palestine problem

The Committee will of course report

to the United Nations Assembly and it is

to the Assembly's recommendations that we

shall eventually have to determine our attitude. Since, however, it now seems possible that a representative of H.M.G. may be invited to discuss the details of a partition proposal with the Committee in Geneva, I think we shall have to look ahead and consider our attitude/to such a proposal if it it eventually adopted by the General

that H.M.G. could not on their own authority give effect to the partition of Palestine.

They did not. So far as I remember, commit themselves in any way as to their attitude in the event of a recommendation for partition by the General Assembly. It was subsequently decided that, at the Special Session of the Assembly in the spring, Sir A. Cadogan should decline to commit H.M.G. in advance to accept whatever solution the Assembly might eventually recommend. We are consequently on record as having reserved

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our/

our freedom of judgment on the Assembly's recommendation. Speaking in the First Committee, Sir A. Cadogan also made the following explicit reservation:-

"We should not have the sole responsibility for enforcing a solution which is not accepted by both parties and which we cannot reconcile with our conscience".

- #. This leaves two questions open:-
 - (a) do we accept a recommendation for partition if it is made by the Assembly?
 - (b) if such a recommendation is not accepted by both parties, can we constitute the sole responsibility for enforcing it?
- having in effect claimed the right to exercise a veto in this question, we cannot escape responsibility for the use we make of it. In these circumstances, the Arab Governments will hold us responsible for the partition of Palestine if it comes about as a result of action by the United Nations. From the point of view of the Foreign Office, therefore, it would seem necessary to examine the consequences of this very carefully before we could agree to recommend to Ministers acquiescence in a recommendation for partition.
- A. Even if it were decided that we should not stand in the way of this solution, there would remain to be considered the arguments for and against accepting the task of giving effect to

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE,

it. Any form of partition which the Committee is likely to recommend would almost certainly provoke an Arab rising, for which/ as you know/ the Mufti is now making energetic preparations. At the same time, the Committee/is not likely to adopt a frontier which would be acceptable either to the Jewish terrorists or to very large elements within the Jewish Agency itself. An attempt to implement the Committee's hypothetical plan of partition would probably be the signal both for the outbreak of a formidable Arab rebellion and for the intensification of terrorist action by sections of the Jewish population. British Administration and British forces would thus find themselves in an exceedingly unenviable position if it were decided that they should alone undertake the task of imposing this settlement on the country.

arguments for your consideration because

I want sure whether the reference in your
letter to consultation with the AttorneyGeneral of Palestine on the drafting of
partition instruments implified the assumption
that H.M.G. would agree to be the sole
instrument for giving effect to partition.

We must of course be prepared for all
eventualities, but I think a high-level
decision would be necessary before we could
take any steps which might give the United

Nations Committee the impression that, if

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they recommended partition, we would certainly carry it through.

For this reason, I find Sandstrom's suggestion for what he refers to as "underground" consultation with a representative of H.M.G. in Geneva rather disquieting. What he appears to be suggesting is that the Committee should work out details of the partition proposals with the aid of informal consultation with H.M.G. on the one hand and the Jewish Agency on the This recalls to mind the events of other. 1919-22, when the present mandate was drafted by H.M.G. in consultation with the Zionist Organisation and subsequently applied to the country with no reference to the wishes of the majority of In my view it would be most its inhabitants. exceedingly unwise to lend ourselves to anything in the nature of a repetition of this procedure.

A. It follows that I entirely agree with the apprehension which you express in your letter about the suggestion that we should help the Committee to work out the detail of a selation in the manner suggested by Sandstrom.

Perhaps the time has come when we should begin to consider the various proposals with which we likely to be confronted either by the Committee or subsequently by the General Assembly, and the attitude to be adopted towards each of If you agree, I would suggest that a them. preliminary meeting to survey the field might usefully he held some time next week.

MARGIN THIS Z WRITTEN

you will have seen the letter which Mathieron wrote W me on the 16th guly, with a draft telegram to generaleur which has to som what her overtaken by wents. We agree in approving Man Gillivray's action in giving the Hamis momenandum to Bonche and Mahn, ht we are glad to hear that you har frame is her the High bommissioner not to supply the Sommittee officially with any documents relating, to postition, but instead to brig Mar Gillissay for discussions in You don on the policy to to followed in supplying the bommittee with material while they are working at

gt appears that Mac Gillismay probably here in the week hymning the 27th gul. We support that,

before he arriver, there should be an inter-depart mental meeting to consider Sandstromis suggestion and its implications. Aided, the time has perhaps come when we should begin to consider over the postetion and any other proposals for may be equited to command an appreciable amount of support in the Systember Assembly.

you walk on grate for your agree, please suggest a time for this meeting.

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FOREIGN OFFICE, S. W. 1.

E 6355/115/31

19th July, 1947.

My dear Martin,

Thank you for your letter of 15th July, in which you pass on Gurney's view that a majority of the United Nations Committee are likely to adopt some form of partition as their recommendation for a solution of the Palestine problem, and his account of an approach by Sandstrom in this connection.

We are frankly disturbed at this approach by Sandstrom as it seems to amount not only to a request for information about possible forms of partition (which is a perfectly legitimate request) but also to an invitation to co-operate with the Committee in the working out of a detailed plan of partition. If this were done surely it would inevitably create the impression in the minds of the Committee that in putting forward a partition proposal they would be acting with the approval of H.M. Government.

The task of the Committee is merely to report to the United Nationslassembly and it is to the Assembly's recommendations that we shall eventually have to determine our attitude.

It was agreed in Cabinet last winter that H.M. Government could not on their own authority give effect to the partition of Palestine. They did not, we understand, commit themselves in any way as to their attitude in the event of a recommendation for partition by the General Assembly. It was subsequently decided that, at the Special Session of the Assembly in the spring, Sir A. Cadogan should decline to commit H.M. Government in advance to accept whatever solution the Assembly might eventually recommend. We are consequently on record as having reserved

J. M. Martin, Esq., Colonial Office.

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our freedom of judgment on the Assembly's recommendation. Speaking in the First Committee, Sir A. Cadogan also made the following explicit reservation:-

"We should not have the sole responsibility for enforcing a solution which is not accepted by both parties and which we cannot reconcile with our conscience."

This leaves two questions open:-

- (a) do we accept a recommendation for partition if it is made by the Assembly?
- (b) if such a recommendation is not accepted by both parties, can we undertake the sole responsibility for enforcing it?

On the first point, it is evident that, having in effect claimed the right to exercise a veto in this question, we cannot escape responsibility for the use we make of it. In these circumstances, the Arab Governments will hold us responsible for the partition of Palestine if it comes about as a result of action by the United Nations. From the point of view of the Foreign Office, therefore, it would seem necessary to examine the consequences of this very carefully before we could agree to recommend to Ministers acquiescence in a recommendation for partition.

Even if it were decided that we should not stand in the way of this solution, there would remain to be considered the arguments for and against accepting the task of giving effect to it. Any form of partition which the Committee are likely to recommend would almost certainly provoke an Arab rising, for which as you know the Mufti is now making energetic preparations. At the same time the Committee are not likely to adopt a frontier which would be acceptable either to the Jewish terrorists or to very large elements within the Jewish Agency itself. An attempt to implement the Committee's hypothetical plan of partition would probably be the signal both for the outbreak of a formidable Arab rebellion and for the intensification

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of beer beast action by sections of the Jewish poulation. The British Administration and British forces would thus find themselves in an exceedingly unenviable position if it were decided that they should undertake alone the task of imposing this settlement on the country.

I have briefly set out these arguments for your consideration because the reference in your letter to consultation with the Attorney-General of Palestine on the drafting of partition instruments seems to imply the assumption that H. M. Government would agree to be the sole instrument for giving effect to partition. We must of course be prepared for all eventualities, but I think a high-level decision would be necessary before we could take any steps which might give the United Nations Committee the impression that, if they recommended partition, we would certainly carry it through.

It is for this reason that I find Sandstrom's suggestion for what he refers to as "underground" consultation with a representative of H.M. Government in Geneva rather disquieting. What he appears to be suggesting is that the Committee should work out details of their partition proposal with the aid of informal consultation with H.M Government on the one hand and the Jewish Agency on the other. This recalls to mind the events of 1919-22, when the present mandate was drafted by H.M. Government in consultation with the Zionist Organisation and subsequently applied to the country with no reference to the wishes of the majority of its inhabitants. In our view it would be most unwise to lend ourselves to anything in the nature of a repetition of this procedure.

You will have seen the letter which Mathieson wrote to me on 16th July, with a draft telegram to Jerusalem which has to some extent been overtaken by events. We agree in approving MacGillvray's action in giving the Harris memorandum to Bunche and Mohn, but we are glad to hear

that/



that you have since asked the High Commissioner not to supply the Committee officially with any documents relating to partition, but instead to brief MacGillvray for discussions in London on the policy to be followed in supplying the Committee with material while they are working at Geneva.

It appears that MacGillvray will probably be here in the week beginning 27th July. We suggest that, before he arrives, there should be an inter-departmental meeting to consider Sandstrom's suggestion and its implications. Indeed, the time has perhaps come when we should begin to consider our attitude towards both partition and any other proposals which may be expected to command an appreciable amount of support in the September Assembly.

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If you agree, please suggest a time for this meeting.

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INWARD TELEGRAM.



Cypher (O.T.P.)

FROM PALESTINE (Gen. Sir A. Cunningham)

TO S. OF S., COLONIES.

D. 16th July, 1947.
R. 16th " 22.50 hrs. [6423]

IMMEDIATE

No. 1348 Top Secret and Personal.

Chairman of UNSCOP has asked me whether he can have any documents which would assist them, particularly with reference to partition. I propose therefore, if you agree, to issue Harris Memorandum as a confidential document. I was also asked whether they could have working out of Morrison (? Grady *) Plan, which I presume referred to proceedings of Anglo-American Committee of experts and there was a general request for documents giving our experience in working out various schemes. I am therefore sending MacGillivrey home before he goes to Geneva to discuss with you what could be given. It has occurred to me that there could be no harm in glving confidentially such papers as replies of High Commissioner for Palestine to questionnaire from Secretary of State dated March, 1944, and any similar papers which may exist.

*(Corrupt group - correction being obtained)

Distributed to:-

M.S.25 Secretary of State Sir T. Lloyd Mr. I. Thomas Mr. Martin Sir C. Jeffries Mr. Blackburne Mr. Gutch

Foreign Office

Mr. Trafford Smith Mr. Mathieson. Mr. Higham Mr. Bennett Mr. Eastwood

Mr. Bigg Miss Boyd.

Mr. H. Beeley.

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